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The new increase in FDI posted brought the region’s share of global FDI flows up to 12% in 2012. Economic growth 
in the region (3%) and the high prices of natural resources have undoubtedly contributed to sustaining the level of 
foreign investment in the region over the past year.
This document offers a qualitative overview of FDI inflows and looks at the relative importance of the different 
destination sectors in the host economies, and the geographical origin of these capital flows.
The performance of FDI from Latin American and Caribbean countries is also examined, affording particular 
attention to the expansion of some of the region’s largest firms, the trans-Latins.
The report also analyses the phenomenon of FDI income, which has become increasingly significant in the past 
10 years, and takes a detailed look at FDI in the agricultural sector. 
A. Overview of foreign direct investment  
 in Latin America and the Caribbean
1. FDI flows into the region
In 2012 FDI flowing into Latin America and the Caribbean hit a new record high of US$ 174.546 billion. This is 
5.7% above the level posted in 2011 and confirms a consistent uptrend that began in 2010. These figures were set 
in a complex scenario of falling international FDI flows throughout the year (13%), to levels close to those seen in 
2009. Macroeconomic uncertainty in the United States and the European Union lay behind this fresh drop in global 
investment, which was sharpest in flows to developed countries (22.5%). The developing countries as a whole also 
saw a decline in inward FDI, although the drop was much more modest (3%).
The differing performances of FDI going to the developed countries and to the Latin American and Caribbean 
region reflected several processes. First, the economic crisis and uncertainty in the developed economies has been 
displacing investment towards emerging markets. Second, local conditions in Latin America are favourable and 
particularly attractive to global investors at present. Natural resources, especially metals, are enjoying a long price 
boom, while the region’s domestic markets have seen several years of steady growth and offer business opportunities 
for services development (telecoms, commerce and financial services).
Summary and conclusions
For the third year in a row, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean continued to attract growing flows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). The figures for 2012 were particularly significant because they were set in an 
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Figure 1 
Latin America and the Caribbean: foreign direct investment flows, 1990-2012a





































































Inward FDI flows (left scale)
Inward FDI flows as a percentage of  GDP (right scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of estimates and official figures as of 29 April 2013.
a FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus disinvestments (repatriation of capital) by foreign investors. The FDI figures do not include flows 
into the main financial centres of the Caribbean. These figures differ from those set out in the 2012 editions of the Economic Survey of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean because they show the net balance of foreign investment, that is, 
direct investment in the reporting economy (FDI) minus outward FDI.
Although the United States and the countries of the European Union continue to be the largest investors in Latin 
America, investments made by firms from Latin American countries increased substantially in 2012, to 14% of all 
FDI entering the region in the past year. Transnational corporations from the United States increased their share of 
FDI flowing into the region, while Spanish firms, which had ranked third in this respect in 2011, reduced their share 
heavily owing to divestments. 
FDI flows to South America and the Caribbean both climbed (by 12% and 39%, respectively). Flow to Central 
America were up as well, by a more modest 7%. The largest increases were in Peru (49%) and Chile (32%). Inward FDI 
also rose significantly in Colombia (up 18%) and Argentina (a 27% increase). Mexico saw a marked 38% downturn 
in inward FDI, to the lowest figure since 1999. Brazil again received the largest share of FDI flowing into the region 
(38%), and Chile became the second largest recipient in 2012. 
The sectoral composition of FDI entering Latin America and the Caribbean is particularly significant, because it 
indicates the extent to which investment is either driving change in the region’s production structure or entrenching 
existing specialization patterns. In 2012, the sectoral distribution of FDI for the region as a whole was similar to the 
average for the past five years, although the share going to services (the largest destination sector) edged up to 44% 
of the total in 2012. Manufacturing slid slightly but continues to represent 30% of the total. The proportion going to 
sectors based on natural resources was the same in 2012 (26%) as during 2007-2011. Patterns vary widely among the 
subregions, however. In South America (excluding Brazil), the pattern has been one of increasing concentration of FDI 
in natural-resource-based sectors (in particular mining), which are the prime FDI destination (51% in 2012), while 
manufacturing and services accounted for 12% and 37%, respectively. In Brazil, the manufacturing sector represents a 
significant percentage of inward FDI, at 38% of the total in 2012. However, this is lower than the average for the past 
five years. By contrast, natural resources were still a relatively small draw for FDI in Brazil in 2012 (13% of the total).
Natural resources account for a smaller share of FDI in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, as well, 
and have tended to hold steady: 10% in 2012 and over the previous five years. Manufacturing, conversely, despite 
the decline in absolute values in Mexico, was again the largest recipient of FDI (48% of the total). As for services, 
their share dropped sharply from 55% in 2007-2011 to 42% in 2012. In this group of countries, the primary sector 
receives a substantial share in some economies of the Caribbean, such as Trinidad and Tobago and the Dominican 
Republic. In Mexico the proportion of FDI to this sector is very small because both mining and hydrocarbon extraction 
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These investments can have a significant effect on the entrenchment or diversification of production patterns, 
because of the substantial impact of FDI on host economies, measured approximately as the ratio of FDI to GDP. 
In 2012, the region captured flows equivalent to 3% of GDP (slightly more than in 2011). Chile stands out with an 
FDI-to-GDP ratio of 11.3% in 2012. 
Figure 2 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): inward foreign  
direct investment, 2011-2012













Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of preliminary figures and official estimates at 25 April March 2013.
The growing share of reinvested earnings —averaging 42% of total FDI flows over the past five years— in total 
FDI could be strengthening the tendency towards entrenching sectoral profiles. In 2012, the reinvested earnings 
component rose again as a proportion of total FDI.
Transnational corporations have consolidated their presence in Latin America and the Caribbean over the years, 
especially in capital-intensive sectors, and have built up capital stocks that generate large income flows. In addition, 
the expansionary phase of the business cycle under way in the region, along with high prices for raw material exports, 
has boosted returns on those investments. Insofar as a proportion of those earnings are reinvested, they help to feed 
foreign investment growth.
Even if flows of FDI into the region continue to grow in the coming years, the flow of income on those investments 
will grow as well, reducing the net capital contribution to balances of payments. This calls for examining the 
contribution of FDI to different dimensions of performance in the host economies, including their capacity to create 
employment. In this connection, investments in expanding production capacity alone are estimated to have created 
three jobs directly for every US$ 1 million invested in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2003-2012 (no estimates 
are available on indirect job creation). 
Again, the profile of investments is important in this analysis, since the employment content of investment projects 
varies significantly between kinds of economic activity. Commerce and construction create the most jobs (seven 
per US$ 1 million invested), followed by the manufacturing industry and services (three jobs per US$ 1 million). 
Mining (including oil) creates one job for every US$ 2 million. Labour-intensive manufacturing creates seven jobs 
per US$ 1 million invested; and engineering-intensive manufacturing (including the automobile industry) creates 
four, similarly to the food industry. Other natural-resource-intensive activities (excluding food) are less employment-
intensive, creating two jobs per US$ 1 million invested.
The service sector is also quite heterogeneous. Call centres are strong job creators: 73 jobs per US$ 1 million. 
Many studies draw attention to the notable job instability in this sector, however. These activities also have low 
entry barriers and tend to change locations in order to take advantage of tax or wage benefits, because the labour 
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higher employment component than more modern ones such as financial services and information and communications 
technologies (ICTs). 
The arguments and evidence set out can inform the discussion of how important it is to consider not only the 
amount of FDI but also the features of investment projects and their alignment with the requirements of each country’s 
development agenda: more FDI does not guarantee greater job creation capacity.
2. Trans-Latins
Outward FDI by Latin American and Caribbean economies expanded in 2012 (18%) to an all-time high of US$ 49.133 
billion, following historically high figures for the past three years. These investments have come mainly from Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia and Mexico, but in 2012 came almost exclusively from Mexico and Chile. In these three years, 
trans-Latins have benefited from strong economic growth and investor confidence in the region, which has facilitated 
access to credit. In 2012, amid shrinking global FDI flows, trans-Latin firms expanded, some thanks to business 
opportunities that arose as a result of asset divestments by European firms. In fact, 7 of the 10 largest acquisitions by 
trans-Latins in 2012 consisted of assets bought from European companies. 
Mexico was the region’s largest outward investor in 2012, with US$ 25.597 billion, more than double the figure 
for 2011 and far exceeding the previous high of two years earlier. América Móvil was the prime stakeholder in this 
process, as it expanded its activities into Europe. Chilean outward investment also reached a fresh record in 2012 at 
US$ 21.09 billion, mainly in South America and principally in the retail industry, forestry and transport. Many Brazilian 
firms have continued to expand abroad, as well, and account for 7 of the 20 largest acquisitions by trans-Latins in 
2012. Apart from the annual flows of FDI, Brazil has the highest level of FDI stock —over US$ 200 billion— outside 
Latin America. Firms from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Argentina also invested abroad, although on a 
smaller scale. Data on outward FDI for the rest of the economies of the region are much more modest. 
B. Transnational company profits: 
 repatriation and reinvestment
The profits made by transnational corporations operating in Latin America and the Caribbean have increased 
by a factor of 5.5 in nine years, swelling from US$ 20.425 billion in 2002 to US$ 113.067 billion in 2011. This 
surge in profits —also known as FDI income— tends to cancel out the positive impacts of FDI inflows on the 
balance of payments. The evidence for Latin America and the Caribbean shows, in fact, that in the past few years 
outflows registered as FDI income were almost as high (92%) as inflows in the form of FDI.
One of the hallmarks of the current stage of the globalization process is that FDI income is growing faster in developing 
economies. Between 2002 and 2011, FDI income quadruped in developing regions and rose sevenfold in China, 
but only doubled in the United States, the European Union and Japan. Latin America and the Caribbean is one of 
the regions where FDI has risen the most. 
Two main factors underlie the surge in FDI income in Latin America and the Caribbean. First, the rapid build-up 
of FDI stock in the region. Although FDI flows into the region have increased steadily, the greatest impact relative to 
the size of the host economies occurred between 1996 and 2001. As State-owned assets were privatized and many 
sectors were opened up to foreign investment, inward FDI stock rose from 11% to 25% of GDP. During the decade that 
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especially from 2003 on. Measured by the return on FDI stock in the region, profitability rose from a low of 4% during 
the 2001-2002 crisis to a high of 10% in 2008, as a result of two simultaneous processes: steady economic growth 
in the region’s major economies —which drove up the profits of transnationals targeting the domestic market— and 
high prices for the region’s export commodities, which benefited firms in the natural resource sector.
Patterns of FDI income by sector draw attention to the extremely high returns obtained by corporations in the extractive 
industries, especially metal mining, in the past few years. This is also reflected in the distribution of FDI income by country 
(see figure 3). Broadly, a first group of countries, in which a large part of FDI goes to mining, have seen returns on FDI well 
above the average. At the opposite end of the spectrum are Mexico and some other countries in which FDI has gone mainly 
to the production of manufactured goods for export; here, returns on FDI have been considerably lower.
Other sectors, which target expanding domestic markets, have also achieved very high returns. These include 
financial services in Chile and the automotive industry in Brazil. In 2012 FDI income in the region was down 7% on 
2011, owing more to the impacts of the economic slowdown in Brazil than to the slight drop in prices for raw materials. 
Figure 3 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): FDI income  













































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
Not all FDI income leads to a net outflow of foreign exchange from the economy, since about half is reinvested 
in the subsidiaries where it was generated. In the countries of the region for which data are available, it is estimated 
that between 2005 and 2011 54% of earnings were repatriated and 46% reinvested. This percentage varies from one 
country to another, but it held steady throughout that period, suggesting that the global financial crisis which broke 
out in 2008 had no effect on the proportion of profits that transnational corporations remit to their head offices, at 
least for the region overall. 
FDI income has become one of the main determinants of equilibrium in the region’s overall balance of payments, 
reflecting the shift that occurred in the late 1990s in the region’s patterns of external financing. Whereas the primary source 
for foreign capital used to be loans and portfolio investment, since 2000 most foreign capital flowing into Latin America 
and the Caribbean has taken the form of FDI. As a result, FDI income is the main component of investment income and 
the main cause of the negative balance on the income account. Between 2008 and 2011, on average, US$ 100 billion 
was generated in FDI income in the region each year, compared with a goods trade surplus of just over US$ 50 billion.
The countries of the region must now consider the implications of FDI for balance-of-payments sustainability 
and the economies’ external constraints. In this regard, FDI acts at several levels: FDI flows represent income, but 
FDI income is an outflow. At the same time, the operations of transnational companies in the economy also generate 
a surplus or a deficit on the trade balance, depending on whether they are export-oriented or not. And, whereas the 
balance-of-payments impact of FDI income generated by mining activities is offset by exports, income from services 
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Another consideration is the FDI income entering the region’s economies from outward investments by trans-
Latins. For now, these firms are remitting just 11% of the income they generate abroad, but the gap has narrowed 
in the past few years and will likely continue to do so as outward FDI gathers momentum. Nevertheless, this gap 
will not close for the entire region in the foreseeable future, and while almost all the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries receive significant amounts of FDI (and therefore generate FDI income), very few of them send outward 
FDI (or receive FDI income) to a comparable degree.
A further implication of the surge in FDI income is that transnational corporations should become much more 
significant in relation to host countries’ tax takes. However, transnationals have a range of instruments at their disposal 
that enable them to transfer their profits to jurisdictions with more favourable tax treatment, perfectly legally. This 
increasingly common practice erodes the tax base and has led to incentives to limit these instruments. Thus far, only 
developed countries, mainly in Europe, have taken this sort of step, but the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
should join efforts to adapt domestic tax regulations and coordinate internationally to achieve a global pact to limit 
the more aggressive practices of transnational corporations. Furthermore, the growth of outward investments by Latin 
American countries will, unavoidably, be another source of tax base erosion, insofar as local firms can resort to the 
same instruments to reduce their tax obligations.
The effects that high FDI income could have on the Latin American and Caribbean economies will not be 
temporary. Although income may be expected to fluctuate with the domestic growth cycle and export prices, in the 
medium term it will remain much higher than it was a decade ago, because of the FDI stock built up in the region. 
This calls for an examination of the role of FDI as a source of capital for these economies and its contribution to 
growth and structural change in the region.
C. Foreign direct investment in the  
 agricultural and agro-industry sector  
 in Latin America and the Caribbean
Agriculture and agro-industry are currently the focus of a global debate on food security, energy security and 
climate change. The world population is expected to reach 9 billion by 2050; to meet the demand for food, 
agricultural production will need to increase by 70% over 2006 levels. All of these changes are creating challenges 
and opportunities in the agricultural and agro-industry sector, particularly in the case of grains, oilseeds, sugar 
cane and other flex-crops that can be used for human consumption, animal feed or making biofuels but compete 
for the same basic inputs: land and water. 
Although national statistics on FDI in the agricultural and agro-industrial sectors of the region vary widely in terms 
of availability, the information which it has been possible to obtain for 10 countries of the region indicates that 
US$ 9.255 billion in FDI entered the primary agricultural sector between 2005 and 2010, which is 2% of this group’s 
combined total inward FDI. The importance of agricultural FDI varies greatly from one economy to another. In Uruguay 
it accounts for nearly 22% of total inward FDI between 2005 and 2010. It also makes up a substantial proportion 
in Guatemala (12.5%), Costa Rica (6.7%) and Ecuador (7.3%). The data for FDI in agro-industry, referring to just six 
countries, total US$ 48.4 billion for 2005-2011. Most of these flows went to Brazil (37.9%), Mexico (35.9%) and 
Argentina (15.5%). FDI targeting the agro-industry sector in these six countries averaged 8.3% of total inward FDI 
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Studies and databases on agricultural land purchase and lease operations in the region disagree as to their 
scale and extent. However, the sources examined do agree that the land market is growing quickly and that trans-
Latin companies are playing a leading role. The governments of the countries of the region have responded to this 
phenomenon by passing legislation seeking to limit the land ownership rights of foreigners. 
Companies specializing in the production of agricultural commodities are mapping their strategies in order to 
integrate their operations along the value chain and optimize global raw materials exports. This requires meshing 
agricultural production, logistics, the maritime freight business and industrial processing in order to reduce costs 
and produce competitively. This approach is being followed by the world’s four major grain processing corporations 
(ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus), together with a wide range of other key but smaller transnationals (Glencore, 
Tereos, Mitsui Mitsubishi and Goldman Sachs) and emerging transnational corporations like the China-based Noble 
Group Limited. The pattern across countries and agro-industry chains is to acquire domestic operations (via mergers 
and acquisitions) and, to a lesser extent, enter into joint ventures with local companies and set up subsidiaries.
Trans-Latin firms have tended to develop a certain specialization based on existing comparative and competitive 
advantages; this is the case of the Brazilian meat sector companies (JBS-Friboi, BRF Foods, Marfrig and Minerva), 
which have been able to position themselves globally through acquisitions in the Southern Cone of South America, 
the United States and Australia. Apart from their competitive advantages, these firms’ internationalization process 
has been aided by a national development policy spearheaded by Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (BNDES), which has provided funding through a variety of instruments for purchases of firms abroad, 
acquisitions of local firms with subsidiaries abroad or the establishment of joint ventures with competitors. 
The vertically integrated, internationalized business model to which many firms aspire is not within the reach of all 
of them, because not all are at the same level or have the same implementation capacity. The specific characteristics 
of the different subsectors also have an impact on the degree of vertical integration at each point. The major actors 
in the sectors analysed therefore fall into four general groups: (i) transnational corporations with market positioning 
advantages; (ii) foreign companies with limited market presence; (iii) trans-Latins; and (iv) domestic enterprises.
The public policy regime and the institutional framework in general play a decisive role in promoting FDI and 
absorbing its positive domestic economic impact. The information set out in this study indicates that biofuel and 
meat industry FDI are driven not only by new market trends but also by the government incentives and regulations 
that have shaped foreign investor and trans-Latin company decision-making. 
The impact of FDI in the agricultural and agro-industry sector in terms of innovation is another area for consideration. 
The study confirms that FDI has had an impact on the biodiesel industry in Argentina and the meat industry in all 
the Southern Cone countries, whose export-oriented facilities are technologically superior to slaughter facilities 
oriented towards the domestic market. The development of trans-Latin meat companies has also had a demonstration 
effect, inasmuch as operating in more developed markets (United States and others) has introduced these firms to 
new technology which is then introduced at home, and has even led to alteration of local standards and regulations.
This study clearly shows how extensively involved transnational corporations are in agriculture in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. FDI accounts for 23% of ethanol output in Brazil; the figures are similar for soybeans in Argentina 
and the seed and fertilizer industry. This level of penetration calls for a look at how accountable these companies 
are to their host countries. Agriculture depends on fragile environmental balances, and many supply chains generate 
negative externalities that must be controlled. The most obvious case is soybean mono-cropping in Argentina, but 
the sugar sector in Brazil and meat production throughout the Southern Cone also face formidable environmental 
challenges that require new responses by transnational corporations (and national ones as well). The same can be 
said of the social challenges. It is estimated that there are about 15 million family farms in the region. They control 
approximately 400 million hectares, of which 10 million hectares are defined as subsistence farms. All this calls for 
rethinking forms of production and for firms to work with new environmental sustainability standards while building 
successful relationships all around (a win-win situation) and forging new production chain linkages with small growers 
and surrounding communities. 
Agricultural and agro-industry FDI can open substantial development opportunities, not only for the main traditional 
players, but also for small and medium-sized producers who normally have few linkages with foreign companies. It 
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help build virtuous circles of economic growth that can contribute to the stability of the region’s agricultural sector 
and further the well-being of the rural population. If this is to happen, firms, whether local or transnational, must be 
aware that they are working with humankind’s common goods —air, water, soil, climate, genomes, local knowledge 
and cultures— which essentially belong to everyone and must be preserved for future generations. As evidenced 
by some of the cases analysed —for example the Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS) standard used in soybean 
growing in Argentina and Brazil and the agro-environmental protocol of the State of São Paulo applied in the sugar 
cane sector— this process is already under way. More needs to be done, however, and in a sustained manner. This 
means assuming new commitments vis-à-vis the major global challenges, forming networks and coalitions of multiple 
public and private stakeholders, capable of generating new synergies to successfully meet these challenges and to 
contribute to a creating a new global governance based on solidarity, responsibility and democracy.
D. Concluding remarks
FDI flows into Latin America and the Caribbean expanded for the third year running to reach a new record of 
US$ 174.546 billion. This took place against a backdrop of heavily shrinking global FDI flows, making the result 
achieved in the region all the more significant.
FDI flows into the Latin American and Caribbean region are not expected to depart from the pattern of the past few 
years in 2013, with reinvestment of earnings by transnational corporations, which now represents almost half of 
inward FDI, similar to 2012. Economic growth (an estimated 3.5%) slightly over the 2012 rate will sustain earnings 
reinvestments and new investments targeting the domestic market. The recent fall in some commodity prices may 
dampen the strong growth of FDI in natural resources seen over the past few years, but will not halt projects already 
under way. ECLAC estimates that FDI flows into Latin America and the Caribbean will be between 3% down and 
7% up on 2012, this broad range being due to uncertainty over whether a recently announced large cross-border 
acquisition will materialize in 2013.
Setting aside the current conditions, sectoral patterns of FDI are leaning increasingly towards natural-resource 
exploitation, especially in South America, and are thus entrenching the region’s existing production structure. Generally 
speaking, manufacturing accounts for quite a limited share of FDI flows, except in Brazil and Mexico. 
There are no clear signs that FDI is making any significant contribution to generating new sectors or to creating 
high-tech activities in any of the countries. Yet, changing the production structure is precisely one of the most important 
needs the region is called upon to address.
The factors that have attracted FDI to the region will, in all likelihood, continue to be important in the coming 
years. Accordingly, attention should be afforded not only to the sums of FDI received, but, increasingly, to its 
characteristics and the nature of investment projects, on the one hand, and their adaptation to the needs of the 
countries’ development agendas, on the other.
It is therefore increasingly necessary to tap the region’s advantages as an FDI destination to improve the countries’ 
production matrices. This could be achieved by making greater efforts to channel part of the profits from transnationals 
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A. Introduction
For the third year in a row, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean continued to attract growing flows 
of foreign direct investment (FDI). The figures for 2012 were particularly significant because they were set in 
an international context in which global FDI flows dropped off substantially. Economic growth in the region 
(3%) and high international prices for natural resources undoubtedly helped keep FDI in the region at levels 
comparable to last year’s.
Recent growth in FDI inflows (measured in current dollars) has, for the third consecutive year, come with a higher 
FDI to GDP ratio. Although this ratio was not above 4% as it was between 1996 and 2001, FDI as a ratio of GDP for 
Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole neared 3%. 
Figure I.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean: foreign direct investment flows, 1990-2012a





































































Inward FDI flows (left scale)
Inward FDI flows as a percentage of GDP (right scale)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of estimates and official figures as of 29 April 2013.
a FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus disinvestments (repatriation of capital) by foreign investors. The FDI figures do not include flows 
into the main financial centres of the Caribbean. These figures differ from those set out in the 2012 editions of the Economic Survey of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean because they show the net balance of foreign investment, that is, 
direct investment in the reporting economy (FDI) minus outward FDI. 
In keeping with a trend that has deepened over the past 12 years, reinvested earnings account for a growing 
portion of inward FDI in the region. This trend is associated with an increase in revenue generated by FDI over the 
years and whose features, causes and implications need to be thoroughly examined.
As revenue increases, so does the capital being reinvested in the region, but it also pushes up the profits transferred 
to parent companies by subsidiaries of multinational companies operating in Latin America.
So, even if FDI flows continue to grow in the coming years, it is likely that the net capital contribution from 
foreign investment will diminish. This calls for examining the contribution of FDI in more qualitative terms, looking 
at, for example, technology spillovers, generation of linkages, contribution to the creation of new sectors, local 
entrepreneurship enhancement and the quality and quantity of jobs created.
The present chapter is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, section B gives an overview of FDI 
worldwide. Section C describes FDI patterns in Latin America and the Caribbean on the basis of official balance-
of-payments statistics. It also looks at investment flows in certain economies. Section D reviews the FDI-sending 
countries and receiving sectors. Section E provides a snapshot of the region’s countries as foreign investors, as well 
as the expanding trans-Latins. Section F weighs some of the factors related to the employment impact of FDI. Lastly, 
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B. Overview of foreign direct  
 investment worldwide
In 2012, global FDI flows fell 13% over the previous year, from US$ 1.6 trillion to US $ 1.39 trillion, just above 
the US$1.37 trillion posted in 2011 when the global economy was still reeling from the financial crisis. 
The main factor behind the drop in 2012 was the 22.5% decline in flows to the developed countries compared with 
2011. Macroeconomic uncertainty in the United States and the European Union had a marked impact on their figures, 
with inward FDI to the United States down by 25.3% and flows towards the European Union economies off by 24.8%. 
The developing countries as a whole also saw a decline in inward FDI, although the drop was much more modest 
(3.0%) than in the developed economies.
Foreign direct investment flows to the transition economies, Asia and the Pacific and the countries of the Middle 
East fell by 13.1%, 10.2% and 3.3%, respectively. The transition economies were the hardest hit, owing to their 
proximity and links to the European Union. 
Only two regions (Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean) saw inward FDI increase, by 5.5% and 7%, 
respectively. For Africa, however, the increase followed three consecutive years of decline, and Africa accounts for a 
far smaller share of global FDI flows (3.5% of the total) than does Latin America and the Caribbean.
With inward FDI falling at different rates, the share going to different groups of countries changed significantly. 
The developed countries (which in 2011 accounted for 51% of global FDI) saw their share drop to 45%. The portion 
going to the developing economies rose from 43.8% in 2011 to 49% in 2012.
The United States, despite the fall in FDI inflows, is still the main destination for FDI: US$ 175 billion, followed 
by China at US$ 120 billion. Most of the countries of Europe saw significant declines; the European Union as a whole 
posted the lowest level of inward FDI since 2004. 
Mergers and acquisitions accounted for much of the decrease in FDI flows. Such transactions dropped by 41%, 
from US$ 525.881 billion in 2011 to US$ 310.141 billion in 2012 —the lowest since 2009. 
Transnational corporations based in developed countries cut back on these transactions across the board (56% 
decline); the value of mergers and acquisitions by multinationals in developing economies climbed 10.7%.
Figure I.2 






















































Developed economies Developing and transition economies
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2012. Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (UNCTAD/WIR/2012), Geneva, July 2012; and Global Investment 
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Table I.1 
Worldwide net foreign direct investment inflows, variation and distribution, by region, 2007-2012
(Billions of dollars and percentages)







2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 a
World 1 975 1 791 1 198 1 379 1 611 1 395 -9 -33  15  17 -13  100  100  100  100  100
Developed economies 1 310 1 020  606  675  816  633 -22 -41  11  21 -22  57  51  49  51  45
European Union  854  542  357  358  431  324 -37 -34   20 -25  30  30  26  27  23
United States  216  306  144  198  234  175  42 -53  38  18 -25  17  12  14  15  13
South-East Europe and 
Commonwealth  
of Independent States b  91  121  72  75  94  81  33 -40  4  25 -13  7  6  5  6  6
Developing economies  574  651  519  629  701  680  13 -20  21  11 -3  36  43  46  44  49
Latin America and  
the Caribbean  116  139  83  124  166  175  19 -40  50  33 6
 c  8  7  9  10  12
Financial centres in  
the Caribbean d  56  71  66  64  51  59  28 -7 -4 -19  16  4  6  5  3  4
Africa  52  58  53  43  43  46  12 -9 -18   6  3  4  3  3  3
Middle East  78  92  66  59  49  47  18 -28 -11 -18 -3  5  6  4  3  3
Asia-Pacific  272  291  251  339  392  352  7 -14  35  16 -10  16  21  25  24  25
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2012. Towards a New Generation of Investment Policies (UNCTAD/WIR/2012), Geneva, July 2012; and Global Investment 
Trends Monitor, No. 11, Geneva, 2013; FDI in Figures, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Paris, 2013.
a Estimates.
b Includes the Russian Federation.
c Some Latin American and Caribbean countries did not provide data for 2012; accordingly, the growth rate was based on the 12-month variation for the most recent 
period available.
d Includes the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands.
The trend was particularly negative in the case of transnational corporations in the countries of the European Union: 
the value of mergers and acquisitions plummeted 99.7%, from US$ 117.050 billion in 2011 to just US$ 310 million 
in 2012. Companies in France, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom carried out major 
disinvestments, selling part of their assets abroad. These patterns could signal extremely defensive restructuring 
strategies adopted by transnational corporations based in developed countries (particularly in Europe) as well as low 
levels of confidence in a very uncertain and complex macroeconomic and industrial context.
Among the developing economies, the value of mergers and acquisitions on the part of transnational corporations 
based in Latin America and the Caribbean (the trans-Latins) surged 50.9%. Trans-Latins headquartered in Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile accounted for the largest share of these transactions. 
Global FDI flows could edge up in 2013 because global GDP, gross fixed capital formation and international trade 
are expected to recover, albeit slightly. Growth will be stronger in the developing economies, but if the economic 
crisis in the developed countries continues or even deepens, international FDI flows are not likely to rise until 2014 
(UNCTAD, 2013).
Table I.2 
Mergers and acquisitions by source, 2011 and 2012
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Region 2011 2012 Change
World 525 881 310 141 -41.0
Developed economies 400 929 176 292 -56.0
European Union 117 050 310 -99.7
United States 130 210 78 721 -39.5
South-Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States 13 510 8 615 -36.2
Developing economies 103 615 114 657 10.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 18 659 28 149 50.9
Africa 4 812 592 -87.7
Asia and the Pacific 80 179 85 873 7.1
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C. Inward foreign direct investment and 
 transnational companies in Latin America  
 and the Caribbean
In 2012 foreign direct investment into Latin America and the Caribbean hit a new record high of US$ 174.546 billion. 
This is 5.7% above the level posted in 2011 and confirms a consistent uptrend that began in 2010.
The figures for the region are particularly significant because they were set in a complex scenario of plummeting 
international FDI flows throughout the year. As a result, the region’s share of global FDI flows climbed from 10% of 
the total in 2011 to 12% in 2012.
A look at the subregions shows that growth was concentrated in South America (12%), the Caribbean (39%) and, 
to a lesser extent, Central America (7%), while FDI flows to Mexico declined by 38%.
Figure I.3 



























































South America Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean Total
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates at 29 April 2013.
Brazil still receives the largest share of FDI flowing into the region: 41%, despite a slight downtick in 2012. The 
largest increases were in Peru (up 49%, to US$ 12.240 billion) and Chile (whose 32% jump, to US$ 30.323 billion, 
made it the second largest recipient of inward FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean). Inward FDI also rose 
significantly in Colombia (up 18%) and Argentina (a 27% increase).
Mexico saw a marked 38% downturn in inward FDI, which reached the lowest figure since 1999.
The figures for the region as a whole reflect a growing interest in natural resources and in the domestic markets 
of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. High international prices for many of the raw materials that are 
found in abundance in some countries of the region (especially those related to metal mining) favoured the growing 
flow of investments. The return on investment in mining has remained high and has, for a number of years, outstripped 
the figure for other sectors.
The region’s continued economic growth over the past 10 years (with the exception of 2009) has led to an 
expansion of domestic markets that are increasingly attractive, particularly for the development of mass consumption 
services such as telecommunications, retail commerce and financial services. Furthermore, against an international 
backdrop of economic crises and uncertainty in many developed economies, many transnational corporations are 
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Figure I.4 











Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Argentina Peru Central America The Caribbean
2011 2012
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of preliminary figures and official estimates at 29 April 2013.
Table I.3 
Latin America and the Caribbean: foreign direct investment inflows  
by receiving country or territory, 2000-2012
(Millions of dollars and percentages)







South America 38 582 71 766 93 447 56 604 92 112 129 140 144 054 14 914 12
Argentina 4 473 6 473 9 726 4 017 7 848 9 882 12 551 2 670 27
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 342 366 513 423 643 859 1 060 201 23
Brazil 19 144 34 585 45 058 25 949 48 506 66 660 65 272 -1 388 -2
Chile 5 387 12 572 15 518 12 887 15 373 22 931 30 323 7 392 32
Colombia 4 108 9 049 10 596 7 137 6 758 13 438 15 823 2 385 18
Ecuador 539 194 1 058 306 163 641 587 -54 -8
Paraguay 59 202 209 95 228 215 273 58 27
Peru 1 870 5 491 6 924 6 431 8 455 8 233 12 240 4 007 49
Uruguay 551 1 329 2 106 1 529 2 289 2 505 2 710 205 8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 2 110 1 505 1 741 -2 169 1 849 3 778 3 216 -562 -15
Mexico 22 916 31 380 27 853 16 561 21 372 21 504 13 431 -8 073 -38
Central America 3 046 7 278 7 769 4 515 6 228 8 305 8 876 571 7
Costa Rica 747 1 896 2 078 1 347 1 466 2 157 2 265 109 5
El Salvador 311 1 551 903 366 117 385 516 130 34
Guatemala 370 745 754 600 806 1 026 1 207 181 18
Honduras 454 928 1 006 509 969 1 014 1 059 44 4
Nicaragua 229 382 626 434 508 968 810 -158 -16
Panama 935 1 777 2 402 1 259 2 363 2 755 3 020 265 10
The Caribbean 3 639 5 958 9 628 5 268 4 656 6 865 8 186 1 983 32
Antigua and Barbuda 162 341 161 85 101 68 74 6 8
Bahamas c 411 887 1 032 753 960 971 465 -375 -45
Barbados 157 476 464 247 290 532 … … …
Belize 78 150 180 113 100 99 195 96 96
Dominica 26 48 57 43 25 14 20 5 38
Dominican Republic 954 1 667 2 870 2 165 1 896 2 275 3 610 1 335 59
Grenada 69 172 141 104 64 45 33 -13 -28
Guyana 57 152 179 164 198 247 294 47 19
Haiti 33 75 30 38 150 181 179 -2 -1
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Saint Kitts and Nevis 90 141 184 136 119 112 101 -11 -10
Saint Lucia 99 277 166 152 127 116 113 -4 -3
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 52 121 159 111 97 86 126 40 46
Suriname -64 -247 -231 -93 -248 70 70 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 879 830 2 801 709 549 1 831 2 527 963 70
Total 68 183 116 382 138 698 82 948 124 368 165 815 174 546 9 394 5.7
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of preliminary figures and official estimates as of 29 April 2013. 
a Simple average.
b The Bahamas, Barbado and Mexico have not reported data for 2012; accordingly, the absolute change and the growth rate for these economies were based on the 
12-month variation for the most recent period available.
c Official data at the third quarter. 
The confidence of investors worldwide in the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean is noticeable in 
other capital flows, not just in FDI. Macroeconomic stability and resilience in the face of the 2008-2009 global crisis 
have helped drive investment portfolio flows up.1
Over the past few years, portfolio investment and other investments2 had, together, outstripped FDI (see figure I.5). 
However, the drop in other investments in 2012 pushed FDI, for the first time since 2007, back up to more than 
half of the cross-border capital flows into the region. In 2011, other investments totalled US$ 103.412 billion 
while portfolio investment stood at US$ 81.389 billion. By contrast, estimates for 2012 put other investment flows 
at US$ 26.142 billion and portfolio investment flows at US$ 127.860 billion. The rise in portfolio investment is 
attributable to the buoyancy and financial robustness of domestic markets and to low returns at the international level, 
which has spurred investment in emerging markets (ECLAC, 2011a). While FDI in the region has been an important 
source of capital over the past two decades and has never posted a negative balance, portfolio investments and other 
investments have both shown high volatility over the past 20 years and have sometimes been in negative territory. 
Figure I.5 












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Inward foreign direct investment
Inward portfolio investment
Other inward investment
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates as of 29 April 2013.
The FDI to GDP ratio increased only slightly, from 2.9% in 2011 to 3% in 2012. But it did change in those 
countries that posted the largest increases or declines in FDI. As a rule, inward FDI accounts for a larger share in 
the smaller economies —as high as 17.4% in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and 14.3% in Saint Kitts and Nevis 
in 2012. Chile stands out among the medium-sized and large economies, with an FDI to GDP ratio of 11.3% on the 
strength of a nearly four-fold increase in inward FDI since 2006. 
1 Portfolio investments are transactions in marketable securities —public or private— such as stock and bonds, as well as money market 
instruments. Investments that carry a significant degree of influence over investee management (in practice, when the shareholding 
exceeds 10%) are not regarded as portfolio investments but rather FDI.
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Figure I.6 






















































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates as of 29 April 2013.
A look at the three components of FDI (reinvested earnings, intra-company loans and capital contributions) 
in 2012 confirms the trend that began 10 years ago, with reinvested earnings accounting for a growing proportion 
(see figure I.7).
Figure I.7 













2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Capital contributionsIntra-company loans Reinvested earnings
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates as of 29 April 2013.
a The distribution of FDI by component is based on 57% of total FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean. Brazil is not included because it does not record data on 
reinvested earnings.
Capital contributions are the most variable of the three components, since most are from corporate mergers 
or acquisitions. Loans between group companies are a flexible way for allocating resources among subsidiaries 
and have made up 20% of total FDI flows over the past six years. The share of reinvested earnings has been 
growing since 2002, and they have been the largest of the three components (42% of total FDI flows) for the past 
five years. This is principally because of the consistent increase in the stock of foreign capital in the economies of 
the region relative to annual inflows. In addition, the expansionary phase of the business cycle under way in the 
region, along with high prices for raw material exports, has boosted returns on that capital. FDI income (which 
includes repatriated profits and reinvested earnings) has soared over the past 10 years and become a significant 
factor. Chapter II examines in detail the features and implications of this trend.
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Brazil
The Brazilian economy is still the primary receiver of FDI in the region: US$ 65.272 billion in 2012, slightly 
(2%) below the record high posted in 2011. This volume of investment, which is just about double the average for the 
past five years, is substantial even for an economy as large as Brazil’s. It is equivalent to 2.9% of the country’s GDP 
and 16% of its gross fixed capital formation (SOBEET 2013). 
In 2012, 81% of FDI was in the form of capital contributions. The remaining 19% was from foreign loans to 
foreign-owned companies operating in Brazil;3 these loans jumped 5% over the past year and partially offset the 4% 
decline in capital contributions. FDI flowing into Brazil is becoming somewhat atomized in that major transactions 
in excess of US$ 1 billion accounted for just 16% of total investments, versus 27% in 2011 (SOBEET 2013). 
In 2012, 21% of Brazil’s inward FDI was in the form of capital contributions from the United States, primarily to 
the communications sector and for the acquisition of AMIL (Brazil’s largest health plan operator) by United States-based 
United Health Group. The stream of capital from Europe and Asia was smaller than in 2011; flows from financial 
centres like Luxembourg and the Netherlands rose.4 
The sectoral composition of inward FDI in 2012 differs from prior-year trends. Services and natural resource-based 
activities account for a growing share as the portion going to the manufacturing industry shrinks. Service-oriented 
FDI climbed 9% over the previous year and made up 48% of total investment. This sector’s share grew significantly 
compared with prior years (36% on average between 2007 and 2011), owing to the acquisition of JPLSPE in the 
health sector (some US$ 3 billion) and the surge in investment in other services (particularly insurance, commerce 
and real estate), which are increasingly attractive thanks to improving income distribution in Brazil. 
The extractive industries took in 13% of total FDI in 2012. FDI to this sector contracted sharply in 2011 but 
rebounded in 2012, driven primarily by oil and gas extraction. Two major transactions stand out: British Gas greenfield 
investments in Sapinhoa (one of the largest fields in the Santos offshore basin) and acquisition of a 30% stake in 
Petrogal by China’s state-owned SINOPEC (US$ 4.8 billion).
Of the remaining total FDI, the manufacturing industry took in 38%, down from 47% the previous year and even 
below the 43% average for the preceding five years. The trend in industrial FDI (which dropped 19% over the past 
year) is the main reason for the slower pace of inward FDI to Brazil in 2012. But the contraction of industrial FDI in 
2012 does not necessarily reflect a trend reversal; it could rather be due to fluctuations in large-scale industrial project 
execution cycles like the new ThyssenKrupp steel plant. The drop in investment flows to the food and beverage industry 
and metal and non-metal mineral products was not offset by rising investment in the chemical and pharmaceutical 
sectors, electronic goods manufacturing and paper pulp production. 
These trends within manufacturing FDI are not enough to radically change the sectoral profile of industrial 
investment. The largest acquisitions were in activities that, in both years, accounted for more than 40% of manufacturing 
FDI: basic metal industries and food production. In the former, Argentina’s Techint Group acquired 15% of steelmaker 
Usinas Siderúrgicas de Minas Gerais (Usiminas) for US$ 2.8 billion. In the latter, the United States company General 
Mills Inc. acquired 100% of Yoki Alimentos SA.
Other economies of South America
FDI income in Argentina climbed 27% to US$ 12.551 billion, according to preliminary data.5 While capital 
contributions decreased by 9%, to US$ 3.708 billion, reinvested earnings reached US$ 7.984 billion, more than 
double the figure for the previous year. A medium-term comparison shows that capital contributions were 7% higher 
than the average for 2007-2011 and reinvested earnings posted even sharper increases. 
3 Brazil’s official statistics on FDI do not include reinvested earnings, so 100% of the country’s inward FDI refers to capital contributions 
and intra-company loans. FDI in Brazil is therefore understated.
4 A good many firms based in these financial centres are, in turn, subsidiaries whose parent companies are based in other countries. 
According to the specific literature, financial centres are called first country of origin, and where the parent company is based is called 
the ultimate country of origin.
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The sectoral composition of cumulative FDI in Argentina at year-end 2011 shows that the sector with the largest 
share of transnational corporations was the oil sector (20%), followed by mining (6%), manufacturing and agriculture 
combined (44%) and the service sector (30%). Spain was the main country of origin of investments, followed by 
the United States, the Netherlands, Brazil and Chile (BCRA, 2013). This distribution changed in 2012 with the 
nationalization of the 51% stake in YPF (Argentina’s largest oil company) held by Spain’s Repsol.6
Acquisitions and investment projects announced for 2012 are in traditional FDI sectors. The largest acquisitions 
involved changes in ownership of subsidiaries of multinational companies in the financial sector. Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) acquired 80% of Standard Bank Argentina (a subsidiary of a South African bank). 
Australia’s QBE Insurance Group acquired the insurance company of Great Britain’s HSBC Group. Brazilian ownership 
stakes in oil and food companies increased. The largest greenfield investments targeted agricultural production. For 
example, China’s Chongqing Grain Group acquired land for soybean production and is seeking to partner with the 
local group Molinos Cañuelas. Both the agricultural machinery manufacturer John Deere and seed company Monsanto 
announced greenfield investments, as did companies that already have a local presence in the automobile industry 
(Daimler AG), food production (Unilever) and the mining sector (Barrick Gold). 
In early 2013, the Brazilian mining company Vale announced its decision to shelve the Potasio Río Colorado 
potash project in Malargüe, in which it had planned to invest nearly US$ 6 billion. The decision was likely driven 
by surging local costs and is also in line with the company’s global strategy to sell off peripheral assets and focus on 
its core iron ore business in Brazil. 
In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, FDI increased by 23% in 2012, to stand at US$ 1.060 billion.
First semester data for 2012 show that FDI largely targeted the hydrocarbon sector (63%), trailed well behind by 
manufacturing (12%). FDI in other traditionally important activities contracted sharply. Such is the case with mining 
and power generation and distribution, which are areas of interest to foreign companies that have been nationalized.
In 2012, two foreign companies accounted for nearly two thirds of oil and gas production in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia: Brazil’s Petrobras and Spain’s Repsol. In May 2012, YPFB authorized Repsol to begin exploration 
in new areas and cleared Petrobras to explore for oil and gas in three reserved areas (Astillero, Sunchal and San 
Telmo) in the department of Tarija. YPFB and the foreign companies therefore invested US$ 1.593 billion in these 
operations in 2012; the figure could increase by 40% in 2013. YPFB will make 64% of these greenfield investments; 
the remaining 36% is to come from private companies: Repsol (US$ 372 million for projects like a gas treatment 
plant in the Margarita field), followed by Petrobras (US$ 179 million), France’s Total (US$ 118 million) and Argentina’s 
Pluspetrol (US$ 104 million).7
In 2012, foreign direct investment in Chile increased by 32.2%, to a new record high of US$ 30.323 billion. FDI 
doubled between 2010 and 2012, making Chile the second largest recipient (after Brazil) of FDI in Latin America 
and the Caribbean for the second year running.
According to Central Bank statistics, the Chilean economy has become key for transnational corporations operating 
in Latin America. Nearly 26% of its inward FDI is subsequently invested outside the country by Chilean subsidiaries 
of foreign companies. With some regional operations being consolidated and coordinated from Chile, it is seen as 
becoming an investment platform or an entry point to other markets in Latin America.8 
Chile is the world’s largest producer of copper, so the mining sector was its top FDI destination, at US$ 15.096 billion 
(49% of the total). In recent years, the high price of copper, together with declining ore grade and rising extraction 
costs have been strong incentives for stepping up investment in the mining sector. Chile’s mining project portfolio 
for 2012-2016 exceeds US$ 104.30 billion,9 of which US$ 58.231 billion is spearheaded by foreign companies.
The financial sector was the second largest recipient of FDI flows in 2012, with 18% of the total. In 2012, foreign 
banks accounted for 40% of the system’s assets, led by Spain’s Santander (18.6% of the market) and BBVA (7%), 
6 This transaction has not yet been included in FDI flows for 2012 (as a disinvestment) because no agreement has been reached 
on compensation.
7 See La Razón, 30 January 2013.
8 See Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras [online] http://www.inversionextranjera.cl/images/stories/pdfs/Inversion_Extranjera_en_Chile_
se_duplico_entre_2010_y_2012.pdf.
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Canada’s Scotiabank (4.9%) and Brazil’s Itaú (4.2%). In December 2011 Banco Santander sold 7.8% of its subsidiary 
in Chile for US$ 980 million. Although some of the proceeds were used to capitalize its operations in Spain, Banco 
Santander announced a US$ 380 million investment plan for Chile for 2011-2013. These funds have been allocated, 
among other things, for opening some 30 branches in major cities in Chile, enhancing customer service (especially for 
SMEs), and marketing. In January 2013 BBVA sold its 64.3% holding in Provida (the largest pension fund administrator 
in the Chilean market) for about US$ 1.3 billion to the United States company MetLife. This transaction came shortly 
after Citigroup’s exit from AFP Habitat in 2010 and the purchase of AFP Capital by Colombia’s Grupo Sura in 2011.
In the manufacturing sector, the United States company Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (the world’s largest 
producer of hydrogen) acquired 67% of Indura for some US$ 903 million. The transaction will enable Air Products 
and Chemicals to increase its market share in Latin America, mainly in industrial gases and welding equipment, and 
reduce its exposure in Europe. 
By late 2012, construction had begun on power generation, transmission and distribution projects totalling 
approximately US$ 3.40 billion. The most active foreign company has been AES from the United States; its projects 
include the Campiche and Guacolda V thermopower plants and the Alfalfal II and Las Lajas hydropower plants in 
the High Maipo. Several renewable and non-conventional energy projects are also under way. Among them are the 
wind parks Talinay, Valle de los Vientos and Tal Tal, as well as the geothermal power plant Cerro Pabellón, all led by 
Italy’s Enel Green Power. 
According to the Central Bank, the main countries of origin of investments in 2012 were the United States (19%), Spain 
(18%), Canada (12%) and Japan (8%). By regions, 16% came from Latin America itself; investments from the European 
Union dropped off sharply, mainly because of disinvestments by firms based in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
FDI in Colombia increased again in 2012, rising by 18% compared with 2011 to stand at US$ 15.823 billion. 
As in previous years, about half of this figure went to the natural resources sector, particularly the oil industry 
(US$ 5.377 billion) and the mining sector (US$ 2.250 billion). FDI received by these sectors in 2012 was similar 
to the previous year; inflows to other activities (primarily manufacturing and power) rose. Much of this increase 
was due to the acquisition of the pharmaceutical company Laboratorio Franco Colombiano (Lafrancol) by Chile’s 
Corporación Farmacéutica Recalcine (CFR) for US$ 562 million and the purchase of Empresa de Energía de Boyacá 
(EBSA) by the Canadian investment fund Brookfield for US$ 415 million. In 2012 Chile became the largest foreign 
investor in Colombia (excluding the oil sector and reinvested earnings) thanks to the two largest acquisitions made 
there as European companies sold off assets. France’s Carrefour sold its supermarket subsidiary to Cencosud for 
US$ 2.61 billion. Spain’s Santander sold its Colombian banking unit to CorpBanca for US$ 1.225 billion.
Investment inflows to Ecuador totalled US$ 587 million; 39% was in capital contributions, 51% in reinvested 
earnings and 10% in intra-company loans. Data for 2012 show a drop over the previous year that is in line with 
year-to-year fluctuations in investment amounts, with no clear trend.
In March 2013, the Government of Ecuador announced the launch of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Integration investment promotion and attraction project. The goal is to significantly increase FDI inflows to the country 
in a set of priority sectors: tourism, metalworking, energy, and services, among other industries. This programme 
is part of a broader policy package aimed at changing Ecuador’s production matrix. The four-year undertaking has 
allocated some US$ 18.5 million for increasing direct investment by between 15% and 20% and enhancing the 
production chain at the province level by identifying opportunities for production investment (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Trade and Integration, 2013).
In 2012, the main investment source countries were Mexico, China and Canada; the main receiving sector was 
natural resource exploitation. Noteworthy among the investment projects announced in 2012 were those related to 
renewable energy production (US$ 322 million from Israel’s S.D.E. Energy, Ltd. for producing power from sea waves), 
and US$ 100 million from Spain’s Isofoton, world leader in solar energy.
Paraguay received US$ 273 million in FDI in 2012. Although this represented considerable (27%) growth over 
the previous year, the flow of FDI still represents only 1.3% of Paraguay’s GDP. In recent years, services have taken 
in a large share of FDI, particularly mobile telephony, the financial sector and call centres. Among the investment 
announcements, Canada’s Rio Tinto Alcan confirmed its interest in investing up to US$4 billion in a power-intensive 
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Box I.1 
Sale of highways in Chile: strategy or urgency?
The Government of Chile has undertaken an ambitious public 
works and infrastructure concession programme, in which the 
private sector has been heavily involved through build-operate-
transfer (BOT) agreements. Between 1993 and 2012, over 
70 projects were tendered out and investments were made for 
over US$ 14.175 billion (Lagos Charme, 2012). In terms of road 
infrastructure, over 2,500 kms of urban and intercity highways 
have been built or upgraded. 
Foreign construction firms have been key actors in this process. 
Spanish companies, in particular, have provided almost 60% of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in construction (CIE, 2010). As of 
2008, some of these Spanish companies —Ferrovial, Acciona, 
ACS and OHL— began to rotate their assets, a very common 
strategy in this industry, selling off older assets in order to finance 
new projects, both in Chile and elsewhere. At the same time, the 
deepening economic crisis in Spain forced a number of these 
companies to sell assets to pay down debt. Together, these two 
factors have led to multiple changes of ownership and the entry 
of new actors into the sector (see table below). 
One of the new entrants was Abertis, also of Spain. Since 
2008 Abertis has acquired the stock of ACS, Sacyr Vallehermoso 
and OHL in six major Chilean highway concessions, with a 
combined investment of US$ 1.3 billion. 
The Colombian firm Interconexión Eléctrica SA ESP (ISA) 
had diversified geographically and by industry to enter the 
telecommunications and highway sectors in several Latin American 
countries. Between 2010 and 2011, ISA paid some US$ 510 million 
for the entire share stock of the Spanish firm Cintra, a subsidiary 
of Ferrovial, in eight segments under concession of Ruta 5, the 
main highway joining the north and south of Chile. 
Between 2006 and 2012, Atlantia of Italy (which is linked to 
the Benetton family) acquired the Costanera Norte urban highway 
from Impregilo S.p.A., also of Italy, and another four from the 
Spanish firms Sacyr Vallehermoso and Acciona. In this process 
Atlantia paid over US$ 1.9 billion and became the largest urban 
highway operator in Chile. 
Being mature, low-risk schemes that generate a long-term, 
stable cash flow, Chile’s tendered highways have attracted not 
only infrastructure management firms but also investment funds. 
Canadian investors, which already had a track record in the Chilean 
infrastructure market, became very active in this area and have 
focused on the new urban highways in the capital, Santiago. In 
2010, the first such move was the purchase of 50% of Autopista 
Central by the pension fund Alberta Investment Management 
Corp. (AIMCo) from the Swedish construction firm Skanska, 
for US$ 850 million. Thereafter, Brookfield Asset Management 
bought shares in the Vespucio Norte highway and the San 
Cristóbal Tunnel from ACS of Spain for about US$ 580 million 
(Cinco Días, 27 September 2011; and 5 October 2012). Lastly, 
the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) bought 49% 
of Grupo Costanera from Atlantia for US$ 1.145 billion (Diario 
de Fusiones y Adquisiciones, 24 April 2012). 
Chile: new actors in road infrastructure, 2013
Current owner Concession Share(percentages)
Kms under 
concession End of concession Former owner
Abertis (Spain) Autopista del Elqui 100.0 229 2022 Sacyr Vallehermoso
Rutas del Pacífico a 78.9 141 2024 Sacyr Vallehermoso 
(50%)/ACS (28.9%)
Autopista Central a 28.9 61 2031 ACS
Autopista del Sol 41.4 133 2019 OHL
Autopista Los Andes 100.0 92 2036 OHL
Autopista Los Libertadores 41.4 116 2026 OHL
770
ISA (Colombia) Talca-Chillán 67.6 193 2015 Cintra-Ferrovial
Temuco-Río Bueno 75.0 171 2023 Cintra-Ferrovial
Collipulli-Temuco 100.0 144 2024 Cintra-Ferrovial
Santiago-Talca 100.0 265 2024 Cintra-Ferrovial
Chillán- Collipulli 100.0 160 2021 Cintra-Ferrovial
933
Atlantia (Italy) Río Bueno-Puerto Montt 100.0 135 Sacyr Vallehermoso
Atlantia (50,1%) (Italy) - Canada Pension Plan 
Investment Board (CPPIB) (49.9%) (Canada)
Costanera Norte 100.0 43 2033 Impregilo S.p.A
Nororiente 100.0 22 2044 Atlantia - Sacyr Vallehermoso 
Vespucio Sur 100.0 24 2032 Atlantia – Acciona- Sacyr 
Vallehermoso
Acceso vial Aeropuerto 
Arturo Merino Benítez
100.0 10 2021 Atlantia - Sacyr Vallehermoso
Litoral Central 100.0 90 2031 Atlantia – Acciona- Sacyr 
Vallehermoso
Autopista de Los Lagos 100.0 136 2023 Atlantia – Acciona- Sacyr 
Vallehermoso
325
Brookfield (Canada) Autopista Vespucio Norte 100.0 29 2032 ACS- Hochtief
Túnel San Cristóbal 50.0 4 2035 ACS
33
Alberta Investment Management Corp. (Canada) Autopista Central 50.0 61 2031 Skanska AB
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a  These assets are operated in partnership with Banco Santander.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Andrés Lagos Charme, “Cartera de inversiones 2012-2014 y proyecciones 
a futuro”, Ministry of Public Works, Public Works Concessions Department, Santiago, November 2012 [online] http://www.concesiones.cl/publicacionesyestudios/
seminariosytalleres/Documents/Seminario_Cartera_de_Proyectos_2012_2014/Prt_Cartera_de_Proyectos_2012_2014.pdf; Foreign Investment Committee (CIE), 
“Chile: Opportunities in Infrastructure”, Santiago, October 2010 [online] http://www.inversionextranjera.cl/images/stories/pdfs/publicaciones/CIEINFRA.pdf; 
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FDI flows to Peru surged in 2012, growing by 49% over the previous year, confirming the sustained growth path 
seen over the past decade and setting a new record high. In 2012, inward FDI to Peru totalled US$ 12.240 billion 
(equivalent to 5.9% of GDP); this made the country the fourth largest recipient in Latin America, after Brazil, 
Chile and Colombia. Replicating the pattern seen in recent years, reinvested earnings (US$ 8.263 billion) was 
the predominant component of FDI in 2012, followed by capital contributions (US$ 4.637 billion). The flow of 
parent-company loans was slightly negative. The high return on FDI in companies based in Peru (chiefly in mining) 
explains why a substantial part of production capacity expansion is funded with reinvested earnings.
There are no official data on the distribution of FDI by destination sector, but reports point to the mining sector 
as the largest recipient of FDI, followed by the expanding power and communications sector and the financial sector. 
According to the Ministry of Energy and Mines, investment in the sector (largely related to foreign companies) came 
to US$ 8.55 billion in 2012. The four companies investing the most account for more than half of that amount. They 
are Minera Chinalco Perú S.A.,10 Xstrata,11 Minera Yanacocha S.R.L.,12 and Compañía Minera Antamina.13 According 
to the Government of Peru, the 47 projects in the mining investment portfolio total an estimated US$ 54.680 billion, 
made up of mining unit expansion projects (US$ 7.674 billion), projects with an environmental impact study approved 
by the Ministry of Energy and Mines (US$ 19.588 billion), and projects in the exploration phase (US$ 26.740 billion). 
The main source countries for these greenfield investments are China (22%), followed by the United States (18%) and 
Canada (16%). Copper and gold are the chief investment draws, at 64% and 13% of the total, respectively.
In 2012, Uruguay posted US$ 2.710 billion in inward FDI to resident companies. This is a key factor of the 
country’s economy, amounting to 4.1% of GDP. FDI flows in 2012 were 8% higher than those in 2011 and well above 
the average for 2007-2011. This uneven growth path can be attributed to the dynamics of large-scale investment 
projects. Sixty-one percent of investment in 2012 was in new capital contributions; 15% was from intra-company 
loans, and 23% was from reinvested earnings. Three major projects stand out among the investment announcements 
made in 2012. The IMPSA group launched the US$ 120 million Libertador I wind power generation project in the 
departments of Lavalleja and Maldonado, with an installed capacity of 50 megawatts. This investment will help 
diversify Uruguay’s energy matrix and reduce its dependence on hydroelectric power. The Spanish company Cementos 
Molins announced the 2014 start-up of a cement plant in Uruguay to supply southern Brazil; the US$ 160 million 
investment is expected to generate 200 direct jobs and 500 indirect ones. And Donald Trump announced the launch 
of a US$ 100 million real estate development project in Punta del Este.
Discussions continue between environmentalist organizations and Uruguayan government officials about 
implementation of the Aratirí project. At an estimated investment cost of US$ 3 billion, the project consists of 
opening a large iron mine and carrying out infrastructure projects that include a deepwater port. The investment 
is to be made by the Zamin Ferrous mining group. Environmental impact studies for the project are under way; 
they are particularly important because of its proximity to tourist areas.
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela received US$ 3.22 billion in FDI in 2012, 15% less than in 2011. The 
oil sector drew in 56%, with two diverging trends according to the nature of the business. While the public sector 
(state-owned enterprises) invested US$ 2.25 billion, the private sector posted net divestments totalling US$ 442 million. 
The rest of inward FDI targeted the financial sector.
Mexico and Central America 
Mexico saw a sharp drop in investment flows over the previous year: provisional data for 2012 shown FDI flows 
of US$ 12.659 billion in 2012. Over the previous 10 years, Mexico’s inward FDI had remained relatively stable (in 
nominal terms) at an average US$ 23 billion per year. The contraction impacted most sectors, but almost half of the 
decline can be attributed to a specific operation: the US$ 4.10 billion IPO of a 25% stake in the subsidiary of Spain’s 
Banco Santander.
10 Minera Chinalco Perú S.A. is a subsidiary of Aluminum Corporation of China (CHALCO).
11 British company.
12 Yanacocha was incorporated in 1992. Its shareholders are Newmont Mining Corporation (51.35%), based in Denver, United States; 
Cía. de Minas Buenaventura (43.65%), a Peruvian company; and International Finance Corporation (5%).
13 Compañía Minera Antamina S.A. is a company incorporated under Peruvian law. It is the product of a joint venture between leading 
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In 2012 most sectors saw lower FDI inflows, although there were some notable exceptions. Manufacturing as a 
whole received 28% less FDI than in 2011, but the automotive sector recorded a 75% jump, to US$ 2.430 billion. In the 
service sector, inward FDI to civil engineering projects increased over the past two years and totalled US$ 1.450 billion 
in 2012. FDI to the commerce sector was also higher than the previous year and outstripped the average for the past 
decade owing to investments in supermarkets (see figure I.8).
Figure I.8 
Mexico: FDI flows by sector, 1999-2011 and 2012
(Millions of dollars)










Yearly average 1999-2011 2012
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates.
In 2012 the manufacturing sector continued to be the strongest investment draw (56% of the total), driven by 
major acquisitions such as the US$ 2.34 billion purchase of paint company Comex by Sherwin-Williams of the United 
States. Noteworthy among the greenfield projects was Brazilian steelmaker Gerdau’s US$ 600 million investment to 
build a new structural steel plant. Caterpillar, a United States manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, 
also began construction of a new plant at an investment cost of US$ 500 million. In the service sector, Swiss insurer 
ACE Group bought ABA Seguros, Mexico’s fourth largest auto insurance company, for US$ 865 million. In the power 
generation resources sector, Japan’s Mitsubishi bought wind energy megaproject Energía Eólica Mareña (from FEMSA 
and Macquarie) for US$ 1 billion.
The Belgian group AB InBev has been unable to complete its US$ 20.1 billion acquisition of the remaining 
50% of the shares of Grupo Modelo because the company has yet to address United States Department of Justice 
reservations as to the impact on competition in the United States beer market.
In 2012 most FDI flows continued to originate in the United States (58.5% of the total), followed by Japan (13%) 
and Canada (8%). Spain, the second largest investor in Mexico in 1999-2012, posted a US$ 1.52 billion negative 
flow in 2012 owing to the Santander transaction mentioned above. 
FDI flows in Central America have regained the momentum they had in the years before the 2008 crisis, with 
some countries in the subregion (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama) reaching record levels of FDI 
in 2012. FDI to Central America as a whole grew by 7% over 2011.
The strongest growth was in El Salvador (34% increase), followed by Guatemala (18%), Panama (10%), Costa 
Rica (5%) and Honduras (4%). FDI income in Nicaragua fell by 16%.
The special ties that Mexico and the countries of Central American have with the United States mean that 
business strategies involving investments in these countries seek to establish export platforms to leverage labour 
cost and location advantages. However, investments are increasingly aimed at gaining access to specific assets. 
In recent years, the high price of metals and petroleum products has attracted the interest of foreign investors in 
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Box I.2 
Mexico: economic reforms and prospects for foreign direct investment
Mexico’s hydrocarbon, mining, power and telecommunications 
sectors are largely dominated by domestic firms, while in most 
of the large countries of the region transnational companies 
have a strong presence. Since 1999 these four sectors 
have accounted for only 9% of the FDI flowing into Mexico, 
chiefly to mining and telecommunications. By contrast, they 
account for 26% of FDI stock in Brazil, 35% in Argentina 
and 45% in Chile.
By law, hydrocarbons and power transmission and 
distribution are reserved for the State-owned companies 
PEMEX and CFE, respectively. Telecommunications and 
mining are open to competition and foreign investment; 
however, in practice they are dominated by large Mexican 
companies. Reforms announced by the new administration 
and set forth in the Pact for Mexico could create opportunities 
for FDI in these sectors over the medium term. Although 
these reforms seek to spur economic competition in all 
sectors of the economy, particularly in strategic ones such 
as telecommunications, transport, financial services and 
energy, the pact does suggest some actions targeting the 
hydrocarbons and telecommunications sectors.
The pact asserts State ownership of hydrocarbon resources 
and rules out the privatization of PEMEX assets. However, the 
administration does commit to creating competition in the 
refining, petrochemical and hydrocarbon transport segments. And 
it stresses the need to increase PEMEX’s production capacity, 
which could spur the signing of service agreements with foreign 
oil companies, a practice that has been approved since 2008 
but has been little used. Lastly, it aims to reform corporate 
governance at PEMEX to make it a “world-class” company that 
is able to compete. In the telecommunications sector, the pact 
will boost competitiveness, strengthening the regulatory body 
and preventing companies from skirting regulations by filing for 
writs of protection (amparo), among other measures. The aim is 
to enable the entry and development of other firms, changing 
the current supply structure. The reforms announced in the pact 
still have to pass the legislature, although this process is at an 
advanced stage in the case of telecommunications.
These reforms could create opportunities for domestic 
and foreign companies in some segments of the hydrocarbon 
and telecommunications sectors’ value chains. They could also 
encourage the main telecommunications company, América 
Móvil, to invest abroad, if it were forced to slow its investing in 
Mexico. With regard to PEMEX, the Pact for Mexico expresses 
the wish that “the firm remain in State ownership, but that it 
should have the ability to compete in the industry and become 
a world-class company”.
Although it is still unclear whether current restrictions 
on investing abroad will be eased, past experience shows 
that oil companies seeking to become more competitive 
have, sooner or later, diversified their operations outside their 
country of origin.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Figure I.9 














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates. 
Panama is still the principal receiver of FDI in this subregion: US$ 3.020 billion (34% of the total) in 2012. 
Although there are no official data on FDI-receiving sectors, data on mergers, acquisitions and investment projects 
announced in 2012 indicate that a large share of FDI went to services, especially logistics, energy and the 
construction industry. Noteworthy among the announcements made in 2012 are the investment by Brazil’s GMR 
Energia in the energy sector, and the investment by Denmark’s AP Moller-Maersk in maritime transport logistics. The 
Swiss company Glencore International increased its equity interest in the mining company Samref Overseas; the 
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the primary sector in the subregion. The buoyant food industry (particularly the dairy sector) was on the receiving 
end of substantial investments: Colombia’s Grupo Nutresa acquired the Central American ice cream company 
Panamanian American Franchising Corp (AFC) for US$ 110 million.
Costa Rica maintained its position as the second leading destination for FDI in Central America (26% of 
the total). According to official estimates, FDI totalled US$ 2.26 million, a 5% increase over 2011. Costa Rica 
is consistently a strong draw for greenfield projects, primarily in the services sector, in keeping with the trend 
that began in 2011 with the liberalization of activities such as telecommunications. This drove the share of FDI 
flowing to the manufacturing sector down from an average 46% during the past decade to 25% in 2012. In the 
manufacturing sector, Colombia’s Pintuco acquired the paint maker and distributor Grupo Kativo. Sealed Air 
Corporation, ArthroCare, ATEK Companies, Covidien and Nitinol Devices & Components (NDC) made investments 
related to the medical device industry. 
Forty high-technology greenfield projects in advanced manufacturing, life sciences and certain services 
accounted for 27% of inward FDI in 2012. Infosys, based in India, will establish a service centre to serve the United 
States market and support its growing operations in Latin America. EPC Ingeniería, the first Korean-owned service 
company in Costa Rica, located its new engineering and design centre there. It plans to invest US$ 3 million during 
2012-2015. The German power project developer Juwi announced a US$ 155 million investment. Other 
announcements included investments in information technology (software and technological services) and business 
services (Amazon, Honeywell, Thomson Reuters and Telefónica, among others). 
According to preliminary figures, FDI flowing into El Salvador totalled US$ 516 million in 2012. This is a 34% 
increase over 2011 and accounts for 6% of the investments made in Central America. The main receiving sectors 
were financial services (44%) and manufacturing (43%). AES, a power generation and distribution company based 
in the United States, invested US$ 26.1 million in infrastructure in 2012. Ubiquity Global Services, a business 
process outsourcing company headquartered in the United States, invested US$ 2 million in opening a call centre. 
Taiwan-based Speedtech Energy Co. (which designs and manufactures solar and LED lighting products) and the 
Government of El Salvador signed a letter of intent for a substantial investment to begin operations in the country. 
In 2012, Speedtech made an initial investment of US$ 2 million. Competition policy issues kept some of the 
investments announced (like the purchase of Digicel by América Móvil) from moving ahead. The government has 
conducted investment roadshows in Brazil, Viet Nam and countries in Central America and elsewhere. 
Guatemala received US$ 1.207 billion in FDI —18% more than in 2011 and a record high. Despite being 
the largest economy in Central America, it ranked third among the receivers of FDI flows, at 14% of the total 
for the subregion. Data by sector show that the main recipient sectors were natural resources (26%), followed 
by banking and commerce (19% each). The largest project announced in 2012 was the nearly US$ 500 million 
that the Canadian mining company Tahoe Resources plans to invest for working a silver deposit. South Korea’s 
Sollensys, which makes touch screens and cellular phones, announced a US$ 20 million investment to build a 
plant. Colombian-owned Empresa de Energía de Bogotá will invest more than US$ 300 million in expanding the 
power transmission system. In December 2011, Telefónica Guatemala announced a US$ 20 million investment 
in remodeling a number of its stores and opening two new locations as part of its domestic expansion strategy. 
In 2012, Mexico’s Grupo Herdez and Grupo Financiero Ficohsa of Honduras began operations in Guatemala. 
During 2012, Honduras received US$ 1.06 billion in FDI —a 12-year high that was 4.3% more than in 2011. 
Telecommunications continued to be the strongest draw. It took in US$ 295.4 million in 2012 (27.9% of total 
FDI for the year), and it is the economic activity that has received the most foreign capital over the past 10 years. 
However, FDI targeting telecommunications dropped 21.5% in 2012 compared with the previous year, as investment 
in this sector slowed. Most of the resources received were for expanding coverage by the main operators: Tigo and 
Claro-Digicel. The manufacturing industry (24.8%) and the offshoring outsourcing industry (15.5%) also received 
significant FDI flows.
The main source countries for these investments were the United States (19.6%), Mexico (18.1%) and Panama 
(13%). Investments from Europe contracted the most (by 4.6%). In 2012 Honduras did not receive any inward 
investments from its usual source countries, such as Guatemala and El Salvador. But the Bahamas-based Columbus 
Business Solutions acquired Telefónica Corporativa (TELECORP) and, in the manufacturing sector, AEC Narrow 
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Nicaragua received US$ 810 million in FDI, 16% less than in 2011. The strongest draws are still the energy 
sector (investment announcements included Globeleq Generation Limited’s purchase of 100% of the shares 
of the Eolo de Nicaragua S.A. project, and Puma Energy’s US$1.2 million purchase of Esso), the industrial 
sector (construction of the El Supremo Sueño de Bolívar refinery), communications (Telefónica’s approximately 
US$ 100 million investment in infrastructure) and mining (Canada’s B2Gold Corp, with its investments in La 
Libertad and El Limón). The largest investments were from the United States (36.8%), targeting metal ore extraction 
and agriculture and livestock projects. Panama accounted for 26.5% of total FDI in commercial banking; Mexico 
accounted for 18.8% of FDI in telecommunications on the strength of América Móvil’s investments in technology. 
The Caribbean
Flows of FDI into the Caribbean increased for the third year running, but remained below the high of 2008 
for the subregion.
As in 2011, most of the rise in FDI took place in the countries with an abundance of natural resources. Mining 
is an increasingly important activity in the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Suriname. For now, oil and gas are 
being exploited to an important extent only in Trinidad and Tobago, but there are major exploration activities in 
other countries, particularly Guyana, suggesting that this sector could become more relevant for the Caribbean 
economies in the future. On a smaller scale, inflows into agriculture and forestry have risen in the countries that 
are land-abundant, Guyana and Belize. 
The Dominican Republic is the largest FDI recipient in the Caribbean. FDI flows into the Dominican Republic 
grew 59% on the back of the acquisition by Anheuser-Busch InBev of Cervecería Nacional Dominicana, the 
country’s largest brewer, for US$ 1.237 billion. Even without this acquisition, however, FDI in the Dominican 
Republic would have been up on 2011, driven by increased investments in electricity, manufacturing and mining. 
This last activity continues to attract increasing amounts of FDI in the country (US$ 1.168 billion in 2012), owing 
mainly to the activities of Barrick Gold Corp., which operates the Pueblo Viejo gold mine. The electricity sector 
received US$ 305 million, mostly for wind and solar generation projects. Investment was also up in manufacturing 
in export processing zones, tourism and real estate. 
Belize received US$ 193 million in 2012, more than double the 2011 figure and 14% up on the previous high 
in 2008. All sectors gained from this surge, but natural resources received more than half of total inflows. Two 
separate investments in sugar cane (including a cogeneration power plant) were announced for a total of around 
US$ 100 million.
FDI flows into Guyana amounted to US$ 294 million in 2012, a 19% rise from 2011 and a new record. Inflows 
were concentrated in the mining industry (bauxite and gold), as well as in telecoms. Gold mining is currently 
conducted through small local operations, but companies from Canada are in the exploration phase, with a view 
to investing in large scale operations. There are also prospects for oil exploration which, if confirmed, could boost 
FDI levels in the coming years.
Suriname reports FDI data only for the bauxite mining sector, which received US$ 70 million in 2012. In 
addition, however, apart from FDI in different services sectors (which could easily match that entering Guyana), 
significant investment has gone to gold mining, including the expansion of the Gross Rosebel gold mine (95% owned 
by IAMGOLD of Canada) and the development of the Merian gold mine, the latter in a joint venture between two 
mining companies based in the United States. Bank of Baroda of India announced a US$ 33.5 million investment 
in Suriname in January 2012, as well.
FDI flows into Trinidad and Tobago stood at US$ 1.831 billion in 2011 and reached US$ 2.527 billion in 
2012,14 with the oil and gas sector accounting for 91%. The country has seen oil and gas exports decline in the past 
few years owing to lack of new investments, but contract awards for exploitation of oil fields, which are assigned 
by the government in a bidding process, have been picking up in 2012 and are expected to boost FDI levels in 
the coming years. In the services sector, New India Assurance made an investment of US$ 44.4 million in 2012. 
Reinvested earnings represent 80% of FDI in Trinidad and Tobago. 







Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2012
Those economies of the Caribbean which have limited natural resources received less FDI in 2012 than 
in the previous year, and less than half of the inflows received in 2006, 2007 and 2008. Although tourism 
arrivals picked up again in 2012 after several years of decline following the financial crisis of 2008 (ECLAC, 
2012), this has not been enough to entice investors into new projects. Recent years have brought increasing 
investments in business processing outsourcing (BPO) activities, which the governments have been pursuing 
aggressively with generous tax concessions. Investors have been attracted by low wage levels, relatively 
skilled, English-speaking populations, location advantages relative to the United States and much improved 
broadband connectivity following investments by newly arrived telecoms operators in the past few years. The 
levels of investment in this industry are necessarily low, given its very low capital intensity, but the resultant 
employment creation is important for some of these economies, with Jamaica and Guyana having an estimated 
3,000 jobs each in BPO centres.
In 2012, US$ 381 million of FDI flowed into Jamaica, 75% more than the previous year but still far lower 
than the annual average for the previous decade. Both mining and tourism, which once accounted for much 
of FDI, have been receiving a fraction of the sums they used to. Mining has been affected by lower aluminum 
prices worldwide, which reduced demand for bauxite, while the tourist sector is still absorbing the new capacity 
created by some large investments in 2003-2009. In the past two years, telecommunications have been the 
largest recipient, as new entrants Digicel (from Ireland) and Columbus (from Canada) have captured the market 
from the incumbent Cable and Wireless (from the United Kingdom). 
The Bahamas received US$ 595 million in FDI in 2012, less than half the level of the previous year. A similar 
trend may be expected for Barbados, which has yet to report data for 2012. Both these economies are highly 
dependent on tourism, which has been badly affected by the economic crisis since 2009. Nevertheless, there 
are investment projects in both countries worth mentioning. While in the Bahamas the Baha Mar project has 
reached the implementation phase (see box I.2 in Foreign Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2011), 
in Barbados a Four Seasons resort project that had to be abandoned after the financial crisis was reinitiated with 
assistance from the Government of Barbados and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 
FDI flows into the economies that form the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) totalled 
US$ 465 million in 2012, a 5% increase with respect to 2011 although again far below previous record years. 
Official estimates suggest that most FDI entering these economies goes to tourism and related activities, such as 
real estate and construction. Some individual projects have been identified in this sector, such as a Park Hyatt 
Hotel in Saint Kitts and Nevis, with an estimated investment of US$ 64 million financed mostly through individual 
investments in exchange for Saint Kitts and Nevis citizenship. A similar level of investment is expected for the 
construction of United Kingdom-owned Hotel Chocolat in Saint Lucia. In the electricity sector, Light & Power 
Holdings (LPH) of Barbados has signed a letter of intent to purchase a controlling share of Dominica Electricity 
Services from United States-based WRB Enterprises, and this deal should be completed during 2013.15
By individual country, FDI flows declined in Saint Lucia (to US$ 113 million), Saint Kitts and Nevis 
(US$ 101 million) and Grenada (US$ 33 million), but rose in Antigua and Barbuda (US$ 74 million), Dominica 
(US$ 20 million) and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (US$ 126 million). Anguilla and Montserrat, which are 
members of OECS and associate members of ECLAC, are discussed in box I.3.
Haiti received US$ 179 million in FDI, practically the same amount as in 2011. FDI flows into Haiti remain 
relatively limited owing to the economy’s small size, modest growth and poor competitiveness. Nevertheless, low 
wages and preferential access to the United States market have attracted some investments in export-processing 
manufacturing, most recently in the Caracol industrial park. In services, Best Western of the United States and 
Occidental of Spain are opening hotels in the country.
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Box I.3 
FDI in ECLAC associate member States in the Caribbean
In addition to the member States which are regularly covered 
in this report, 12 other economies in the Caribbean, which are 
not fully independent States, are associate members of ECLAC: 
Anguilla, Aruba, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Curaçao, Guadaloupe, Martinique, Montserrat, Puerto 
Rico, Turks and Caicos Islands and the United States Virgin 
Islands. Except for Guadaloupe and Martinique, which use the 
euro, all other economies either use the United States dollar 
or peg their currencies to it.
Besides their currency status, these economies vary widely 
in terms of size and economic activity. Most are service-based 
and small, even for the Caribbean, but some are relatively 
large and therefore can be significant for corporate investment 
strategies in the region. Guadeloupe and Martinique have 
larger economies (with GDP of around US$ 10 billion each) 
than any other English-speaking Caribbean country except 
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica but, as French overseas 
departments, they do not keep separate FDI records. FDI 
data for the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands are 
distorted by their status as offshore financial centres, while 
the United States Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos 
Islands do not report these data. Table 1 represents the most 
up-to-date information available concerning flows of FDI into 
the other economies. 







2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Anguilla  15  288 29 87 117 142 119 99 44 11 38 18
Aruba a  107  2 677 161 -106 -209 222 -477 16 -31 159 470 -228
Bermuda  65  5 973 … … … 368 1 016 267 208 705 -337 222
Curaçao a  142  3 017 20 39 75 -39 419 476 209 33 -49 20
Montserrat  6  62 2 2 5 4 7 13 3 4 3 3
Puerto Rico  b  3 749  101 496 1 869 2 105 2 656 3 345 4 230 13 313 9 701 5 707 1 446 2 356
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of from UNStats, World Bank, UNCTAD and national sources.
a  Prior to 2010, data for Curaçao refer to the Netherlands Antilles, of which Curaçao was the largest island.
b  Data for Puerto Rico refer to “long-term investments” rather than FDI. 
Puerto Rico is by far the largest economy and the 
foremost recipient of investments in the Caribbean. Puerto 
Rico is attractive to international investors, particularly since 
it can act as a bridge between the United States market and 
the markets of Latin America and the Caribbean. In 2012 the 
island received US$ 2.356 billion in FDI, 63% up on the 2011 
figure but far short of the average inflows for 2006-2010. LGI 
Broadband Operations of the United States purchased San 
Juan Cable LLC for US$ 585 million and the Caribbean Property 
Group, also of the United States, invested US$ 347 million 
in assets held by Banco Popular of Puerto Rico. In addition, 
América Móvil announced a significant investment (estimated 
at US$ 240 million) through its Claro subsidiary and several 
companies announced expansions of their pharmaceutical 
facilities on the island (totalling an estimated US$ 390 million).
Bermuda also benefits from its status as an offshore 
financial centre and received several large investments during 
2012, including the acquisitions of an oil and gas exploration 
company for US$ 196 million and of two different insurance 
companies, totalling US$ 492 million. Two very large deals pending 
in the insurance and hospitality industries, respectively, may 
significantly boost the 2013 FDI figures, with their combined 
value of US$ 4.7 billion.
The economies of Dutch-speaking Aruba and Curaçao 
are both relatively dependent on tourism and thus rely on the 
international tides of tourism flows. Accordingly, Curaçao’s FDI 
figures for the first three quarters in 2012 were similar (-3%) to 
the prior-year period. However, the sale of LMA International NV, 
which was completed in the fourth quarter, is expected to lift 
the figure for the year overall. In Aruba, the flow of investment 
was affected in particular by the closure of the Valero refinery. 
Although the former refinery may be refurbished for different 
uses, it nevertheless represents a significant divestment.
Lastly, the two OECS members represent only a very small 
share of FDI in the subregion. In Anguilla, FDI inflows fell to 
US$ 18.3 million, less than for any year since 2003, bar 2010, 
despite an uptick in tourism-related FDI. While 2012 was thus 
not a good year, in 2013, the government signed a memorandum 
of understanding with AJ Capital of the United States for a 
US$ 20 million hotel investment. Montserrat continues to receive 
little in terms of FDI, as volcanic activity persists on the island. 
Nevertheless, inflows rose 36% year-on-year, to US$ 3.4 million.
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D. Patterns of origin and destination  
 of foreign direct investment
The United States and the countries of the European Union are still the largest source of investment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. However, 2012 saw a sharp rise in the share of FDI flows from the countries of the 
region, bringing them up to 14% of the total.
In 2012, transnational corporations based in the United States were the source of 24% of inward FDI in the region, 
a higher share than in the past five years. Transnational companies based in the Netherlands were the second largest 
source of FDI (11% of the total), although it is estimated that most of these flows were originally from companies 
headquartered in other countries.16 Investments from Spain (the third-ranked source country in 2011) dropped sharply, 
to 5% of the total (see figure I.10) Several disinvestments contributed to this decline, particularly the public offering 
of 25% of Banco Sandander’s subsidiary in Mexico, for US$ 4.1 billion.
Figure I.10 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates at 29 April 2013.
a  FDI in this figure accounts for 66% of total FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean. “Others” refers to data on other countries and to flows without an 
identifiable source.
A high percentage of inward FDI in the region cannot be identified as coming from a specific source economy. 
This is because transnational corporations increasingly channel their investments abroad through subsidiaries 
in third countries. In addition to the Netherlands, much of the FDI flowing into many countries of the region is 
registered as coming from the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands or Luxembourg. A number of countries 
of the region do not disclose this information, or the data they do provide is incomplete or late. For these two 
reasons it is especially difficult to estimate the share of the region’s inward FDI that is sourced in China. Most of 
it is channelled through third countries and, in 2012, was concentrated in countries like the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Peru that do not report data.
In 2012, the sectoral distribution of FDI for the region as a whole was similar to the average for the past five 
years, although the share going to services (the largest destination sector) edged up to 44% of the total in 2012. 
Manufacturing slid slightly but still accounts for 30% of the total. The proportion going to sectors based on natural 
16 For cumulative FDI to Brazil at year-end 2010, an estimated 91% of per cent of the investments identified in the first instance as coming 
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resources was the same in 2012 (26%) as during 2007-2011. Patterns vary widely among the subregions, though, 
and have consolidated over time.
In South America (without Brazil), the pattern has been one of increasing concentration of FDI in natural resource-
based sectors (in particular mining), which are by far the prime FDI destination. Their share of FDI reached 51% in 
2012 after averaging 44% over the previous five years. This is reflected in the proportion of total inward investment 
targeting manufacturing and services (12% and 37%, respectively). These percentages are lower than the average 
for 2007-2011, although the trend towards a higher concentration of FDI towards natural resources in this group of 
countries was already well established in 2011.
Figure I.11 
Latin America and the Caribbean: sectoral distribution of foreign direct investment  
by subregion, 2007-2011 and 2012
(Percentages)
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In Brazil, the manufacturing sector continues to account for a substantial percentage of inward FDI, at 38% of 
the total in 2012. However, this is lower than the average for the previous five years. By contrast, natural resources 
were still a relatively small draw for FDI in Brazil in 2012 (13% of the total), and services have surged to 48% of the 
total inflow of investment (compared with 44% in 2011 and an average of 34% in 2007-2011).
Natural resources account for a smaller share in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean as well and have 
tended to hold steady: 10% in 2012 and over the previous five years. Manufacturing, despite the decline in absolute 
values in Mexico, continues to be the largest recipient of FDI (48% of the total). The portion targeting services has 
dropped sharply, from 55% in 2007-2011 to 42% in 2012.
In this group of countries, the primary sector receives a substantial share in some economies of the Caribbean, 
such as the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago. In Mexico the proportion of FDI flowing to this sector is 
not large, because both mining and hydrocarbon extraction are in the hands of domestic groups.
In all the countries of the region, agriculture (despite being an important sector) receives very little FDI. 
Nevertheless, there are some activities and subsectors in which transnational firms have a substantial presence, as 
will be seen in chapter III. 
Beyond the official FDI figures, data on mergers and acquisitions yield a more comprehensive picture of which 
countries are investing in the region and in what sectors. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions targeting Latin 
America and the Caribbean totalled US$ 57.70 billion in 2012, 34% lower than the previous year. This decline is due 
primarily to the 12% decrease in the number of deals and, especially, to the 65.7% drop in the value of acquisitions 
by multinationals from European Union countries. The value of mergers and acquisitions by United States companies 
also fell (by 18.4%), as did transactions by companies in other regions of the world (60.1% decrease). The value of 
mergers and acquisitions in the region carried out by trans-Latin companies jumped 139.3%, from US$ 8.90 billion 
in 2011 to US$ 21.30 billion in 2012. Such companies thus became the main source of mergers and acquisitions in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, although this increase did not offset the fall in the value of transactions originating 
in other countries of the world. 
Table I.4 
Latin America and the Caribbean: ten largest cross-border mergers or acquisitions, 2012
(Millions of dollars)
  Company Country of origin Assets acquired Seller located in Assets located in Sector Amount
1 LATAM  Chile and Brazil Merger of LAN and TAM Chile and Brazil Chile and Brazil Transport 6 502
2 Sinopec China Petrogal (30%) Portugal Brazil Oil 4 800
3 United Health Group United States JPLSPE Empreendimentos (85.5%) Brazil Brazil Health services 3 199
4 Techint Argentina Usiminas (15%) Brazil Brazil Steel 2 823
5 Cencosud Chile Carrefour Colombia France Colombia Commerce 2 614
6 Abertis Spain Partícipes Spain Brazil Construction 1 667
7 Experian Ireland Serasa (30%) Brazil Brazil Financial 1 530
8 AmBev Belgium Cerveceria Nacional Dominicana (51%) Dominican Republic Dominican Republic Food and beverages 1 237
9 Corpbanca Chile Banco Santander Colombia Spain Colombia Financial 1 225
10 Canada Pension Plan Canada Grupo Costanera (50%) Italy Chile Infrastructure 1 174
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Thomson Reuters.
The drop in the total value of mergers and acquisitions was also reflected in the amounts of individual operations. 
They were, on average, substantially lower than in 2011: US$ 78 million versus US$ 104 million, respectively. 
Other than the merger of LAN and TAM (US$ 6 billion), no single transaction exceeded US$ 5 billion, unlike what 
happened, for example, in 2010.17
17 Among the major mergers and acquisitions in 2010 were a US$ 9.742 billion deal (the purchase of Brazil’s telecommunications company 
Vivo by Telefónica S.A. of Spain), the US$ 7.325 billion acquisition of Mexico’s FEMSA Cerveza by Heineken of the Netherlands, and 
the purchase of Repsol YPF Brasil S.A. by China’s Sinopec group, for US$ 7.10 billion. The only deal in excess of US$ 5 billion in 2011 
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E. The trans-Latins and outward foreign  
 direct investment from the region 
Outward FDI originating in the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 18% between 
2011 and 2012, to stand at US$ 49.133 billion (see figure I.12). This is 5% above the previous high, set in 2010. 
Direct investments abroad from individual countries vary widely from year to year because the number of major 
trans-Latins behind these flows is still small and the aggregate figures are very project-sensitive. Nevertheless, 
outward FDI flows from the region have held at historically high levels over the past three years. During the past 
decade, the great majority of investments abroad originated in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. In 2012, 
however virtually all of them were sourced in Mexico and Chile.
Figure I.12 


























































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates at 29 April 2013.
Trans-Latins have, over the past three years, benefited from the region’s healthy economic growth (which 
kept them profitable) and from investor confidence in the economies of the region (which facilitated their access 
to credit). Although global FDI flows fell off in 2012, the trans-Latins have stepped up their pace of international 
expansion. In some cases this was because other companies, mainly European ones, opted to slow their own 
investments and to shed assets. Many trans-Latins took advantage of this scenario in 2012 to expand in Europe 
and in other markets.
This trend is clear in the list of major corporate mergers and acquisitions undertaken by trans-Latins in 2012. 
Seven of the ten largest acquisitions were of assets held by European companies. In some cases, the European 
company was taken over by a Latin American group or the latter purchased a controlling interest (as did Brazil’s 
Camargo Correa with Cimpor in Portugal). But in most of these transactions, the selling company regarded the 
assets sold as peripheral or non-strategic ones that could therefore be sold to improve its balance sheet or undertake 
other investments. Such was the case with the Colombian operations of French retail group Carrefour and Spain’s 
Banco Santander, or the Central American subsidiaries of the British bank HSBC.
Mexico was the country of the region that most invested abroad in 2012. Outward investments from Mexico 
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two years earlier. América Móvil, Mexico’s largest trans-Latin, was the primary (but not the only) driver behind 
this increase. After focusing its international expansion efforts on Latin America, where, together with Spain’s 
Telefónica, it leads the telecommunications market (ECLAC, 2011b), in 2012 América Móvil decided to diversify 
towards Europe and acquired substantial stakes in telephone operators in Austria and the Netherlands, for a total 
of US$ 4.48 billion. Half of its profits still come from Mexico, but its ongoing expansion abroad, now extended to 
Europe, and possible regulatory changes in Mexico (see box I.2) could bring down this percentage and contribute 
to the internationalization of profits. 
Mexico does not publish disaggregated data on outward FDI that would allow a breakdown by destination 
sectors and countries. In any event, data on mergers and acquisitions show that Mexican investments, while still 
chiefly targeting the United States and other markets in Latin America, are also venturing into Europe and other 
regions. In addition to new acquisitions, Mexico’s major trans-Latins continue to announce investments abroad. 
Among them, Grupo México invested US$ 134 million in its mining operations in Peru; Bimbo opened a new 
plant in Brazil and one in Argentina; Gruma inaugurated a facility in the United States; and Cinépolis (the fourth 
largest movie theatre chain in the world) announced early this year the opening of 350 theatres in Brazil, Colombia, 
India and the United States. 
Table I.5 
Main cross-border acquisitions by trans-Latins, 2012
(Millions of dollars)
  Company Country of origin Assets acquired Seller located in Sector Amount
1 LAN and TAM Chile and Brazil Merger Chile and Brazil Transport 6 502
2 Camargo Correa Brazil CIMPOR Cimentos (40%) Portugal Cement 4 097
3 América Móvil Mexico Koninklijke KPN (23%) Netherlands Telecom 3 380
4 Techint Argentina Usiminas (15%) Brazil Steel 2 823
5 Cencosud Chile Carrefour Colombia France Commerce 2 614
6 Grupo Safra Brazil Bank Sarasin & Cie Netherlands Financial 2 087
7 Iochpe-Mexion Brazil Hayes Lemmerz International United States Automobile 1 317
8 Corpbanca Chile Banco Santander Colombia Spain Financial 1 225
9 América Móvil Mexico Telekom Austria (16%) Austria Telecommunications 1 103
10 Banco Davivienda Colombia HSBC assets in Central America United Kingdom Financial 801
11 Cielo SA Brazil Merchant e-Solutions United States Financial 670
12 Grupo Elektra Mexico Advance America United States Financial 656
13 CSN Brazil Stahlwerk Thueringen Spain Iron and steel 632
14 BTG Pactual Brazil Celfin Capital Chile Finance 600
15 Techint Argentina Confab Industrial (56%) Brazil Iron and steel 567
16 Banco Inbursa Mexico Caixa Bank (offices) Spain Finance 566
17 CFR Chile Lafrancol Colombia Pharmaceutical 562
18 Cencosud Chile Prezunic Brazil Commerce 495
19 Cencosud Chile Jumbo Retail Argentina (39%) Argentina Commerce 484
20 Tupy SA Brazil Cifunsa Diesel and Technocast Mexico Iron and steel 439
21 Molymet Chile Molycorp Inc (15%) United States Mining 390
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Thomson Reuters.
Table I.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean (major economies): outward foreign direct investment, 2000-2012
(Millions of dollars)
  2000-2005 a 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Argentina 533 2 439 1 504 1 391 712 965 1 488 1 089
Brazil 2 513 28 202 7 067 20 457 -10 084 11 588 -1 029 -2 821
Chile 1 988 2 212 4 852 9 151 7 233 9 461 20 373 21 090
Colombia 1 157 1 098 913 2 486 3 348 6 842 8 280 -248
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 809 1 524 33 1 150 1 838 2 671 -1 141 2 460
Mexico 2 909 5 758 8 256 1 157 8 464 15 045 12 139 25 597
Latin America and the Caribbean 10 375 42 017 23 558 37 600 12 095 46 913 41 742 49 133
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and estimates at 29 April 2013.
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Chilean companies invested US$ 21.090 billion abroad in 2012. This is a new record and more than twice the 
figure for just two years ago. Chilean companies are still focusing their expansion efforts on other South American 
countries; some have become regional leaders in the retail, forestry and transport sectors. The most recent case is 
the merger of Chilean airline LAN with Brazil’s TAM, which had been announced in 2010 but was not completed 
until 2012. The US$ 6.502 billion transaction via a stock swap created LATAM, a binational airline that is now the 
largest carrier in Latin America.18 Another Chilean company that consolidated its leading position in the region 
in 2012 is Cencosud, by means of new acquisitions in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia.
Chilean companies have benefited from several years of strong economic growth, both in the domestic market 
and in the main foreign markets where they operate (especially Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru). Despite 
some recent acquisitions by Chilean companies in the United States and Europe, these groups are just starting to 
expand beyond South America.
Outward FDI flows from Brazil were negative for the second year in a row, at US$ 2.821 billion. This is 
the outcome of the funding strategy followed by Brazilian trans-Latins: channelling foreign subsidiary loans 
to parent companies in order to avoid Brazil’s higher interest rates. For this reason, the intra-company loan 
component of Brazilian investment abroad has been negative since 2009 and totalled US$ 20.562 billion 
in 2011. In 2012 the negative intra-company loan balance shrank to US$ 10.377 billion, but the capital 
component declined sharply as well, to US$ 7.555 billion (61% less than in 2011). This indicates that Brazilian 
companies invested less abroad than in previous years and that, in some cases, they have also increased the 
sale of assets abroad (divestments). 
The mining company Vale and the oil company Petrobras (two of the largest Brazilian trans-Latins) are 
following an explicit divestment strategy involving the global sell-off of non-core assets, most of which are 
outside Brazil. In 2012, Vale sold US$ 1.167 billion in overseas assets, including manganese operations in 
Europe, coal mines in Colombia and ore carrier ships. Other major mining companies that are direct competitors 
of Vale, like Río Tinto and BHP Billiton, are following similar strategies to face rising costs and shrinking 
operating margins.19 This strategy will probably continue in 2013: Vale announced the sale of Sudbury Mines 
in Canada for US$ 1.2 billion. 
Petrobras’s ambitious programme for investing in pre-salt oilfields in Brazil has forced it to cancel some foreign 
investment projects. In 2012 the company announced asset sales totalling as much as US$ 7 billion, but most 
have not yet been carried out. Divestments during 2012-2016 are expected to amount to US$ 15 billion, including 
refineries in the United States and Japan and operating fields in Nigeria. Petrobras’s divestment programme is so 
large that FDI outflows from Brazil should continue to be modest over the next few years.
Nevertheless, many Brazilian companies have continued to expand abroad. Seven of the twenty largest foreign 
acquisitions by trans-Latins in 2012 were by Brazilian companies, including Camargo Correa’s purchase of a 
40% stake in Portuguese cement manufacturer Cimpor. Beyond annual FDI flows, Brazil has the highest level of 
outward FDI stock in Latin America: more than US$ 200 billion. This figure is more than twice that of Chile and 
50% higher than for Mexico, indicating that, on the whole, Brazilian trans-Latins hold more assets abroad than 
companies based in these other countries do.
In addition to Brazil, Chile and Mexico, other countries with high levels of outward FDI were the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela (US$ 2.460 billion) and Argentina (US$ 1.089 billion). The state-owned oil company PDVSA 
accounts for most of the FDI flowing from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In Argentina, steelmaker Techint 
accounts for the largest share. Colombia, which for two years had ranked third in the region in terms of outward 
FDI, posted slightly negative outflows in 2012. This does not indicate a radical strategy shift on the part of the major 
companies but rather a period devoted to the assimilation of assets acquired in 2010 and 2011.
Outward FDI for the rest of the economies of the region is much more modest. The exceptions are Trinidad and 
Tobago (US$ 1.332 billion) and Costa Rica, which posted US$ 426 million that included Cervecería Costa Rica’s 
US$ 388 million purchase of the United States-based North American Breweries (NAB) (see annex table I.A-5). 
18 LATAM is headquartered in Santiago and is majority Chilean-owned, although the Brazilian partners hold a majority on the board of 
directors. The transaction does not seem to have been included in official FDI data from Brazil or Chile (for statistical secrecy reasons).
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Most of the smaller economies in the region do not report outward FDI, or the data are flawed. While there 
is anecdotal evidence of FDI outflows from other countries, such as Guatemala (sugar cane sector) and Peru, 
official data are still incomplete. Panama is a special case; with some foreign companies using it as a base for their 
operations in Central America and other countries of the region, it receives and sends transit FDI. Panama does 
not report official data on outward FDI, but International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates put the figure at some 
US$ 400 million over the past two years. 
Although outward FDI levels are still very uneven among countries, the overall trend in the region is towards 
increased investment abroad. This process is a natural counterpart to the increasing flow of FDI into these economies: 
stiffer competition from transnational corporations is forcing domestic firms to seek business opportunities in other 
countries. This is a global trend. Developing and transition economies, which already receive more than half of 
global FDI flows, accounted for a third of outward FDI worldwide in 2011. Ten years earlier their share did not 
exceed 10%.
Exceptionally, foreign investments by Mexican companies were more than twice the figure for FDI flowing 
into Mexico in 2012. Taking a longer view, during 2007-2001 outward FDI was 34% of inward FDI for Mexico, 
45% for Colombia and 69% for Chile. For all three countries, these percentages are sharply higher than for the 
previous period (2002-2007), even though Chile and Colombia also saw a surge of inward FDI during the period. 
The trend was the opposite in Brazil; the ratio of investment abroad by Brazilian firms to the country’s outward FDI 
was smaller (13%) in 2007-2011 than in 2002-2007 (55%). This latter trend is due to the funding strategy adopted 
by Brazilian trans-Latins, which has generated negative outward flows in recent years even as these companies 
continue to increase their assets abroad.
Although most of the countries of the region have rather modest levels of outward FDI, Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico are slowly approaching a more balanced ratio between FDI inflows and outflows. The ratio of outward to 
inward FDI was in the area of 25% in 2002-2007, rising to nearly 50% the following period (see figure I.13). The 
trend is the same in China, while in other large developing economies such as India and the Russian Federation, 
the ratio between inflow and outflow has been more balanced for more than a decade.
Figure I.13 
Selected economies: cumulative outward FDI and ratio of outward  
and inward FDI, 2002-2007 and 2007-2011 
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
China 366 
India 111 






























Shrinking inward/outward FDI ratio
Colombia 31 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribben (ECLAC), on the basis of national sources and information provided by the United Nations 
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F. FDI and job creation in Latin America
After the market reforms, most of the governments of Latin America were convinced that foreign direct investment 
was an engine of development with automatic positive impacts for the receiving economy. Policies aimed at 
attracting FDI have therefore been a key outward development strategy instrument for many countries as a way 
to compensate for the lack of financial resources for upgrading, boosting production and, consequently, creating 
jobs. This approach regarded quantity as more important than quality, so countries adopted strategies aimed at 
maximizing inward FDI (ECLAC, 2012). For the labour market, FDI inflow was expected to have a beneficial 
impact on job creation, productivity, wages and working conditions in general. But experience suggests that 
the impact of FDI on the economies of receiving countries 20 depends on the type of inward investment and the 
regulatory framework in each country (Lipsey and Joholm, 2005; Dunning, 1993).
20 FDI impacts are usually classified in two kinds: (i) macroeconomic (capital formation, foreign trade, balance-of-payments financing 
and job creation) and (ii) microeconomic (productivity, innovation and linkages). Its direct impacts differ, in turn, from its spillover 
impacts, which are particularly important for dimensions such as knowledge, productivity and innovation.
One of the traits of FDI flows is the kind of strategy that leads parent companies to invest in the region. The literature 
classifies these strategies as seeking (i) raw materials; (ii) access to domestic markets; (iii) export platform efficiency 
gains; or (iv) access to strategically important assets (Dunning, 2002). These strategies are often associated with a 
certain sectoral profile, such as natural resource extraction, manufacturing, or services, and they impact the local 
labour market in different ways.
The FDI strategy focus has varied throughout the region over the past few decades. In short, natural-resource-
seeking investment has been concentrated in the countries of the Southern Cone and has surged in recent years 
owing to the high price of raw materials. Market-seeking investment has focused on the larger countries, taking 
advantage of fast-growing economies and a middle class with more purchasing power. In Mexico and Central 
America the primary strategy has been the search for export platform efficiency, mainly targeting the United States. 
(ECLAC, 2012).
FDI flows also differ in how they gain access to local production networks and impact the production profile 
and local labour markets. Foreign capital enters the picture mainly through (i) greenfield projects; (ii) privatization 
of public enterprises; or (iii) mergers and acquisitions of domestically-owned companies. Generally speaking, 
greenfield investment is aimed at building production capacities, including new lines of business, that promote 
job creation. But FDI can have negative impacts on employment when it seeks to change the ownership of existing 
production assets, which is often associated with restructuring and layoffs. It can also lead to market displacement 
of non-competitive domestic firms, substitution of local suppliers with imports or the introduction of job-saving 
technologies. When FDI targets capital-intensive sectors, even its positive impacts on direct employment tend to be 
modest. There are also different patterns of FDI access to production systems across the region. In South America it 
tends to be through acquisition or privatization; in Central America, greenfield investments are the primary route 
(Ernst, Berg and Auer, 2007; Chudnosvsky and López, 2007).
More productive enterprises would be in a position to pay higher wages and offer better working conditions in 
general. Since the 1970s, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has been issuing recommendations aimed at 
promoting best practices.21 But many studies indicate that since the 1990s multinationals venturing into Latin America 
have tended to favour job flexibility and the outsourcing of certain tasks. This contributed to precarious conditions in 
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the region’s labour markets and led to the introduction of a model that was unlike the one prevailing during the import 
substitution period and even weakened the labour relations system (Pochman, 2003; ILO, 2005; Carrillo 2010).22 
 In other words, there is no consensus, either, on the impact of FDI on job quality in the receiving countries 
according to the type of FDI and the features of labour market institutions. 
These arguments highlight the need for better, more broad-based knowledge that will help countries assess what 
types of projects would be more suitable for their local realities. A better understanding of the impact of the various 
types of investments would improve the design of policies for attracting quality FDI (for example, through investment 
agencies) and strengthen the institutions that regulate labour markets.
These arguments also show that greenfield investments would be more likely to enhance the production 
capacity of an economy and expand labour demand. But, as this section will explain, direct job creation capacity 
can vary widely across the economies of the region, even for greenfield investments.
The investment announcements in the Financial Times’ fDi Markets database make it possible to estimate, at 
least in terms of trends, the impact that greenfield FDI is likely to have on any given country’s labour market. The 
analysis is based on an indicator of direct job content in investment announcements, which is an estimate of the 
expected number of jobs generated for every US$ 1 million. Although the source is a broad database of some 10,000 
announcements between 2003 and 2012 in virtually all the countries of the region, the fact that it contains projections 
and incomplete information is a constraint for this type of study.23
With these considerations and investment announcement data in mind, it is estimated that every US$ 1 million 
invested in expanding production capacity in Latin America during 2003-2012 created three jobs. Labour-intensity 
has remained relatively stable over the past 10 years, so the number of jobs created by these investments should track 
fluctuations in the international business cycle, as do investment amounts. The job content of FDI varies substantially 
from country to country. The countries of the Caribbean can be classified into two general groups according to the 
job content of inward investments. In the group where FDI targets tourism-related activities, each US$ 1 million of 
investment is projected to generate about six jobs. This group comprises Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Haiti, Jamaica 
and Saint Lucia. As mentioned above, inward FDI over the past 10 years was oriented towards tourism-related activities 
(mainly, hotels and transport services). Call centres are major job creators in Jamaica and Saint Lucia. 
The situation is virtually the opposite in the second group of Caribbean countries (Aruba, Dominican 
Republic, Cuba, Guyana, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago). Here, investments skew heavily towards the 
financial sector, mining and some natural-resource-intensive industrial activities; every US$ 1 million can be 
expected to generate fewer than two jobs. 
Comparing the countries of Central America and Latin America also reveals sharp contrasts in terms of the sectors 
and strategies that draw FDI to local production networks. In Mexico and the countries of Central America, FDI 
patterns have a high job content, creating about four jobs per US$ 1 million of investment. In Latin America (including 
Brazil) FDI is estimated to have modest effects on job creation, generating on average 2.5 jobs per US$ 1 million 
(see figure I.14).
As explained above, sectoral FDI patterns vary among countries and regions. Location factors such as proximity 
to major markets and the availability of resources, along with domestic production structure path dependence, 
explain why greenfield investments target certain sectors. In the Caribbean and South America, nearly 60% 
of inward FDI was concentrated in extractive activities and natural-resource-intensive manufactures, while in 
Central America these represent less than 30%. By contrast, in Mexico and Central America, engineering- and 
natural-resource-intensive manufacturing industries (including the automobile and food industries, respectively) 
accounted for 54% of the investment amounts announced for the period.
22 This point is of special interest to the ILO, which argues that it is not enough to create jobs and that job quality is also a concern. 
It therefore developed the concept of decent work in an attempt to capture, in everyday language, the convergence of these four 
dimensions that define a good job: employment, labour rights, job security and representation. The underlying idea is to boost labour 
productivity, not by cutting costs but rather through specialized training.
23 The source has some limitations for a study of this kind: (i) it is based on investment announcements, which are not necessarily carried 
out; (ii) it draws on press releases, which might reflect the most optimistic project estimates; (iii) while the source is broad-based, it 
is not exhaustive; (iv) both variables (investment amount and job creation) are attributed to the year the announcement is made; and 
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Figure I.14  
Latin America and the Caribbean: subregional differences in the direct job content  
of announced FDI, 2003-2012
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on fDi Markets investment announcements.
But the sectors that receive the greatest investment in a region are not necessarily the strongest when it 
comes to employment. Job creation by sector does not mirror investment configuration, as can be seen when 
comparing the three activities that have the strongest employment impact with the three that draw the largest 
investments. In Latin America, natural-resource-intensive and engineering-intensive manufactures, along with 
commerce, account for 67% of the jobs created. In the Caribbean, 65% of all new jobs are in natural-resource-
intensive manufactures, personal services and call centres. In Mexico and Central America, natural resource- and 
engineering-intensive manufactures generate 51% of the jobs. It is only here that the sectors attracting the most 
investment create the most jobs.
These different patterns of investment amounts and job creation are likely to impact labour productivity in each 
of the economies. A scenario in which sectors receiving higher amounts of investment are driving the job market 
would be more favourable than one in which the activities that draw less investment create more jobs. 
The investment announcement job content indicator varies significantly across sectors of activity. Commerce and 
construction create the most jobs (seven per US$ 1 million invested), followed by the manufacturing industry and 
services (three jobs). Mining (including oil) creates one job for every US$ 2 million. Labour-intensive manufacturing 
creates seven jobs per US$ 1 million; for engineering-intensive manufacturing (including the automobile industry) 
the ratio is four jobs; this is similar to the food industry. Other natural-resource-intensive activities (other than food) 
are less employment-intensive, creating two jobs per US$ 1 million invested. 
The service sector is also quite heterogeneous. Call centres are strong job creators: 73 jobs per US$ 1 million. 
Many studies note their high employee turnover and low entry barriers. And they tend to relocate in order to take 
advantage of tax or wage benefits because the labour component figures heavily in their cost structure (Novick and 
others, 2011; Del Bono and Henry, 2010). Tourism-related activities (transport and personal services) have a higher 
job content than more modern ones such as financial services and information and communications technologies 
(ICT) do (see figure I.15).
Sectoral specialization has much to do with the job content of greenfield investments, but there are also other 
factors behind differences in the employment intensity of similar projects in different locations. These are: the type of 
technology used, the type of multinational company (how complex its processes are and its role in the global supply 
chain), each country’s institutions, and the local macroeconomic context (relative prices), among others.
The arguments and the evidence set out herein can inform the discussion of how important it is to consider not 
only the amount of FDI but also the features of investment projects and their alignment with the requirements of each 
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Figure I.15 
Latin America and the Caribbean: differences in direct job content of foreign direct  
investment by economic activity, 2003-2012


































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on investment announcements in fDi Markets.
Box I.4 
Argentina- and Mexico-based subsidiaries in the global value chain: some comparative outcomes
Over the past two decades, foreign investment in Argentina 
and Mexico has followed different paths. In the early 1990s 
the volume of FDI in the two countries was fairly similar: in 
fact, in 1992 they both posted just above US$ 4 billion. At that 
point FDI in Mexico began to grow faster than in Argentina, far 
outstripping it by 2010.
A breakdown of recent FDI flows highlights major differences 
across sectors in each of the countries. Investment in export 
manufactures in Mexico is still heavily skewed towards offshoring 
outsourcing (the maquila industry) and is a springboard for access 
to the United States market. This differs from FDI in Argentina, 
where the investment focus is on natural resources and services. 
Market strategies prevailing among multinational companies in 
Mexico are consistent with this pattern: more than half target 
their sales at the regional market. In Argentina, by contrast, 80% 
of the multinationals focus on domestic market sales.
As for integration in their respective value chains, most of 
the subsidiaries of multinational companies in Mexico buy and 
sell products or services from or to their parent company or 
other corporate subsidiaries. In Argentina, on the other hand, 
only a quarter of the subsidiaries engage in intra-company sales 
or purchases; 40% of the multinational companies neither 
purchase nor sell products from or to the parent company or 
other subsidiaries. 
Given their high degree of integration with their respective 
value chains, subsidiaries of multinationals located in Mexico have 
less autonomy. Only 15% of them report having considerable 
decision-making autonomy. In Argentina, on the other hand, two 
thirds of the subsidiaries have a high degree of decision-making 
autonomy, which also confirms their predominantly low degree of 
integration in the global supply chain. Despite differing degrees 
of integration in value chains, a common feature revealed by the 
comparison is the frequent use of research and development 
(R&D) resources provided by the parent company on the part of 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations in Mexico (50%) and 
among those located in Argentina (67%).
Lastly, subsidiaries of multinational companies based in these 
two countries would be expected to have differential impacts 
on employment practices and labour relations stemming from 
their different positions in their respective value chains. In this 
regard, unlike Argentina (where these companies have gradually 
adapted to the local labour relations system), in Mexico there is 
evidence of a predominantly involutional pattern with significant 
impact on trade unions.
Source: Jorge Carrillo and others, “Las filiales de la Argentina y México en la cadena global de valor”, Multinacionales en la Argentina. Estrategias de empleo, 
relaciones laborales y cadenas globales de valor, M. Novick, H. Palomino and S. Gurrera, Buenos Aires, Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social 
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G. Conclusions
FDI flowing into Latin America and the Caribbean in 2012 grew for the third consecutive year to stand at a 
record US$ 174.546 billion. This figure is all the more significant in view of the international context marked 
by plunging global FDI flows.
Inward FDI was boosted by sound economic growth over the past 10 years, as well high raw material prices and high 
returns on investment in the exploitation of natural resources.
The effects of the new uptick in FDI in 2012 are also reflected in the rising share of global flows going to Latin 
America and the Caribbean, which has reached 12%. The FDI to GDP ratio rose as well, to 3% in 2012.
The trans-Latins continue to expand; their operations abroad surged to US$ 49.133 billion in 2012, which is 5% 
above the previous record high set in 2010.
This buoyant growth is also reflected in the composition of the region’s inward FDI by source. The share coming 
from a number of developed countries (in particular those of the European Union) declined while investments originating 
in countries of Latin America and the Caribbean themselves climbed from 9% of the total in 2011 to 14% in 2012. 
FDI patterns by destination sector are, increasingly, targeting the exploitation of natural resources, in particular 
in South America. This is reinforcing the existing production structure in the region. Overall, manufacturing accounts 
for a fairly small share of inward FDI flows, with the exception of Brazil and Mexico, and the latter saw a sharp 
decline in inward investment in 2012.
In the vast majority of the countries there is no clear indication that FDI is making a relevant contribution to the 
creation of new sectors or high technology content activities. However, changing the production structure is one of 
the most pressing needs that the region must address (ECLAC, 2010 and 2012).
While the growth of FDI income helps generate a considerable flow of reinvested earnings in the receiving 
countries themselves, it is also pushing up outflows in the form of repatriated profits. These are structural aspects 
related to the build-up of FDI stocks in the region over the past 15 years. As such, they are deserving of the closer 
examination set out in chapter II.
The relationship between FDI and employment generation, as well as job quality, can also be complex, especially 
if the investments are channelled towards sectors whose impact on employment is quantitatively or qualitatively less 
positive. The evidence presented in this chapter, while preliminary, indicates that several of the sectors that are the 
strongest FDI draws in the region are not, as a whole, making a significant contribution to employment, at least not 
in relation to the amounts being invested. 
It is quite likely that the factors shaping inward FDI in the region will continue to be relevant in the coming years. 
This calls for focusing not only on amounts, but also on the nature of FDI inflows and investment projects, as well 
as their alignment with development agenda requirements at the country level.
The need to set in motion processes for modifying and diversifying the production structure so as to generate 
activities with a higher value-added and knowledge content as well as production and technology spillover capacities 
points to the potential for leveraging the region’s advantages as an FDI destination in order to improve the production 
matrix of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.
There are several different policy strategy options. One of them could be based on channelling part of the revenue 
generated by transnational companies towards the creation of funds for financing production development policies 
(targeting SMEs, manufacturing, technology and other sectors).
It might ultimately be possible to combine the establishment of such funds with targeted policies for attracting 
inward FDI. However, for this second option to be effective it will be necessary to identify projects that can actually 
help build local business capacities, boost innovation and create production linkages. There is also a need to define 
an appropriate incentive system, because the prevailing structure in the region is one in which sectors with higher 
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high degree of institutional development on the part of the agencies responsible for defining and implementing it. This 
in turn calls for a global production development project, shared and supported by economic and social stakeholders, 
that would guide FDI-related decisions.
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Annex
Table I.A-1 
Latin America and the Caribbean: inward foreign direct investment by countries, 2000-2012
(Millions of dollars)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Antigua and Barbuda a 67 112 80 179 95 238 361 341 161 85 101 68 74
Argentina 10 418 2 166 2 149 1 652 4 125 5 265 5 537 6 473 9 726 4 017 7 848 9 882 12 551
Bahamas b 301 144 181 236 529 641 843 887 1 032 753 960 971 465
Barbados 55 87 81 167 127 240 342 476 464 247 290 532 …
Belize 30 61 26 42 119 155 117 150 180 113 100 99 195
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 736 706 677 197 85 -288 281 366 513 423 643 859 1 060
Brazil 32 779 22 457 16 590 10 144 18 146 15 066 18 822 34 585 45 058 25 949 48 506 66 660 65 272
Chile 4 860 4 200 2 550 4 334 7 241 7 097 7 426 12 572 15 518 12 887 15 373 22 931 30 323
Colombia 2 436 2 542 2 134 1 720 3 016 10 252 6 656 9 049 10 596 7 137 6 758 13 438 15 823
Costa Rica 409 460 659 575 794 861 1 469 1 896 2 078 1 347 1 466 2 157 2 265
Dominica a 20 21 21 32 27 32 29 48 57 43 25 14 20
Dominican Republic 953 1 079 917 613 909 1 123 1 085 1 667 2 870 2 165 1 896 2 275 3 610
Ecuador -23 539 783 872 837 493 271 194 1 058 306 163 641 587
El Salvador 173 279 470 142 363 511 241 1 551 903 366 117 385 516
Grenada a 39 61 57 91 66 73 96 172 141 104 64 45 33
Guatemala 230 499 205 263 296 508 592 745 754 600 806 1 026 1 207
Guyana 67 56 44 26 30 77 102 152 179 164 198 247 294
Haiti 13 4 6 14 6 26 161 75 30 38 150 181 179
Honduras 382 304 275 403 547 600 669 928 1 006 509 969 1 014 1 059
Jamaica 468 614 481 721 602 682 882 866 1 437 541 228 218 381
Mexico 18 282 29 962 23 901 18 672 24 855 24 449 20 292 31 380 27 853 16 561 21 372 21 504 13 431
Nicaragua 267 150 204 201 250 241 287 382 626 434 508 968 810
Panama 624 467 99 818 1 019 962 2 557 1 777 2 402 1 259 2 363 2 755 3 020
Paraguay 104 84 10 27 38 54 95 202 209 95 228 215 273
Peru 810 1 144 2 156 1 335 1 599 2 579 3 467 5 491 6 924 6 431 8 455 8 233 12 240
Saint Kitts and Nevis a 99 90 81 78 63 104 115 141 184 136 119 112 101
Saint Lucia a 58 63 57 112 81 82 238 277 166 152 127 116 113
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines a 38 21 34 55 66 41 110 121 159 111 97 86 126
Suriname -97 -27 -74 -76 -37 28 -163 -247 -231 -93 -248 70 70
Trinidad and Tobago 680 835 791 808 998 940 883 830 2 801 709 549 1 831 2 527
Uruguay 273 297 194 416 332 847 1 493 1 329 2 106 1 529 2 289 2 505 2 710
Venezuela (Boliviarian 
Republic of) 4 701 3 683 782 2 040 1 483 2 589 -508 1 505 1 741 -2 169 1 849 3 778 3 216
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of estimates and official figures as of 29 April 2013.
a Official estimate of FDI for 2012.
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Table I.A-2 
Latin America and the Caribbean: inward foreign direct investment by destination sector, 2005-2012
(Millions of dollars)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Argentina a
Natural resources  1 766  2 536  2 470  840  751  3 155  1 082 …
Manufactures  2 890  3 041  3 286  6 528  360  5 152  5 477 …
Services  2 092  1 894  2 251  3 382  1 870  2 248  4 517 …
Belize
Natural resources 8 12 9 37 7 13 29 100
Manufactures 25 6 5 14 14 14 16 20
Services 117 84 103 113 83 68 48 69
Other 5 14 34 16 9 5 5 6
Brazil
Natural resources 1 722 1 835 4 806 15 085 7 503 18 358 6 296 9 048
Manufactures 5 411 7 851 16 074 15 791 12 810 20 416 31 664 25 649
Services 7 521 8 950 13 163 13 785 6 162 12 332 30 035 32 627
Chile b
Natural resources 595 3 384 6 607 4 625 7 092 5 012 13 787 15 198
Manufactures 199 1 149 -431 1 616 921 550 1 553 3 372
Services 1 003 2 766 6 358 8 939 5 511 9 527 7 215 10 921
Other 244 215 256 106 -1 500 -8 534 -6 992
Colombia
Natural resources 3 288 3 786 4 474 5 267 5 481 4 614 7 619 7 735
Manufactures 5 513 803 1 867 1 748 621 656 792 2 049
Services 1 451 2 067 2 709 3 605 1 035 1 488 5 027 6 040
Costa Rica 
Natural resources 37 62 1 448 68 -6 53 -11
Manufactures 375 436 722 574 412 1 003 680 575
Services 449 971 1 174 1 056 867 469 1 372 1 701
Other -1 10 4 26 22 23 1 0,0
Dominican Republic 
Natural resources 31 107 30 357 758 298 1 060 1 168
Manufactures 199 -168 184 574 280 466 355 1 384
Services 893 1 146 1 453 1 938 1 128 1 132 860 1 058
Ecuador c
Natural resources 222 -69 -77 265 45 168 378 241
Manufactures 75 90 99 206 128 123 121 140
Services 196 250 173 535 148 -134 91 205
El Salvador
Natural resources 0 29 10 5 1 1 -1 -3
Manufactures 317 17 21 28 56 -58 243 62
Services 191 182 1 315 480 165 147 143 336
Other (maquila) 4 0 101 26 72 -1 0 16
Guatemala
Natural resources 150 69 70 174 139 120 325 313
Manufactures 131 175 210 175 51 299 150 164
Services 219 328 437 369 401 363 544 674
Other 9 20 28 36 9 23 7 57
Honduras
Natural resources 53 44 11 5 12 3 46
Manufactures 270 227 384 215 103 368 392
Services 263 359 515 681 408 426 577
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Table I.A-2 (concluded)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mexico
Natural resources 229 454 1 832 4 801 875 1 286 1 078 689
Manufactures 11 067 10 102 13 608 7 851 5 674 11 590 9 820 7 045
Services 13 111 9 563 16 053 14 489 9 570 7 833 10 606 4 925
Nicaragua
Natural resources 0 15 11 49 15 39 114
Manufactures 87 63 121 122 70 108 226
Services 155 109 250 447 313 322 522
Other 0 101 0 8 36 38 105
Panama
Natural resources 0 -108 1 -59 -34 104 -6
Manufactures -62 105 129 161 104 10 34
Services 1 693 2 531 1 765 2 106 1 190 2 249 2 727
Other -696 19 2 -11 0 0 0
Paraguay
Natural resources -2 -36 -2 3 8 -5 -1 -0,4
Manufactures -16 60 8 149 -109 53 2 160
Services 53 70 196 56 195 180 214 160
Uruguay
Natural resources 264 328 338 604 253 329 384
Manufactures 26 96 263 261 242 131 190
Services 248 594 592 1 005 965 1 010 1 362
Other 310 475 136 236 69 820 568
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of estimates and official figures as of 29 April 2013.
a  Data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina.
b  FDI in 2005 corresponds to investments made under Legislative Decree 600.
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Table I.A-3 
Latin America and the Caribbean: inward foreign direct investment by country of origin, 2005-2012
(Millions of dollars)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Argentina a
United States 1 229 845 724 2 158 1 035 1 334 2 193 …
Brazil 1 234 447 859 1 573 -384 1 694 1 576 …
Switzerland 281 38 273 739 207 659 1 167 …
Chile 606 518 507 863 311 1 309 1 067 …
Denmark -67 79 24 -98 43 251 655 …
Netherlands 1 062 98 599 1 154 157 -37 573 …
Mexico 588 30 547 546 107 295 482 …
Spain 1 302 2 397 1 786 744 1 183 1 103 376 …
Brazil
United States 4 034 2 784 3 744 5 007 1 963 5 348 5 572 13 509
Netherlands 979 3 317 7 634 3 916 4 260 2 736 17 908 12 003
Luxembourg -44 397 5 864 6 292 -483 9 132 2 452 7 648
France 1 383 555 1 015 2 231 2 231 3 029 4 383 2 760
United Kingdom -68 144 1 682 375 1 938 1 334 3 315 2 151
Spain -582 749 1 787 2 572 3 262 313 9 779 2 073
Japan 572 826 81 4 316 1 709 2 426 7 387 1 255
Chile b
United States 9 111 3 726 2 272 991 819 1 915 4 376
Spain 207 822 1 088 2 210 1 220 1 844 4 110 4 052
Canada 86 498 2 612 1 667 2 364 772 1 853 2 638
Japan 47 159 236 -28 350 1 613 1 199 1 860
Netherlands -21 327 805 824 1 379 173 1 289 1 820
Colombia
Anguilla 0 0 1 195 1 111 790 257 184 546
Panama 208 240 477 760 337 426 674 478
Chile 6 2 46 45 54 20 651 431
Brazil 8 19 529 125 47 54 206 412
United States 1 410 1 524 1 064 1 215 1 198 400 507 394
Netherlands 319 25 -818 -130 -109 -158 810 333
United Kingdom 3 747 17 35 200 386 194 390 301
Spain 599 492 289 564 -327 44 733 -12
Costa Rica
United States 532 821 974 1 345 1 022 1 025 1 353 965
Mexico 37 22 71 20 7 40 183 357
Spain 14 13 57 141 79 28 247 303
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 7 14 21 20 9 15 34 142
Italy 24 16 19 19 10 -2 59 117
Colombia 22 -3 30 50 6 99 152 108
Dominican Republic
Canada 111 142 113 383 773 329 1 067 1 194
Brazil 12 0 60 54 85 16 2 1 081
United States 457 662 536 360 455 307 459 594
Spain 215 308 605 181 151 299 192 115
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 6 17 53 11 31 140 2 55
Ecuador c
Mexico 7 43 -40 313 621 279 70 83
China -20 12 85 47 56 45 80 86
Canada 29 -252 49 58 65 105 252 59
United States -77 -160 50 -29 -607 -535 12 94
Spain 3 7 85 190 50 -18 50 48
Italy 0 0 11 17 1 10 25 27
El Salvador
Panama 42 68 841 321 80 110 6 178
Luxembourg … … … … … -2 -14 67
United States 332 13 499 129 74 114 80 67
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Table I.A-3 (concluded)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Guatemala
United States 192 198 326 229 151 343 127 200
Canada 3 4 25 54 74 114 305 140
Mexico 26 83 76 76 50 97 81 123
United Kingdom 9 13 63 66 58 -25 121 67
Spain 56 56 42 66 64 50 2 40
Honduras c  
United States 303 339 460 339 347 325 … …
Canada 17 107 139 37 24 117 … …
United Kingdom 48 49 103 71 -89 58 … …
Costa Rica -2 2 8 2 6 37 … …
Guatemala 25 17 15 40 13 39 … …
Ireland 0 0 0 214 19 33 … …
Mexico
United States 11 796 13 035 12 665 11 395 7 319 5 369 10 700 7 403
Japan 168 -1 422 410 528 484 545 897 1 658
Canada 481 635 521 3 075 1 612 1 525 801 1 041
Netherlands 4 018 2 807 6 634 1 865 2 248 8 939 1 480 717
Switzerland 324 578 607 228 81 246 1 163 204
China 15 24 9 13 34 14 21 74
Chile 124 61 33 31 50 73 55 28
Brazil 46 50 25 93 128 379 336 13
Spain 1 702 1 441 5 416 5 105 2 613 1 885 3 492 -1 524
Nicaragua
Canada 43 14 32 69 51 167 … …
United States 51 53 84 126 88 88 … …
Spain 17 10 45 59 25 33 … …
Mexico 36 53 128 164 48 90 … …
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0 0 47 132 147 29 … …
Panama
United States -74 121 230 492 -19 161 1 900 …
Colombia 18 102 407 49 135 193 540 …
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 9 69 53 86 68 16 274 …
Brazil 16 68 61 33 4 202 …
Argentina -152 66 58 -22 12 145 …
Spain 141 172 273 189 327 344 140 …
Switzerland 314 282 190 -122 301 397 129 …
Paraguay
United States 20 84 107 190 111 265 80 137
Brazil 10 52 41 42 -26 30 13 60
Mexico 0 0 0 0 -8 -18 -13 40
Luxembourg -22 -66 69 23 13 -46 75 32
Spain 9 7 19 11 16 24 -5 31
Uruguay
Argentina 106 282 373 534 432 588 814 …
Spain 203 81 153 232 55 75 196 …
Netherlands 29 -18 10 14 110 -2 172 …
Brazil 20 56 86 183 110 108 170 …
United States 35 67 43 144 167 -36 77 …
Belgium 0 1 46 -2 53 55 51 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of estimates and official figures as of 29 April 2013.
a  Data from the Central Bank of the Republic of Argentina.
b  FDI in 2005 corresponds to investments made under Legislative Decree 600.
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Table I.A-4 
Latin America and the Caribbean: inward foreign direct investment by component, 2005-2012
(Millions of dollars)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Antigua and Barbuda
Capital contributions 221 335 328 149 79 96 61 66
Inter-company loans 4 18 0 0 1 1 2 3
Reinvested earnings 13 9 12 12 5 5 5 5
Argentina
Capital contributions 4 590 2 166 2 578 4 552 2 133 2 176 4 223 3 354
Inter-company loans -481 263 1 846 4 777 -1 010 2 607 2 600 1 214
Reinvested earnings 1 156 3 108 2 050 396 2 894 2 273 3 059 7 984
Bahamas a
Capital contributions 641 843 887 1 032 753 960 971 465
Inter-company loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Reinvested earnings 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Barbados
Capital contributions 192 265 420 339 140 222 381 …
Inter-company loans 26 49 24 80 94 41 176 …
Reinvested earnings 22 28 32 45 13 27 -25 …
Belize
Capital contributions 88 98 100 141 80 80 103 197
Inter-company loans 21 -15 13 8 6 2 0 0
Reinvested earnings 19 25 30 21 23 15 -8 -4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) b
Capital contributions -122 -41 -120 -127 -5 -1 3 19
Inter-company loans -147 55 215 232 -82 -150 -43 -7
Reinvested earnings 30 266 272 407 509 793 899 566
Brazil
Capital contributions 15 045 15 373 26 074 30 064 19 906 40 117 54 782 52 838
Inter-company loans 21 3 450 8 510 14 994 6 042 8 390 11 878 12 434
Reinvested earnings … … … … … … … …
Chile
Capital contributions 781 1 980 2 622 7 775 1 905 4 662 10 601 9 664
Inter-company loans -223 -1 697 -232 1 146 463 2 848 2 863 10 078
Reinvested earnings 6 539 7 143 10 182 6 597 10 519 7 863 9 466 10 581
Colombia
Capital contributions 9 270 5 193 7 462 7 803 4 951 3 814 9 171 9 501
Inter-company loans -15 -31 42 23 42 -25 268 1 334
Reinvested earnings 996 1 495 1 983 2 332 2 144 2 969 3 999 4 989
Costa Rica b
Capital contributions 483 1034 1377 1594 1050 818 1077 311
Inter-company loans 286 25 -2 39 -175 150 711 464
Reinvested earnings 92 410 521 446 471 497 368 431
Dominica
Capital contributions 5 5 28 39 24 9 5 10
Inter-company loans 10 19 9 9 13 13 7 8
Reinvested earnings 16 5 10 9 6 3 2 2
Dominican Republic
Capital contributions 688 765 1 616 2 199 704 1 333 1 156 …
Inter-company loans -49 -394 -446 278 1 096 614 617 …
Reinvested earnings 484 714 498 394 365 351 598 …
Ecuador a
Capital contributions 119 136 151 229 278 265 252 227
Inter-company loans -26 -260 -368 530 -227 -315 61 59
Reinvested earnings 400 395 411 298 256 213 328 301
Grenada
Capital contributions 54 71 140 128 97 56 39 27
Inter-company loans 8 12 17 1 2 3 1 1
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Table I.A-4 (concluded)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Guatemala
Capital contributions 18 87 260 197 94 265 198 363
Inter-company loans 118 -21 -30 75 19 -26 105 192
Reinvested earnings 372 526 515 482 488 568 723 652
Honduras
Capital contributions 169 204 220 567 84 29 284 310
Inter-company loans 63 46 203 -40 65 378 56 52
Reinvested earnings 368 419 505 479 360 562 674 697
Mexico
Capital contributions 12 989 6 340 17 110 12 015 8 461 14 124 10 088 2 926
Inter-company loans 7 400 6 175 6 121 7 499 3 787 4 410 4 189 5 275
Reinvested earnings 4 061 7 776 8 149 8 339 4 313 2 839 7 227 4 458
Panama
Capital contributions 47 2078 719 918 898 948 1 025 835
Inter-company loans 448 293 178 136 105 540 426 692
Reinvested earnings 423 187 879 1 348 257 874 1 304 1 492
Paraguay a
Capital contributions 65 60 43 20 173 -10 318 148
Inter-company loans 3 -11 129 132 -102 129 219 75
Reinvested earnings -15 46 30 57 23 110 -322 97
Peru 
Capital contributions -145 874 733 2 981 1 828 2 445 276 4 637
Inter-company loans 0 240 924 656 -782 693 2 285 -659
Reinvested earnings 2 724 2 353 3 835 3 287 5 385 5 317 5 671 8 263
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Capital contributions 38 19 41 78 49 40 29 15
Inter-company loans 63 93 98 103 85 77 78 81
Reinvested earnings 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4
Saint Lucia
Capital contributions 12 49 56 66 58 59 70 101
Inter-company loans 17 48 54 84 51 34 11 20
Reinvested earnings 12 13 11 9 2 4 4 4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Capital contributions 53 220 254 135 135 109 97 92
Inter-company loans 4 6 8 21 13 13 14 15
Reinvested earnings 25 11 15 11 3 4 5 6
Suriname
Capital contributions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 …
Inter-company loans 28 -163 -247 -231 -93 -248 -51 …
Reinvested earnings 0 0 0 0 0 0 121 …
Trinidad and Tobago
Capital contributions 664 497 554 2 322 426 309 … …
Inter-company loans -16 -20 -21 -16 -12 -11 … …
Reinvested earnings 292 406 297 495 296 251 … …
Uruguay
Capital contributions 231 576 550 1 012 990 1 617 1 409 1 664
Inter-company loans 484 699 448 540 82 8 263 410
Reinvested earnings 133 219 331 554 457 664 832 635
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
Capital contributions 502 -134 -1 004 511 -2 855 -1 182 -673 -851
Inter-company loans 1 -2 323 813 110 -455 1 158 2 143 1 340
Reinvested earnings 2 086 1 949 1 696 1 120 1 141 1 873 2 308 2 727
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of estimates and official figures as of 29 April 2013.
a  Data for 2012 refer to the cumulative total at the third quarter.
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Table I.A-5 
Latin America and the Caribbean: outward foreign direct investment by country, 2000-2012
(Millions of dollars)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Antigua and Barbuda 23 13 14 13 15 17 2 2 2 4 5 3 3
Argentina 901 161 -627 774 676 1 311 2 439 1 504 1 391 712 965 1 488 1 089
Bahamas a 51 42 28 46 256 77 136 141 172 89 88 304 116
Barbados 1 1 0 1 4 9 44 82 -6 -56 -54 -28.5
Belize 5 0 0 39 5 21 6 5 8 3 2 3 1
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 -3 -29 0,3 0
Brazil 2 282 -2 258 2 482 249 9 807 2 517 28 202 7 067 20 457 -10 084 11 588 -1 029 -2 821
Chile 3 987 1 610 343 1 709 2 145 2 135 2 212 4 852 9 151 7 233 9 461 20 373 21 090
Colombia 325 16 857 938 142 4 662 1 098 913 2 486 3 348 6 842 8 280 -248
Costa Rica 8 10 34 27 61 -43 98 262 6 7 25 58 426
Dominica 3 4 0.6 0.5 1.3 13 3.0 7 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0
El Salvador -5 -10 -26 19 -3 113 -26 95 79 0 0 0 0
Grenada 2 2 3 1 1 3 6 16 6 1 3 3 2
Guatemala 0 10 22 46 41 38 40 25 16 26 24 17 39
Honduras 7 3 7 12 -6 1 1 1 -1 4 -1 18 6
Jamaica 74 89 74 116 60 101 85 115 76 61 58 75 90
Mexico 0 4 404 891 1 253 4 432 6 474 5 758 8 256 1 157 7 664 15 045 12 139 25 597
Paraguay 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 7 7 0
Peru 0 74 0 60 0 0 0 66 736 411 266 113 -57
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 2 1 2 7 11 4 6 6 5 3 2 0
Saint Lucia 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 6 5 6 5 4 3
Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0
Suriname 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Trinidad and Tobago 25 58 106 225 25 341 370 0 700 0 0 1060 1 332
Uruguay -1 6 14 15 18 36 -1 89 -11 16 -60 -7 2
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 521 204 1 026 1 318 619 1 167 1 524 33 1 150 1 838 2 671 -1 141 2 460
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of estimates and official figures as of 29 April 2013.
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A. Introduction
Over the past decade the profits of transnational corporations operating in Latin America and the Caribbean 
have increased fivefold. Returns swelled from an average of US$ 20 billion (at current prices) between 1998 
and 2002 to US$ 113.067 billion in 2011. This surge reflects both the growing importance of transnational 
corporations in the region’s economy and their higher average returns, on the back of robust domestic demand 
and high prices for export commodities. The magnitude of this change calls for an examination of the role of FDI 
as a source of capital for these economies and its contribution to growth and structural change in the region.
FDI has been on the rise in Latin America for two decades. Before 1993, inflows to the countries of the region came to less 
than US$ 15 billion a year. Then they began to climb, hitting new highs every year and reaching a record US$ 88.9 billion 
in 1999. Since then, FDI inflows have fluctuated with the business cycle, but overall they have continued to trend upwards, 
surpassing US$ 165 billion in 2012. To varying degrees almost all countries in the region have built up substantial FDI 
liabilities over the last 20 years. Transnational corporations are present in almost all sectors of the economy and, in recent 
years, thanks to rising domestic demand and high export commodity prices, they have been very profitable.
This FDI income rose sharply throughout the region between 2003 and 2007 and has remained at a relatively 
steady level since then. It is unlikely to drop back down to the levels seen 10 years ago, owing to the region’s large 
inward FDI stock. Between 2006 and 2011, FDI income averaged US$ 92 billion annually, representing 92% of the 
value of FDI inflows during the same period. In some countries (such as Argentina, Chile and Peru), capital inflows 
in the form of FDI are being completely neutralized by capital outflows in the form of FDI income. In other words, 
the effect that the investments of transnational corporations are having on the balance of payments in Latin America 
and the Caribbean has changed substantially. FDI can still be seen as a tool with the potential to shift the structure 
of the economy towards more productive and sustainable sectors and activities, but it is no longer possible to equate 
FDI with net inflows of capital that help to maintain equilibrium in the balance of payments. 
In this context, the profits made by the subsidiaries of foreign companies can affect the sustainability of each 
country’s external balance. The pattern of earnings varies by country depending on the predominant investment 
strategy. The countries where earnings are highest are those where natural-resource-seeking strategies have been the 
prime driver. In those countries, FDI income rises and falls in the short term in line with export commodity prices. 
Other sectors have also experienced surges in the profits generated by transnational corporations, particularly some 
industries and services oriented towards the domestic market, such as the telecommunications and automotive sectors. 
Depending on the structure of its FDI stock, each country in the region should take into account how the domestic 
and external environment affects the profits of transnational corporations and the external balance. Another important 
factor to consider is whether these companies decide to reinvest these earnings in the countries where they were 
generated or repatriate them to the parent company. 
The rise in foreign company earnings, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP, has an increasingly 
significant impact in terms of countries’ tax revenues. To avoid erosion of the tax base, the region’s countries should 
create mechanisms to prevent the transfer of profits generated in their economies to other jurisdictions with lower 
tax rates. This presents an administrative, technical and political challenge to the world’s increasingly globalized 
economies and will require international coordination. 
Not only has there been an increase in the FDI income that countries in the region generate and send to other 
countries. With the expansion of the trans-Latins in recent years, there has also been an increase in the income that 
these countries receive as a result of the profits generated by their companies abroad. This naturally attenuates the 
balance-of-payments impact of rising FDI income generated in the economy, but necessarily to a limited degree for 
two reasons. First, a wide gap still separates the FDI income generated in the region (US$ 113 billion in 2011) from 
its FDI income inflow (US$ 17 billion). Second, while almost all the countries in the region generate large amounts 
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FDI income is on the rise worldwide. Section B of this chapter charts this variable in the main regions of the 
world, noting that Latin America and the Caribbean has experienced some of the highest growth in the past decade. 
Section C compares FDI income with other components of the balance of payments in the region to assess to what 
extent the profits of transnational corporations now determine the external balance. Although the chapter focuses 
its analysis on FDI income generated in the region, it also quantifies other capital earnings (those generated in and 
received by the region), situating them in the overall context of capital flows and tracking them over time. Thus it 
provides a better understanding of how the region’s external financing structure has changed over the past 20 years 
(becoming more dependent on FDI and less on other types of investment), bringing with it an expansion in FDI 
income in relation to interest on debt and negotiable instruments.
The aggregate figures for FDI income mask significant variations among the countries in the region and (where 
data are available) from sector to sector. Section D groups countries according to the average returns on their FDI 
stock and analyses which sectors generate the most income from FDI in the region, among which the extractive 
industries stand out in particular. Before setting out conclusions, section E reviews two specific problems caused by 
the accumulation of profits by transnational corporations: the difficulty of collecting taxes from these entities and 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments.
B. The rise in FDI income during 
 the past decade 
1. Trends in Latin America and the Caribbean and worldwide
FDI income1 has increased dramatically worldwide over the past decade, especially since 2003. This is attributable 
primarily to the increase in FDI flows since the 1990s, which has strengthened the role of transnational corporations 
in the world economy. As FDI flows have shifted towards developing economies (see chapter I), much higher earnings 
have also been generated in these countries. Thus, FDI income nearly quadrupled (at current prices) in developing 
regions between 2002 and 2011, while in the United States, the European Union and Japan, it increased just over 
twofold (see table II.1). More important than those trends, however, is the balance between inflows and outflows: 
while inward FDI income far exceeded FDI income outflows in Europe, the United States and Japan (which are home 
to the world’s largest transnational corporations), developing economies sent abroad much more than they received.
Apart from Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and Africa are the regions where the largest increases in 
FDI income have been seen in the last decade (see table II.1). In absolute terms, the upsurge in FDI income generated 
in China stands out in particular, burgeoning from less than US$ 20 billion in 2004 (less than that generated in Latin 
America and the Caribbean) to US$ 145.241 billion in 2011 (30% more than in Latin America and the Caribbean) 
(see figure II.1).2 FDI income from South-East Asia has grown at a much more modest pace (merely doubling), as has 
that from the Middle East. Income from South Asia has grown faster than the average rate, although the total amount 
of FDI in the region remains relatively small for the size of the economies.
Despite having been overtaken by China, Latin America and the Caribbean is still one of the regions with the highest 
growth in FDI income in the past decade, in both absolute and relative terms. From 1990 to 2002, the region’s FDI income 
barely doubled (at current prices), but since that year it has increased more than fourfold. Despite a setback as a result 
of the 2009 crisis, growth rates picked up once again in the two subsequent years. By comparison, from 2006 to 2011, 
the amount of FDI revenue generated in Latin America and the Caribbean was equivalent to 92% of its FDI inflows.3
1 The FDI income generated in a country is defined as the profits that foreign companies obtain from their subsidiaries in that country. 
FDI income received by a country is defined as the profits that domestic companies obtain from their foreign subsidiaries. In this 
document the terms “FDI income” and “transnational company profits” will be used interchangeably depending on the context.
2 Besides China, the leading FDI income-generating economy in East Asia is Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, which 
topped US$ 100 billion in 2011.
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Table II.1 
FDI income generated in the major regions, 2000-2011
(Millions of current dollars)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
World 361 153 285 329 347 433 475 850 622 123 864 959 1 050 336 1 288 434 1 190 426 1 073 605 1 355 039 1 489 920
Developing economies 106 086 108 095 107 269 120 279 152 762 229 876 279 504 355 931 390 455 382 071 509 337 527 827
Latin America and the Caribbean  23 289  21 585  20 425  26 163  37 827  55 303  77 895  93 277  97 427  80 627  96 525  113 067 
Africa  10 152  10 697  11 598  14 287  16 654  27 774  35 874  50 960  60 841  46 498  61 584  61 351 
Middle East  5 744  7 693  6 939  7 643  9 278  10 793  13 489  17 560  22 083  19 839  23 223  26 074 
South Asia  721  2 932  3 206  3 656  5 388  7 979  11 542  15 236  16 585  16 196  19 082  20 562 
South-East Asia  11 004  10 945  12 470  13 716  21 274  23 996  24 123  28 330  30 967  25 485  36 083  41 597 
East Asia  55 583  54 550  52 727  55 172  62 747  104 166  116 891  151 868  163 980  192 971  271 915  264 654 
Developed economies  240 481  159 069  232 936  337 365  452 642  605 592  719 991  865 094  705 004  629 981  765 391  765 391 
United States 56 910 12 784 43 244 73 749 99 754 127 978 159 187 136 261 139 073 112 392 153 267 153 267
European Union 137 448 107 360 150 645 209 291 279 967 368 341 447 812 566 078 410 524 402 713 471 555 471 555
Japan 2 615 4 122 5 320 5 041 6 343 9 484 9 011 14 886 11 770 8 766 5 818 5 818
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Figure II.1 
Developing economies: FDI income, 2002-2011
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
In 2012 FDI income generated in the region declined slightly compared with 2011, but nevertheless remained 
high. At an estimated US$ 105 billion, this was the second highest figure in history. The decline was concentrated 
in Brazil, where FDI income shrank by 23% with respect to 2011 as the economic downturn impacted the results of 
transnational corporations that mostly serve the domestic market. Transnational corporations in Chile and Peru also 
saw their profits fall slightly, while on the contrary in Colombia such companies saw their profits rise.
FDI income flowing into the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean (that is, the profits generated by foreign 
subsidiaries of the trans-Latins) amounted to US$ 16.139 billion in 2011 compared with the US$ 113.067 billion 
generated in the region. The ratio between foreign-company profits in the region and profits generated by trans-Latins 
abroad is in line with the amounts invested in each case. However, FDI income received by the region has grown at a 
similar pace to its FDI income outflow over the past decade, and at a higher rate during the past three years. This reflects 
the fact that the international expansion of the trans-Latins began relatively late but has accelerated in recent years.
2. Repatriation and reinvestment of profits
Income from foreign direct investment can be used in two ways. First, it can be reinvested in the economy where it 
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in other countries, distributed as dividends or retained as cash in the business. While all FDI income is recorded as 
a debit (outflow) on the income side of the balance-of-payments current account, any share of this income that is 
reinvested counts as a credit in the financial account of the balance of payments, as one of the three components 
of FDI. In the case of Chile, for example, 55% of the country’s FDI inflows in 2011 (US$ 9.589 billion) was not net 
income in the balance of payments. This amount represents the portion of the profits of transnational corporations 
that was reinvested in the country and was therefore recorded as a debit in the current account and as a credit in 
the financial account.
In Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, transnational corporations repatriate a slightly higher proportion of 
their profits (55%) than they reinvest (45%).4 Within this relative balance at the regional level, there are large differences 
between countries: Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela Colombia and Dominican Republic, stand out as 
having a lower percentage of reinvestment. In Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Uruguay the reinvestment rate is 
higher. The high rate of reinvestment in Mexico (64%) is attributable mainly to the predominance of companies from 
the United States among its foreign investors. The tax treatment of profits in the United States discourages companies 
from repatriating profits, which is why they keep an extraordinarily high proportion of their foreign subsidiaries’ 
profits offshore (see box II.1).
Repatriation rates are generally higher in Caribbean economies than in Latin America, with the highest rates seen 
in Barbados, Belize and Suriname. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago post average repatriation rates for the region, 
at 58% and 54%, respectively.
4 Calculated on the basis of data from Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay between 2005 and 2011. These economies account for 66% of total FDI 
income in the region.
Box II.1 
The fiscal situation of companies in the United States: reinvesting profits to pay less tax
Not all reinvested profits are intended to expand the production 
capacity of a company’s subsidiaries; sometimes money is simply 
“parked” abroad for financial or tax reasons, as is the case of 
many United States transnational corporations. These companies 
had accumulated an estimated US$ 1.3 trillion in their overseas 
subsidiaries by the end of 2010, an amount which has undoubtedly 
increased in the past two years. Of the businesses in the S&P 
500 index (the 500 leading publicly listed companies in the United 
States) 89% are transnational corporations that generate on 
average 49% of their profits outside the United States. 
In the United States, there is a fiscal incentive to reinvest 
profits abroad. Transnational corporations from that country are 
taxed in the United States on their global profits, minus any 
taxes paid in the country where the profits were generated. For 
example, a company that pays taxes in Mexico on the profits 
made by its subsidiaries at a rate of 30% must pay a further 5% 
in the United States on those same profits to match the rate of 
35% that is applied in the United States. However, the difference 
is paid only when the money returns to the United States, thus 
encouraging companies to keep their profits abroad.
Originally the tax rate on profits in the United States (35%) 
used to be in line with that applied in the main economies 
where the country’s transnational corporations were operating. 
However, most of these countries have lowered their corporate 
rates over the past two decades, which now means that 95% 
of transnational corporations from the United States have to pay 
additional taxes to repatriate earnings. Studies put this fiscal 
cost at an estimated 20% to 28% of profits generated abroad. 
In accounting terms, the profits that are not repatriated are 
referred to as “permanently reinvested earnings”, whether they 
take the form of productive assets (57% of the total) or are held 
in cash (43%). Over the past decade many companies have been 
concentrating such income in low-tax jurisdictions, and today 
one quarter of all such profits are divided between only seven 
countries with especially low corporate rates; indeed, 12% of all 
non-repatriated profits of United States transnationals are located 
in Ireland. On the other hand companies with a small tax liability 
in the event of repatriating profits to the United States tend to 
reinvest in high-growth subsidiaries, rather than maintaining 
large cash balances. 
In short, the remarkable growth in reinvested earnings 
abroad by United States companies is partly driven by the 
business opportunities that arise overseas and partly by an 
attempt to reduce the tax burden; in the latter case, profits are 
held primarily in cash and do not contribute to building capacity 
in the receiving economies. 
Whether measures should be taken to put an end to this 
incentive is currently a hotly debated issue in the United States. 
The aims of such a move range from increasing tax revenue (such 
measures could raise up to US$ 360 billion) to promoting the 
investment of these funds in productive projects in the United 
States. Implementing such a measure could influence corporate 
behaviour, result in substantial negative FDI flows from the United 
States and have serious repercussions for some economies in 
the region, such as Mexico, which receive a large proportion of 
their FDI from the United States.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J. Blouin, L. Krull and L. Robinson, “Where in the world are 
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Figure II.2 



































































































Repatriated earnings Reinvested earnings
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Figure II.3 

































































































Repatriated earnings Reinvested earnings
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
This pattern of distribution of profits has remained relatively unchanged over the past decade, though some 
countries have seen more fluctuations than others. The percentage of profits repatriated to parent companies was 
almost the same before and after the international financial crisis. The percentage of profits that were repatriated even 
declined slightly, from 54% in 2005-2007 to 52% in 2009-2011.5 This shows that the economic crisis in the United 
States and Europe did not force multinational companies operating in the region to repatriate a greater proportion of 
their profits from Latin America. While some corporations have used the profits generated in the region to recapitalize 
parent company operations, this will have been offset by the expansion of investment in subsidiaries with the best 
growth prospects, thus boosting levels of reinvestment. 
With the reinvestment rate holding steady during a period in which the income of transnational corporations 
has increased fivefold, the reinvestment of profits has skyrocketed in virtually all of the region’s economies, both 
in absolute terms and as a proportion of total FDI. As described in chapter I, the reinvestment of profits has gained 
momentum, building up from only 10% of total flows in 2002 to 43% of total flows in the past five years.
5 The repatriation rate for Argentina was unusually high in 2008, as a one-off operation by YPF, a subsidiary of the Spanish company 
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The worldwide uptrend in reinvested profits as a proportion of FDI began only after the financial crisis of 2008. 
In effect, the drop in global FDI flows was seen most markedly in the capital component and inter-company loans, 
while the reinvestment of profits dipped in 2008 but sprang back in 2009 and 2010 (UNCTAD, 2012). 
While all profits that are not repatriated are recorded as reinvested earnings, that money is not necessarily being 
spent in its entirety on new production capacity. In recent years, there has been a marked increase in the accumulation 
of cash by the world’s leading companies. It is estimated that the assets held in cash and short-term investments by 
the 100 largest transnational corporations worldwide increased by one third between 2008 and 2010, when their 
value surpassed US$ 1 trillion (UNCTAD, 2012), and presumably a good portion of this amount is held by overseas 
subsidiaries. It is estimated that approximately half of the non-repatriated profits generated abroad by United States 
companies remain in liquid assets (Blouin, Krull and Robinson, 2012).6
6 The United States is the leading direct investor in Latin America and the Caribbean, but the behaviour of firms from that country in 
this respect is not necessarily representative of other investors, for the reasons given in box II.1. It is also to be assumed that most of 
these liquid assets are held by subsidiaries located in tax havens.
C. Transnational corporation profits in the 
 context of the balance of payments
Regardless of whether transnational corporate profits are repatriated or reinvested they are recorded as outflows 
for balance of payments purposes. They have become the main component of the income balance, as well 
as one of the main determinants of the region’s aggregate balance of payments equilibrium. The surge in FDI 
inflows and outflows of FDI earnings has to be analysed in the context of an abundance of capital at the global 
level at a time when Latin America and the Caribbean has ample access to external financing.
Global capital flows experienced unprecedented growth during the first decade of this century. Cross-border capital 
movements peaked in 2007 at nearly US$ 12 trillion (20% of nominal global GDP), up from just over US$ 2 trillion 
(6.5% of global GDP) in 2002 (see figure II.4). This overabundance of capital, resulting in part from exceptionally 
low interest rates in the developed economies, led to the emergence of financial bubbles and growing private debt, 
sowing the seeds of the subsequent crisis.7
In 2008, cross-border capital flows contracted by close to 90%, and even though the global economic recovery 
since 2010 has caused flows to pick up once again, they still fall short of the 2007 peak. Developed countries have 
borne the brunt of this decline, while cross-border flows to emerging countries have soared, both in value and as a 
proportion of the total.
Cross-border flows to Latin America and the Caribbean followed a similar trend to global flows, but they did not 
plummet quite so dramatically in 2008-2009 and subsequently recovered more rapidly. The financial integration, 
in GDP terms, of the region’s countries has been on the rise in the past decade, reaching 7% in 2010, which is very 
close to the world average (see figure II.4).8
The structure of capital inflows in Latin America and the Caribbean is similar to that in other emerging regions 
(IIF, 2011), with FDI outweigthing other investment (see definitions in box II.2). Indeed, FDI has exceeded portfolio 
flows and other investment every year except in 1994, 2007 and 2010, and has proved to be significantly less volatile 
(see figure II.5). Since 1996, the sum of direct investment and other investment has outweigthed FDI in only 2007 and 2010.
7 Interest rates averaged 4.5% between 2005 and 2007, compared with an average of 1.5% between 2001 and 2005, which was the 
lowest level in recent history (using as a reference the United States discount rate since 1980). 
8 Financial integration is measured as total cross-border capital inflows (direct investment, portfolio investment and other investment) 
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Figure II.4 
World and Latin America and the Caribbean: cross-border capital flows, 1998-2011







1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Worldwide cross-border capital flows
Cross-border capital inflows to Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and information provided by the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
Box II.2 
Foreign investment flows and income as components of the balance of payments
Cross-border capital flows are recorded in the national balance 
of payments, specifically in the capital and financial account. 
Foreign investment, both inflows and outflows, is classified into 
three categories depending on the type of investment: 
(i)  Direct investment is the category of investment whereby 
an entity seeks to obtain a lasting interest in an enterprise 
and establish a significant degree of influence over the 
management of that enterprise. In practical terms, a direct 
investor must own 10% or more of the enterprise’s capital. 
All subsequent financial transactions (acquisition of new 
assets, bonds and notes, and commercial or financial loans) 
are also counted as direct investment.
(ii)  Portfolio investment refers to transactions in negotiable 
securities. The main components of this type of investment 
are stocks, bonds and notes (public or private) and money-
market instruments. Stock transactions that are covered under 
the category of direct investment are excluded. Financial 
derivatives, whether negotiable or not, are included in this 
category, although they are not commonly traded in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
(iii)  Other investment covers commercial and financial loans, 
and deposits, including foreign exchange holdings. This is 
a residual category of the financial balance that essentially 
refers to loans not included in negotiable securities (which 
are classed under portfolio investment).
The returns on these investments are reflected in the income 
balance, which is part of the current account, together with the 
balance of goods, services and current transfers. FDI income 
reflects the profits made by the subsidiaries of transnational 
companies; portfolio investment income is the dividends or capital 
gains generated by fixed- and variable-income investments; and 
other investment income refers to the interest generated on 
loans and deposits. 
While the sums of foreign investment received are recorded 
as positive entries, the income they generate is registered 
as a negative flow. Conversely, investments made abroad by 
domestic companies are recorded as negative entries, while 
the income that those investments generate is recorded as 
positive (revenues). 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Figure II.5 
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Privatizations and foreign-debt securitization made portfolio investment the primary source of foreign capital for 
the region between 1990 and 1996. During that period, average portfolio investment inflows to the region amounted 
to US$ 40 billion a year, against US$ 22 billion in FDI (both at current prices).
Thereafter, portfolio investment went through a period of decline that steepened between 2000 and 2004 when 
a wave of divestments was sparked by a series of emerging-market crises that began in Asia in 1997 and continued in 
Brazil and the Russian Federation in 1998 and in Argentina in 2001. Even though the amounts of portfolio investment 
rose once again from 2007 (with the exception of 2008), averaging over US$ 90 billion a year, they remain lower 
than FDI inflows. Furthermore, portfolio investment is much more concentrated than FDI in a few countries: Brazil, 
Mexico and Chile, followed at some distance by Colombia and Peru, receive almost all of these investments in the 
region. The smaller economies of Central America and the Caribbean are virtually excluded from these investments, 
with the partial exceptions of the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Panama. The reason for this is that the region’s 
equity and debt markets lack the depth of their counterparts in the advanced economies. In addition, the need for 
external financing to cover the fiscal deficit has been modest.9
The “other investment” category predominated in Latin America and the Caribbean until the 1980s, but the 
external debt crisis caused bank loan and deposit flows to the region to turn negative between 1990 and 2005 (with 
some fluctuations); only since then have they regained significant levels. Between 2006 and 2011, other investment 
averaged US$ 50 billion a year (just over half of the amount of FDI). 
Investment flows originating in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have a completely different 
structure, with a predominance of loans and deposits amounting to more than double the combined sum of FDI 
and portfolio investment. Thus, the region’s funding capacity over much of the past decade, attributable to current 
account surpluses, has been used primarily to provide the rest of the world with loans and deposits and to accumulate 
reserve assets. Almost all the region’s countries have significant outflows of loans and deposits in relation to the size 
of their economies, but in absolute terms the countries that stand out the most are Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico. 
The region’s portfolio investments abroad have shown very little momentum in the past few years, and are 
even lower (at current prices) than they were 10 years ago. Only Chile stands out as a major investor in shares and 
negotiable securities abroad. It accounted for 45% of all flows from the region between 2005 and 2010, owing to 
the creation of sovereign wealth funds in 2006 and 2007 (whose assets must be invested in top-rated fixed-income 
instruments) and pension fund investment activity.
Figure II.6 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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These contrasting trends in the region’s inward and outward investment flows are reflected in its corresponding 
income outflows and inflows. While outflows of FDI income have surged, the income generated by foreign portfolio 
investment has risen only modestly, from approximately US$ 20 billion per year between 1997 and 1999 to US$ 30 billion 
at current prices over the past few years, which means that its share as a percentage of GDP has shrunk by one third. 
Outflows  of income generated by other investment (interest paid) are, in current dollars, lower now than in 1990 or 
in 2000, and slightly less than portfolio investment income outflows (see figure II.7). 
Other investment income inflows were higher than for the other categories until 2009, peaking at US$ 24.623 billion 
in 2007. Since then, they have fallen by more than half owing to the worldwide drop in interest rates (especially in 
the United States and other developed economies) and were surpassed for the first time by FDI income and even by 
portfolio investment income (see figure II.8).
Figure II.7 
Latin America: capital income outflows, 2000-2011












Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Figure II.8 
Latin America: capital income inflows, 2000-2012












Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Preliminary figures.
Changing capital flows to the region over time have marked three distinct periods according to the predominant 
form of external financing. Bank loans (other investment) were the main type of foreign investment until 1990, when 
this source dried up in the aftermath of the external debt crisis of the 1980s. For a short period of time, until 1996, 
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the conversion of a certain amount of bank debt into negotiable assets, the financial opening and liberalization of 
many countries in the region and an international context in which priority was given to portfolio investment in the 
economies that would come to be renamed the “emerging markets”. This context changed dramatically with the crises 
that hit these markets between 1997 and 2001, and although portfolio investment in Latin America has picked up, 
and even reached record levels in 2005, it has not regained the top spot from FDI in terms of the amounts invested. 
The patterns in income from the various types of investment are consistent with their flows. While income from 
portfolio investments and loans and deposits grew modestly or even decreased over time (even at current prices), 
income paid to transnational corporations has skyrocketed. In the 1980s, external debt interest payments accounted 
for 87% of the total investment income flowing from Latin America and the Caribbean, while FDI income represented 
a minor flow. Towards the end of the 1980s this pattern was broken and a new framework emerged whereby portfolio 
investment income (sovereign bonds and private securities) played a central role in the outflows from the region. 
Portfolio investment income began to increase in 1989, accounting for 26% of total investment income between 
1994 and 2004 and mirroring the change in capital flows to the region described above. 
Another change in the funding pattern, and thus in the flows of investment income, began to take shape in the 
wake of the emerging-market financial crises between 1997 and 2001. The amount of portfolio investment income 
has remained significant since the 1990s, but its growth slowed owing to the crises and FDI income began to climb 
in 2003.
Considering the balance of payments for the region as a whole, total FDI income (almost US$ 100 billion on 
average between 2008 and 2011) far outweighs the goods trade surplus (less than US$ 50 billion) (see table II.2).
Table II.2 
Latin America and the Caribbean: main components of the balance of payments, 2005-2011
(Millions of dollars)
Heading 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Balance on current account 34 681 48 470 9 131 -35 455 -27 230 -57 600 -75 193
Exports of goods, f.o.b. 571 556 684 041 770 189 895 935 695 685 882 435 1078 697
Imports of goods, f.o.b. 495 006 590 127 706 325 859 171 649 420 839 020 1014 303
Balance on goods 76 550 93 913 63 864 36 764 46 265 43 415 64 393
Services (credit) 79 088 88 883 104 559 119 079 108 589 120 977 133 096
Transportation (credit) 16 600 18 440 21 005 25 235 20 801 24 128 27 208
Travel (credit) 38 524 42 197 46 942 50 381 46 786 50 036 51 644
Other services (credit) 23 965 28 246 36 612 43 463 41 002 46 813 54 245
Services (debit) 91 899 102 731 125 271 148 261 138 561 167 522 196 577
Transportation (debit) 33 603 38 135 46 107 56 007 43 139 53 674 62 308
Travel (debit) 23 617 26 200 31 320 35 325 33 087 39 890 47 235
Other services (debit) 34 679 38 396 47 844 56 929 62 335 73 958 87 034
Balance on goods and services 63 739 80 066 43 152 7 582 16 292 -3 129  912
Income (credit) 25 595 38 409 53 143 51 401 34 398 36 271 41 497
Employees’ compensation (credit) 2 212 2 277 2 313 2 743 2 550 2 534 2 780
Investment income (credit) 23 383 36 132 50 831 48 657 31 848 33 737 38 717
Direct investment income (profits and dividends) (credit) 6 114 8 473 11 538 12 337 9 575 14 883 16 871
Portfolio investment income (credit) 3 919 7 923 14 669 15 387 9 711 8 454 10 912
Other investment income (interest received) (credit) 13 351 19 735 24 623 20 934 12 562 10 401 10 935
Income (debit) 108 090 134 193 154 065 161 523 135 536 152 177 179 853
Employees’ compensation (debit)  509  657  552  638  476  531  615
Investment income (debit) 107 581 133 535 153 512 160 884 135 060 151 645 179 237
Direct investment income (profits and dividends) (debit) 55 303 77 895 93 277 97 427 80 627 96 525 113 067
Portfolio investment income (debit) 23 391 24 638 26 019 29 700 26 736 28 785 36 727
Other investment income (interest paid) (credit) 28 887 31 003 34 216 33 757 27 697 26 336 29 444
Balance on income -82 495 -95 783 -100 921 -110 122 -101 138 -115 906 -138 355
Current transfers (credit) 57 484 68 919 73 550 74 714 66 128 71 869 72 974
Current transfers (debit) 4 047 4 731 6 650 7 629 8 513 10 434 10 724
Balance on current transfers 53 437 64 188 66 900 67 085 57 615 61 435 62 250
Balance on capital account 2 663 6 993 7 312 2 469 5 931 9 793 3 482
Balance on financial account 32 691 6 191 115 591 69 952 77 528 158 090 192 263
Errors and omissions -23 891 -3 251 -4 203 5 657 -15 543 -27 308 -16 355
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Investment income inflows cannot offset this imbalance. In fact, between 2005 and 2011, they were equivalent to 
about 26% of the region’s outflows under the same heading. The greatest difference is in relation to direct investment, 
where inflows represented only 13% of outflows. Outbound capital income in 2005-2011 totalled US$ 1 trillion; 
inbound capital income came to US$ 263 billion.
This imbalance is consistent with the fact that Latin America receives more FDI than it sends; despite the growth 
in FDI outflows, this pattern is expected to continue in the coming years. Furthermore, while FDI income outflows 
are significant for all countries of the region, inflows under the same heading are notable only in those economies 
with substantial direct investments abroad (Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico). 
It is important to note that, in the past decade, Latin America and the Caribbean has been a net lender in the 
global economy: the current account for the countries of the region as a whole posted a surplus of US$ 12.2 billion 
(at its peak in 2003-2007, the cumulative surplus for this account was US$ 133 billion). Even though the region has 
been able to maintain a healthy current account and, consequently, has the capacity to provide funding for other 
regions, its capital income outflows have remained higher than inflows. In fact, the income sub-account has been the 
poorest performer for the region during the past decade, owing primarily to the outflows of direct investment income. 
D. Profits by country and sector
1. FDI stock and profitability
The profits of transnational corporations in Latin America and the Caribbean have soared since 2003 owing to a 
combination of two factors: a substantial FDI stock and higher returns on that stock.
Chronologically, the first factor was the sharp increase in FDI flows to the region between 1996 and 2001, 
which tripled, in less than 10 years, the foreign capital accumulated in the region in the form of foreign-company 
subsidiaries. In absolute terms, the region’s FDI stock has grown constantly, but at varying speeds. This indicator is 
presented at current prices, so in order to appreciate its significance in the region’s economies it is helpful to view 
it as a percentage of nominal GDP (see figure II.9). Thus, the role of FDI in the economies of the region increased 
significantly between 1996 and 2001 and later stabilized at about 30% of GDP.
Figure II.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean: FDI stock, 1990-2011
































































FDI stock (UNCTAD index of effective inward FDI for
Latin America, not including tax havens)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures and information provided by the United Nations Conference 
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The real FDI boom in Latin America and the Caribbean took place in the second half of the 1990s, more specifically, 
between 1996 and 2001, when many State-owned assets were privatized and many sectors, which until then had 
received little FDI, were opened up and deregulated. It was during this period that transnational corporations began 
to expand their role in the region’s economies. Their level of influence held steady in the years immediately after the 
boom (between 2002 and 2009) and has recently started to trend slightly up again. 
Like FDI flows, the significance of FDI stock in an economy is not the same in all countries. Rather, it is much 
larger in smaller economies. In Mexico and the countries of South America, FDI stock accounts for between 26% 
and 28% of the economy. In the economies of Central America it represents about 40%; in the larger countries of 
the Caribbean, such as Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, it reaches 80%. And in the economies of the Organisation 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) it as much as 200%. As a result, the smaller economies are most vulnerable to 
the balance-of-payments impact of rising FDI income.
Even in those countries where the weight of FDI in the economy is lower than average, many important sectors are 
virtually dominated by transnational corporations. The banking sector in Mexico, mining in Peru, telecommunications 
in Brazil and the automotive industry in the region as a whole are all examples. This selective concentration of 
transnational corporations in different sectors has implications when it comes to explaining FDI income patterns for 
each country of the region, as will be outlined in the next section. 
The second factor that has contributed to the increase in FDI income since 2003 was the sharp rise in the 
profitability of FDI in the region. This reflects, above all, a global trend. In recent years, the profits of large companies 
have continued to swell, despite worldwide economic uncertainty and stagnant growth in the developed countries. 
In the United States, for example, corporate profits hit a historic peak as a percentage of national income in 2012. 
The same has happened in Latin America (Manuelito and Jiménez, 2013).
Subsidiaries of transnational companies operating in the region have seen relatively high profitability in the past 
few years. Measured by the return on FDI stock in the region, profitability rose from a low of 4% during the 2001-2002 
crisis to a high of 10% in 2008. Figure II.10 shows how this rise in the profitability of FDI coincided exactly with the 
upsurge in FDI income as a proportion of FDI stock, which doubled during the same period.
Figure II.10 
Latin America and the Caribbean: FDI stock, FDI income and average profitability of FDI, 1990-2011




























































FDI stock as a proportion of GDP
FDI income as a proportion of GDP FDI income as a proportion of FDI stock
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The 2009 crisis scaled back the profitability of FDI to 7%, which is the average for the past two decades. In spite 
of this decline in profitability, income has increased in absolute terms owing to the steady growth in FDI stock during 
the years of record inflows (see chapter I).
A similar decline in the average profitability of FDI had been seen a decade earlier, when it fell from 7% to 4% 
during the crisis in 1998-2001, pointing to the close relationship between profitability and the economic cycle. These 
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far higher level than a decade ago because average returns are unlikely to fall below 4% and the region’s FDI stock 
will not decrease in the near future.
This structural factor will ensure that in the coming decades the economies in the region will experience high 
levels of FDI income. While FDI flows, as seen in chapter I, are highly variable, the fluctuations in FDI stock are 
much smaller. Moreover, given the substantial reinvestment of profits outlined under heading 2 of section B, even if 
Latin America did not attract new foreign investors for a long period of time, its FDI stock could continue to expand.
There could indeed be a shift in the balance between outflows and inflows of FDI income, as has been seen to a 
certain extent in recent years. But that change is as yet incipient and limited to only four of the region’s economies. 
Thus, the level of FDI income and the imbalance between inflows and outflows will hold steady for the foreseeable 
future, although with significant differences between countries, as discussed in the next section. 
2. FDI income by country and sector
The profits of transnational corporations have surged in the region as a whole, but this increase has not been spread 
evenly across countries. While almost all countries have seen significant growth since 2003, there are notable 
differences in the amount of income they generate, how much that income has grown in the last decade and the 
relative importance of these revenues to the national economy. 
In absolute terms, FDI income is highly concentrated in a small group of countries, in particular Brazil (with 29% 
of the total income generated in the region in 2011), Chile (17%), Colombia (13%), Peru (12%) and Mexico (9%) 
(see table II.3). As expected, this distribution reflects the size of the different economies, the significance that FDI has 
for each of them and the different levels of return obtained by the foreign companies in each country. 
Table II.3 
Latin America: outflows of FDI income, 1990-2011
(Millions of dollars)
1990-2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Argentina 1 820 1 626 3 712 5 456 7 112 7 283 7 902 8 360 8 530 8 956
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 74 234 292 271 392 644 681 769 863 977
Brazil 3 671 5 984 6 860 11 035 13 884 19 692 28 773 21 029 26 584 31 716
Chile 1 652 4 611 8 231 11 416 19 913 22 832 17 430 14 801 18 980 18 136
Colombia 639 1 525 2 453 3 585 4 615 6 667 8 765 7 666 9 877 14 315
Ecuador 211 595 964 1 004 977 1 160 785 821 539 698
Paraguay 71 60 192 158 271 366 505 555 760 530
Peru 317 1 112 2 567 4 030 6 741 7 788 8 346 8 172 10 714 12 866
Uruguay 27 127 229 228 261 531 843 767 1 126 1 253
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 989 1 802 3 498 3 895 6 540 4 733 4 608 2 413 3 889 5 789
Mexico 3 919 4 010 3 989 8 145 10 200 13 442 11 201 8 011 7 102 10 122
Costa Rica 379 644 330 743 853 1 131 749 986 606 503
El Salvador 39 85 80 181 91 159 39 175 215 252
Guatemala 126 319 270 370 608 819 886 951 1 001 1 343
Honduras 90 292 390 479 621 535 488 499 567 910
Nicaragua 39 77 80 82 85 93 113 121 135 146
Panama 415 739 967 1 048 1 197 1 521 1 747 1 310 1 829 2 096
Dominican Republic ... 1 391 1 652 1 765 1 932 2 194 1 669 1 518 1 528 1 800
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
It is particularly useful to categorize the countries in the region according to their FDI income in relation to the 
FDI stock in their economies. This indicator, already used for the region as a whole in the previous section, measures 
the average profitability of FDI in an economy. This revealed two groups of economies in the region with completely 
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Figure II.11 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): FDI income  













































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
The first group is made up of countries where the strategy of transnational corporations has focused on the 
extraction of raw materials for export (Chile, Colombia, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, 
the Dominican Republic). These economies have seen average returns on FDI of over 10% in the past five years —and 
as high as 25% in the case of Peru— while the average for the region as a whole was 7.8%. The figures for Guatemala 
and Paraguay are very high too, but this profitability indicator is more difficult to interpret for these two countries as 
they receive very little foreign direct investment. 
Of this group of countries, only Chile and Colombia provide data disaggregated by sector, which clearly show 
how important natural resources are. The vast majority of the FDI income generated in Chile comes from the mining 
sector, with returns of 25%. Electricity, gas and water services were also highly profitable (12%), but fell far short of 
the returns achieved by mining. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum are Mexico and some of the Central American economies (El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and, to a lesser extent, Costa Rica) where transnational corporations have largely adopted efficiency-
seeking strategies in the production of manufactured goods for export. The profitability of FDI in these economies 
is well below average and has grown very modestly in the last decade. These low returns are due, on the one hand, 
to the sluggish growth of domestic demand in these economies compared with those of South America, which has 
adversely affected businesses in the service sector (accounting for approximately half of all FDI). On the other hand, 
the manufacturing sector (40% of FDI) has a preponderance of export platforms that are highly integrated into global 
value chains and tend to operate with narrow profit margins.
In Mexico and Central America, data on FDI income are not disaggregated by sector, but it is possible to analyse 
the data reported by the United States companies that invest in these countries. Of the profits reported by United 
States companies in Mexico in 2011, 39% were in manufacturing, while 25% were not attributable to any specific 
sector. The percentage for manufacturing was even higher in Costa Rica (80%), Honduras and the Dominican Republic 
(more than 100% in both owing to losses in other sectors) and in El Salvador and Nicaragua (45% each).
In Ecuador, FDI has been concentrated in natural-resources extraction; however, the Government has reformed 
the oil sector to ensure that the public sector receives a higher percentage of the income generated. The reform 
crystallized in 2010 when transnational corporations in this industry began to operate under provision-of-services 
contracts giving them a flat-rate payment based on the amount of oil extracted. About half of the foreign companies 
in the sector accepted the new terms while the rest decided to liquidate their assets in the country (ECLAC, 2010). 
These measures, which had been expected for some years, are behind the decline in FDI income since 2007 in 
Ecuador, which is one of the few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean to have experienced such a drop. 
The returns on FDI are below average for the region in the Caribbean economies, with the exception of Barbados, 







Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2012
and Tobago is the only exporter of primary products (hydrocarbons). Though its FDI income is above average for the 
region, it still falls far short of the level of the metal-exporting countries. The other countries receive FDI mainly in the 
services sector, where stagnant tourist arrivals since the 2009 crisis and slower growth in domestic demand (compared 
with Latin America) have dragged down the profits of transnational corporations. In absolute terms, the FDI income 
generated in these countries increased only very slightly during the last decade, unlike in Latin America (see table II.4).
Figure II.12 





































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Table II.4 
The Caribbean: outflows of FDI income, 2000-2011
(Millions of dollars)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Anguilla 10 8 7 6 5 4 4 4 11 9 1 1
Antigua and Barbuda 22 26 24 24 25 31 42 44 41 36 33 41
Barbados 30 38 41 54 116 129 220 224 265 311 250 ...
Belize 31 33 33 31 42 35 52 87 107 56 102 40
Dominica 33 19 18 16 22 23 7 13 13 13 8 5
Grenada 28 34 32 26 25 23 22 36 32 55 31 21
Jamaica 290 301 434 326 362 454 376 533 376 232 127 112
Montserrat 3 1 3 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
Saint Kitts and Nevis 21 23 23 23 20 20 20 23 23 20 18 19
Saint Lucia 33 31 23 32 49 51 34 45 52 35 32 12
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 13 11 15 21 25 22 23 20 18 12 11 7
Suriname 51 96 37 40 62 45 55 0 0 1 100 266
Trinidad and Tobago 381 374 295 489 271 566 722 664 904 780 827 ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
FDI profitability is slightly above average in countries including Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Honduras, Panama and Uruguay. Each of these economies has followed a very different path. Uruguay, for example, 
has seen the highest FDI income growth over the past decade, reflecting a rapid expansion in FDI inflows, in particular 
those received by the forestry sector. Argentina and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela rank above average in the 
region in terms of profitability, but they stand out for having seen only very modest growth or even zero growth in FDI 
income in recent years (see table II.3). The fall in profits in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela can be attributed to 
two factors. First, the nationalization of foreign companies, especially in manufacturing and some services, has led 
to a decline in real terms in the stock of foreign capital in the country. Second, in a process similar to that which took 
place in Ecuador, operating conditions for transnational corporations involved in oil extraction (the main destination 
of FDI) changed radically in the last decade. Under the new conditions, transnational corporations must operate in 
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In Argentina, FDI income has hardly grown since 2007. Sectoral data show that the services sector has generated 
the least income in recent years (25% of the total).10 The rate freeze for many public services has without doubt 
had an impact on the profits of transnational corporations, particularly in the energy sector. Many transnational 
corporations operate in the electricity sector, financial services and trade, areas in which profits have been below 
average; indeed, only communications and transport have recorded above-average profits. Of the income generated, 
36% is from manufacturing, where the metallurgical industry stands out in particular, and 39% is attributable to the 
natural-resources sector, where mining and the extraction of hydrocarbons generated above-average profits (20% 
and 16%, respectively) between 2005 and 2010, although lower than the average calculated for the other countries 
in the region.
Lastly, Brazil (which drew more than one third of the region’s total inward FDI in the past two years) includes 
only repatriated FDI income in its figures on FDI income and does not count reinvested profits, which suggests that 
the data presented in table II.3 understate the real level.11 Sectoral data for Brazil indicate that between 2010 and 
2012, most repatriated profits were from companies in the manufacturing sector (56%), followed by services (41%) 
and, trailing far behind, natural resources (3%). Within manufacturing, automotive companies repatriated more than 
US$ 12 billion in these three years, representing 16% of the total repatriated from Brazil and more than three times 
the amount of FDI received by the industry during the same period. In this industry, all of the assembly firms and 
the largest producers of car parts are subsidiaries of transnational corporations that have been very successful in the 
past few years in Brazil. The beverage industry (with strong growth in 2012 as a result of new acquisitions) and the 
chemical industry have also performed well. All of these industries are geared towards the Brazilian domestic market.
Within the services industry, the finance sector stands out with more than US$ 7 billion, followed by the 
telecommunications, electricity and gas, and retail sectors. Of these sectors, telecommunications is the only one in 
which transnational corporations dominate the Brazilian market. In the other three, foreign companies compete with 
Brazilian companies for market share. 
In terms of profitability, the automotive sector stands out once again, having repatriated an annual amount 
equivalent to 13% of FDI stock for the past three years —four times the national average and double that of the next 
most profitable sectors, such as paper and pulp (7%), electricity and gas (6%) and chemicals (6%). 
The low level of profits repatriated from Brazil by mining and hydrocarbon companies (both in absolute terms 
and in relation to the amounts invested) is somewhat exceptional and can be attributed to two factors. First, the 
country has an abundance of natural resources, but since Brazilian companies dominate the sector, only 17% of FDI 
stock is invested in the primary sector. Second, FDI in the hydrocarbon sector is relatively recent and is focused on 
the exploitation of pre-salt oilfields that are still coming online. The profits of the foreign companies in this sector are 
expected to increase as these sites are developed in the coming years.
The preponderance of FDI in non-export sectors in Brazil is the reason why the country scores above average for 
the region when measuring FDI income as a percentage of exports of goods and services, despite the fact that only 
repatriated FDI income is taken into account (see figure II.13). Although this measure ignores other components of 
the balance-of-payments current account, notably investment income inflow, it does indicate what percentage of a 
country’s income from exports is used to offset FDI. Being the largest economy in the region, exports account for a 
relatively small percentage of Brazil’s GDP; however, the country has attracted a lot of FDI in recent years, mainly 
in manufacturing and services aimed at its domestic market.
As expected, the profits of transnational corporations in each country are concentrated in the sectors where they have 
invested more: manufacturing in Mexico and Central America, and natural resources in the South American countries.
As shown above, the amount of profits, their growth and their relative importance in the economy vary greatly 
by country. Returns range from 3% in Mexico to 25% in Peru. Differences of this magnitude can be explained, first, 
by the variations in the economic performance of the countries in recent years, by their production structure and, 
10 The sectoral data for Argentina does not match the aggregate data as they come from different sources.
11 If transnational corporations in Brazil were to follow a strategy similar to that employed by companies in other countries in the region, 
they would be reinvesting in their subsidiaries just a little less than the amount they repatriate to their parent companies. If that were 
the case, total FDI income for the Brazilian economy would be about double that indicated in table II.3, that is, about the same amount 
as for the rest of the economies in South America combined. Estimated FDI profitability in Brazil shown in figure II.11 would not have 
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primarily, by the type of strategy that transnational corporations have chosen to apply in each country. The natural 
resources sector has been the key driver of FDI income in the region.
Figure II.13 





























































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
3. Natural resources 
Sectoral data for Argentina and Chile, as well as the exceptionally high returns in other countries with strong extractive 
industries (Colombia, Peru and Plurinational State of Bolivia), point to the key role of companies that specialize in 
the exploitation of natural resources in the increase in FDI income in the region (apart from in Brazil). These data 
from the countries’ balance-of-payments position are consistent with the balance sheets of individual companies: 
the return on assets for companies in the mining sector included in the top 500 companies in the region was more 
than double that of the second-ranked sector (beverages) in 2010 and three times higher than for the hydrocarbons 
sector (see figure II.14).12
Figure II.14 















































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from América Economía [online] http://www.americaeconomia.com.
12 This indicator is not completely objective since mining companies do not count their mineral reserves among their assets (oil companies 
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The profits generated by the natural resources sector13 in Latin America have risen by a similar amount and within 
a similar time frame as FDI income as a whole, as shown in section A (ECLAC, 2012a). In the mining sector, profits 
as a percentage of regional GDP nearly quadrupled during 2004-2009 in relation to the previous decade; in the 
hydrocarbons sector, the increase was about 60%. While the latter is a considerable increase, the difference between 
the two sectors is attributable to rising maintenance costs in traditional hydrocarbon fields and higher development 
costs in non-traditional areas.
Although mining income has shot up at a much faster rate than hydrocarbon income in the region, the latter is 
still much higher in quantitative terms. Figure II.15 shows that, in countries where natural-resources income exceeds 
10% of GDP, mining income accounts for the lion’s share only in Chile; in those where natural-resources income 
exceeds 2% of GDP, mining generates more income than hydrocarbons in only Guyana, Peru and Suriname. 
Figure II.15 
































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, World Development Indicators [online database].
The income generated from mining and from oil and gas extraction counts as FDI income depending on the 
extent to which these sectors are dominated by transnational corporations. Even though hydrocarbons are responsible 
for a larger proportion of income in the natural-resources sector, FDI income is concentrated in mineral-exporting 
countries because of the dominance of State-owned companies in the hydrocarbons sector. In some cases this is due 
to a statutory monopoly (as in Mexico) or special sector regulations that grant a leading role to domestic firms, as in 
Brazil, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador (as mentioned above). Even the countries that are more 
open to FDI in hydrocarbons, such as Chile, Colombia and Peru, also have State-owned oil companies. In 2012 
Argentina renationalized YPF, an oil company which had been State-owed prior to 1999. 
Mining, in contrast, is an industry dominated in many countries by transnational corporations. The main exceptions 
are Mexico, where it is dominated by private domestic capital, Brazil, where the quasi-State enterprise Vale is the 
main player, and Chile, where the State-owned CODELCO extracts a third of all copper (although its tax contributions 
are higher than those of the private companies accounting for the other two thirds).14
FDI income in the natural-resources sector fluctuates in accordance with international market prices. This is 
one of the main reasons why FDI income began to rise in 2003 and has remained high since then. In the short term, 
changes in international prices immediately translate into variations in corporate profits in the sector (see figure II.16); 
this is why FDI income suffered a slight fall in 2012. 
13 Income from the natural resources sector is the sum of revenues from mining and oil. Each of these is calculated as the value of 
production at international prices minus the relevant production costs.
14 ECLAC (2012a) concludes that States obtain a larger share of the income generated by natural resources when they have State enterprises 
in the sector, in comparison with those who collect revenues solely through profit taxes, special taxes and royalties. Overall, as a 
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Figure II.16 
United States: FDI income generated by mining and oil companies and commodity prices, 2007-2012
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FDI income in the natural resources sector
Commodity price index (2005=100)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
E. Latin America and the Caribbean 
 in this new scenario
While there is no doubt that the natural-resources sector is the main cause of the rise in FDI income in the region, it 
is far from the only one. Proof of this is that profits have gone up in all developing economies, even in those where 
FDI in the primary sector has been very limited. The clearest example of this worldwide is China, which has seen an 
even higher rise than Latin America and the Caribbean and where FDI has been concentrated in the manufacturing 
sector. In Latin America, Brazil has seen a remarkable rise in FDI income, mainly in some areas of manufacturing 
and services. Even in countries such as Chile, where most income is concentrated in mining, other sectors have 
also experienced higher-than-average rates of return in recent years. Among them are electricity and banking.
Transnational corporations involved in the extraction of natural resources are not the only ones to have enjoyed record 
profits in Latin America in recent years. Service providers and manufacturing companies have also taken advantage 
of the generally positive economic performance of developing economies over the past decade. Indeed, the growth 
gap between developed and developing countries widened from only 0.1% of GDP in 2003 to 4% from that year 
onwards (ECLAC, 2012b). The disparity is particularly notable between Latin America, which has maintained high 
rates of economic growth in recent years, and the European Union (the region’s main source of FDI), which has seen 
very slow growth since the 2009 crisis.
Major Spanish companies, which have significant assets in Latin America and face a severely recessionary 
domestic market, are among those that seen the most growth in their dependence on profits generated in the region 
(ECLAC, 2013). The two largest Spanish banks (Santander and BBVA) generated almost half of their profits in 2011 
in Latin America (ECLAC, 2012c). The largest Spanish electricity companies also saw an increase in the percentage 
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In short, Latin America has stood out in recent years for its capacity to generate substantial profits for the 
transnational corporations that have invested there. While the rates of return have reached historic highs in recent 
years and are likely to decline in the medium term, the absolute level of FDI income generated in the region will 
remain very high. This will require rethinking the role that transnational corporations should play in the region’s 
development and of the policies that States should implement to that end. 
Evaluating the significance of transnational corporation profits in the region’s tax base and considering the effect of 
increasing income on the balance of payments and on growth and development are two of the more immediate requirements.
1. Transnational corporations and tax revenues
There are no disaggregated data giving an exact figure for how much transnational corporations pay in taxes in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. However, considering the expansion in FDI income in the balance of payments of 
almost all the region’s countries, transnational corporations account for an ever larger share of taxes on profits. Today, 
they account for about 10% of tax revenues in the region, but this percentage should go up as the region adopts tax 
structures that more closely resemble those of developed countries.
Subsidiaries of transnational corporations contribute to tax revenues mainly through taxes on profits, in which 
respect they generally have the same obligations as domestic firms. There are some important exceptions to this 
general practice of non-discrimination by origin (national treatment). For example, in some cases foreign investors 
sign tax stability agreements upon entering the country (as in the mining sector in Chile), and in practice some major 
foreign companies are the primary beneficiaries of tax benefits aimed at specific sectors or activities. Even when 
foreign companies are subject to the same tax rate on their profits as domestic firms, the mobile nature of international 
capital creates room for tax competition between countries to attract FDI. 
Some studies have suggested that this tax competition has led to a loss of revenue, particularly for developing 
economies (Keen and Simone, 2004), although this does not seem to be the case in Latin America. A more recent 
study (Abbas and others, 2012) concluded that in 1996-2007 Latin America was the only region in the world where 
the effective corporate tax rate did not go down but remained unchanged while revenues soared. In fact, today Latin 
America has higher corporate tax rates than other regions of the world (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012). In addition, 
in the aggregate companies pay a little more than the theoretical tax rate because they have to add other taxes that 
more than outweigh any savings they might make owing to exemptions in other areas. The result is that the actual 
tax rate in the subregion is around 30%: the highest worldwide. In short, there is little evidence of tax competition 
among Latin American countries to attract FDI, though there may be some in specific areas, such as export platform 
investments. In the Caribbean, however, there is evidence of tax competition to attract FDI (Nassar, 2008): corporate 
tax rates have been reduced by 30% in recent years while tax holiday schemes have eroded the tax base.
The tax rate is applied to the profits that companies report in each economy, but transnational corporations have at 
their disposal mechanisms that allow them to transfer a portion of those profits to subsidiaries in other countries, thus 
reducing the taxes that they have to pay in a given country. The main mechanism used to this end is transfer pricing.
Transfer prices are charges for goods and services between subsidiaries in the same group. They are an inevitable 
necessity in a world in which many major companies form value chains with their subsidiaries. There are different 
methodologies for calculating these prices. For example, they can be based on similar arm’s-length transactions or 
by allocating each party’s share according to its contribution to the production process. In any case, companies can 
easily find ways to implement aggressive transfer prices that reduce profits in some countries (those with high tax 
rates) and inflate them in others (those with low rates or no tax on profits).
There are no official data on how widespread this practice is worldwide or on the effects it has on tax revenues in 
different countries, but available estimates point to a very significant impact. The Government of the United States, for 
example, estimates that the country loses US$ 100 billion a year in tax revenue for this reason.15 In the case of Latin 
America, a private study estimated that the region loses 2.2 billion euros in revenue owing to transfer pricing by European 
companies and US$ 29.1 billion owing to the practices of companies from the United States (Christian Aid, 2009).
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It also seems clear that as businesses grow more globalized the use of these instruments is becoming more 
widespread. In 2011 almost half (47%) of the income generated by foreign subsidiaries of United States companies 
was located in just seven economies (Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Singapore 
and Switzerland), which are not those where the companies are most active but rather where they receive more 
favourable tax treatment; this proportion was up from 28% in 1994 (Blouin, Krull and Robinson, 2012).
Given the increased profits generated by transnational corporations in the region, and taking into account that 
the tax pressure in these countries remains above the world average, it is to be expected that transnational corporate 
profit-shifting to low-tax jurisdictions will have an impact on the revenues of the region’s countries. In developed 
economies, the erosion of the tax base by transnational corporations is a matter of public concern, and governments, 
businesses and civil society are reacting to this problem (see box II.3). In addition, burgeoning direct investment by 
Latin American entities abroad will just add another potential source of tax base erosion, since local businesses will 
be able to access the same tools to reduce their tax obligations. For example, 8 of the 20 largest Chilean trans-Latins 
have subsidiaries in the Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands.
Box II.3 
Governments and civil society demand that transnational corporations pay taxes
The coffee chain Starbucks opened its subsidiary in the United 
Kingdom in 1998 and since then has posted a total of 3 billion 
pounds (£) in sales at its more than 700 locations. Since it opened, 
the company has paid only £8.6 million in taxes, despite having 
repeatedly stated that its subsidiary in the United Kingdom was 
successful. Its corporate tax return for 2009 —a year in which the 
board described the company’s performance as positive— it reported 
losses amounting to £52 million (see [online] http://uk.reuters.com/
article/2012/10/15/us-britain-starbucks-tax-idUKBRE89E0EX20121015).
Starbucks uses different strategies so as not to report 
profits in the United Kingdom, all of which are perfectly legal. 
For example, the company pays an amount equal to 6% of its 
sales to another subsidiary in the Netherlands in license fees; 
it buys coffee from a subsidiary in Switzerland, which is then 
transported by another subsidiary in the Netherlands, where 
taxes on commodity trading are particularly low. In addition, the 
United Kingdom subsidiary is funded entirely by intra-group loans 
at LIBOR plus 4%, which is much higher than the rate paid by 
the group on its debt with outsiders. 
Cases like this have begun to be widely discussed in the 
United Kingdom and other European countries. Several civil 
society groups have criticized these practices of transnational 
corporations from various angles: Tax Justice Network (see [online] 
www.taxjustice.net/cms/front_content.php?idcatart=2&lang=1) 
opposes the existence of tax havens and the abuse of transfer 
pricing and proposes specific solutions; Christian Aid (see [online] 
www.christianaid.org.uk/resources/policy/tax.aspx) believes that 
these practices particularly affect developing countries. In the 
context of public spending cuts, organizations including UK Uncut, 
US Uncut and Citizens for Tax Justice believe that increasing the 
taxes paid by transnational corporations would ease the need for 
cuts in social benefits and would reduce public deficits. Some 
have called for a boycott of specific companies. 
Governments have also begun to take action. At its meeting 
in Los Cabos in June 2012, the Group of 20 (G20) supported the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
initiative on tax base erosion, which is being followed by the tax 
authorities in many countries. In January 2013 the OECD published 
a report on the subject, requesting international cooperation and 
concluding that the international tax system had not kept pace 
with changes in global business practices. The problem is rooted 
in a tax system designed to support international trade and avoid 
double taxation. Transnational corporations have taken advantage 
of these regulations to reduce their tax burden. For example, the 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital does not 
help reduce these opportunities, while the United Nations Model 
Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries, which facilitates a more equitable distribution of fiscal 
revenues, is much less commonly used.
One possible way to tackle the problem is to use a simpler 
method of attributing profits to the countries where a company 
operates. In the United States, for example, profits are allocated 
to states on the basis of the number of employees that the 
company has in each. These solutions would likely have other 
disadvantages, such as giving priority to the locations that are 
more labour-intensive, and could even seriously distort companies’ 
recruitment strategies. 
There are still many questions regarding the ability of 
governments and international institutions to significantly 
reform the tax system worldwide. Meanwhile, it will be 
necessary to see what effect civil society campaigns can have 
in this area. Many companies’ corporate social responsibility 
efforts are being negated by their reputation as tax evaders. 
For some companies, however, paying their fair share of taxes 
is an explicit part of their social responsibility (Scheiwiller and 
Symons, 2010). 
Public pressure has forced the United Kingdom subsidiary 
of Starbucks to announce that in 2013-2014 it will voluntarily pay 
£10 million more in taxes than it is required to pay by law (The 
Economist, 2012).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, Paris, 2013; PricewaterhouseCoopers, Corporate income tax – a global analysis, London, 2012; T. 
Scheiwiller and S. Symons, “Corporate responsibility and paying tax”, OECD Observer [online] http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/3132/
Corporate_responsibility_and_paying_tax.html; M.A. Sullivan, “Apple reports high rate but saves billions on taxes”, Tax Analysis, 2012; and “Wake up and 
smell the coffee”, The Economist, 15 December 2012. 
It is no coincidence that the profit-transfer practices of transnational corporations have become a matter of 
political concern as the European Union economies slide into recession and there is increased pressure on public 
finances. It is therefore to be expected that the same concerns will arise in Latin America when the economic cycle 
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In the particular case of natural resources (mining and hydrocarbons), royalties are another fiscal instrument by 
which States can obtain a fraction of transnational corporation profits. In fact, royalties are designed in part to prevent 
transfer pricing and other financial practices from unduly limiting the State’s revenues from national resources that are 
non-renewable and, in many cases, of great economic and political importance. A notable case was that of Disputada 
de Las Condes, a Chilean mining company that, during the years it was owned by ExxonMobil, drastically reduced 
the taxes it paid in Chile by obtaining 99% of its funding by borrowing from its subsidiaries; it thus paid 4% tax on 
the interest on those loans instead of the 35% it would have paid on capital gains. In 2001, ExxonMobil sold the 
mining company to Anglo American for US$ 1.3 billion, which reflects the profitability of the asset (ECLAC, 2003).
Nevertheless, royalties account for only a small share of the tax contributions that mining and oil companies pay 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2012a).
2. Transnational enterprises and balance-of-payments sustainability
As discussed in section C, over the past decade the profits of transnational corporations have become one of the main 
components of the aggregate balance of payments in Latin America and the Caribbean. It is therefore important to 
consider their potential impact on the economies of the region, both at present and in the future.
A country’s current account deficit will be sustainable and will not jeopardize economic growth if it can be 
funded on the international market (ECLAC, 2012d). The growth rate to which countries can aspire without coming 
up against this external constraint depends on four variables: (i) the net exports of each economy; (ii) the terms of 
trade; (iii) capital flows between the economy and the rest of the world; and (iv) net payments to non-resident factors 
of production.
In addition to the influence of these four variables in the balance of payments, each country will face potential 
deficits from a different position, depending on its level of reserves, sovereign funds (if any) and degree of access to 
international markets, which is mainly determined by its credit history. The combination of these conditions means that 
in the short term the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are subject to very different external constraints.
The external shocks that periodically affect the region’s economic growth typically take the form of sudden 
changes in the terms of trade and capital flows. As described in section C, capital flows tend to be less volatile if 
a larger share of them is in the form of FDI than in the form of portfolio investment and bank loans and deposits. 
Although FDI flows vary greatly from year to year, these variations are never comparable to those suffered by other 
types of investment and are very rarely negative.
While FDI has become the main component of the financial account, FDI income is also the main component 
of investment income and the main cause of income balance deficits. The earnings of transnational companies in 
the region (minus those generated by the trans-Latins abroad) are the main net payment to non-resident production 
factors and, therefore, have become a determinant of external constraints on the economies of the region (Abeles, 
Lavarello and Montagu, 2013).
When looking at the connection between sustainable economic growth and external constraints, it is necessary 
to consider not only the amount of net FDI income that the countries in the region pay out to the rest of the world, but 
also the effects that FDI has on other variables that affect external constraints, particularly net exports and the terms 
of trade. Large FDI inflows, which are expected to generate high outflows of FDI income, should also generate an 
equivalent net export balance or contribute to structural change in the host economy that in turn changes the terms 
of trade, so as not to impact the external constraints on the economy. High FDI earnings in sectors such as natural 
resources thus go hand in hand with high export flows, while FDI income in sectors that meet domestic demand do 
not have this export equivalent. 
It is also necessary to consider how FDI income can be expected to react to an external shock. The strong link 
between the profits of transnational corporations in the region and export commodity prices would suggest that a 
drastic drop in these prices, which would adversely affect the terms of trade of most countries in the region, would also 
trigger a decline in FDI income. Beyond the natural-resources sector, FDI income can be considered a countercyclical 
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flows into the economy decline or turn negative. While the income earned by direct investors is closely linked to the 
performance of the economy, interest on loans or bonds must be paid regardless of the current situation.
In short, while in the 1990s and early 2000s FDI inflows were seen as an indisputable boon for the balance of 
payments in many countries, their contribution to external equilibrium is now regarded as doubtful and, in many 
cases, negative. Given the large stock of FDI in the region, this situation will undoubtedly continue in the medium 
term, alleviated to some extent in certain countries by the income produced by the trans-Latins. The long-term impact 
on the economic cycle will depend on the type of investment received.
F. Conclusions
The increased profitability of the operations of transnational corporations in Latin America and the Caribbean 
since 2003 is part of a global trend. This is attributable, first, to the continuous rise of corporate profits in most 
countries, both in absolute terms and relative to GDP. Second, because of business internationalization many 
companies are conducting an increasing proportion of their activities —and, therefore, generating an ever larger 
share of their profits— in third countries. As a result, a growing portion of the business surplus is recorded in 
the balance of payments as FDI income.
In the long term, therefore, FDI income worldwide can be expected to remain at high levels. In Latin America and 
the Caribbean, there will continue to be a significant imbalance between outward and inward FDI income. Although 
in these economies inward FDI income is equivalent to only 13% of their FDI income outflow, inward and outward 
FDI trends have been narrowing the gap since 2009 (see chapter I); this pattern can be expected to continue in the 
near future. However, the gap will not be closed throughout the region in the foreseeable future: while almost all 
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean receive substantial amounts of FDI (and, therefore, generate FDI 
income), very few have comparable FDI outflows (are recipients of FDI income).
There are great disparities in the FDI income levels generated in the different countries in the region, depending 
on the prevailing business strategies in each. In general, those countries where a large share of FDI has focused on 
the extraction of natural resources (particularly mining) have generated the most FDI income in the past decade. 
Current FDI income levels in the region have thus been contingent on high export commodity prices; in the short 
term, significant fluctuations can be expected in line with price trends. Because of this relationship, an external shock 
caused by worsening terms of trade would be buffered by a decline in capital outflows in the form of FDI income.
Given the substantial profits attained by transnational corporations in the region and the fact that a significant 
share of them are generated by exploiting non-renewable resources, ensuring that these companies contribute fairly 
to tax revenues is a matter of particular urgency. The ability of transnational corporations to transfer their profits 
legally from the originating country to jurisdictions with more favorable tax treatment has caused concern among 
governments as to the potential for tax base erosion. While initiatives to minimize erosion have so far been limited 
to developed countries, especially in Europe, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean should join efforts to 
adjust their domestic tax regulations and to coordinate on an international level to achieve a worldwide agreement 
to rein in the more aggressive practices of transnational corporations. For the important case of natural resources, 
revenues raised by taxing corporate income should be supplemented with other fiscal instruments (such as royalties) 







Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
Beyond the impact that these profits might have on countries’ tax bases, the level that they have reached over the 
past decade has meant that in recent years FDI as a whole has had an ambiguous effect on the balance of payments 
in the region. In many countries, FDI inflows now pale in comparison with outflows of FDI income, making it all 
the more urgent to measure the impact of FDI in terms of its contribution to employment, exports, local value added 
and, in a more dynamic sense, structural change.
For FDI to continue contributing to these objectives, it will be necessary to maintain adequate incentives for 
productive investments. But at the same time, it is important to recognize that the record profits of recent years can 
be challenged by public authorities and civil society, especially if it is perceived that transnational corporations are 
not contributing fairly to tax revenues, the creation of good-quality jobs and economic development in the broadest 
sense. Governments should fine-tune their policies and regulations to strike a balance between investment incentives 
and the equitable distribution of profits. Transnational corporations themselves should also be aware of this challenge 
and duly adjust their corporate social responsibility stance.
Finally, it is vital to remember two important elements that lie behind the figures for soaring FDI income in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The first is that almost half of these profits are reinvested in the economies in which they 
are generated and, even though these reinvested earnings continue to increase the financial liability of the economies 
involved, they also boost production capacity. The second consideration is the growth of outward direct investment 
by some economies (Mexico and Chile in particular, but also Brazil and Colombia), which means that in the medium 
term FDI income outflows will be partially offset by the income generated by trans-Latins abroad.
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Agriculture1 and agro-industry2 are currently the focus of a global debate on food security, energy security and 
climate change. The world population is expected to reach 9 billion by 2050; to meet the demand for food, 
agricultural production will need to increase by 70% over the level recorded in 2006 (FAO, 2009). Virtually all 
of the net population increase of 2 billion will be in the emerging and developing economies. This demographic 
trend is accompanied by rising family incomes3 (see figure III.1) and an increasingly Westernized diet based on 
higher consumption of animal protein (see figure III.2) and more highly processed food.
1 For the purposes of this chapter, agriculture includes all primary activities related to the production of crops (that is, activities that seek 
to obtain agricultural raw materials) and livestock (cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry). It thus includes all economic activities that have 
their basis in the exploitation of the earth’s resources, favoured by human action (FAO, 1997).
2 A common and traditional definition of agro-industry refers to the subset of manufacturing that turns out intermediate or end products 
derived from the agricultural sector. Agro-industry therefore refers to processing agriculture, forestry and fisheries products (FAO, 1997). 
This chapter looks at agro-industry activities in the areas of food (or agro-food) and agro-energy (specifically, the production of biofuels).
3 Mainly in the case of the emerging economies (such as Brazil, China, India and Indonesia, with a combined population of 3 billion 
and annual economic growth rates between 4% and 9%). 
At the same time, the rising price of oil, the pursuit of energy security and the commitment to mitigate climate change 
have led the governments of a number of countries to support the production and use of biofuels. Maize and sugar 
cane have been ethanol feedstocks in the United States and Brazil, respectively, while canola (rapeseed) has been the 
biodiesel feedstock in the European Union. According to World Bank estimates (2010), the total area under biofuel 
crops has grown at a dizzying pace in recent times, more than doubling between 2004 and 2008 when it hit the 
36 million hectare mark. 
All of these changes are creating challenges and opportunities in the agricultural and agro-industry sector, 
particularly in the case of grains, oilseeds, sugar cane and other flex-crops that can be used for human consumption 
or animal feed or for making biofuels but compete for the same basic inputs: land and water. 
To respond to the increasing new food and biofuel demand it is necessary to address the physical, technological 
and institutional factors that limit the growth of agricultural supply. The physical constraints (such as the number of 
hectares of land available for agricultural use) are relevant, especially locally, because worldwide studies (Roudart, 
2010) indicate that there is enough land for expanding food production. 
Estimates of agricultural productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean suggest that the region is closer to 
its potential than Africa but is still below the levels reached in other, more developed economies (GAEZ, 2013). 
Therefore, a key objective is to increase productivity and achieve full potential. This poses challenges in the spheres 
of science, technology and innovation for development and involves adopting new techniques that, in turn, mitigate 
environmental risks (not only those related to climate change, but also those associated with the rise in specialization, 
or mono-cropping, in many countries of the region). The use of new technologies for controlling biotic conditions 
(genetically modified organisms are one example) raises new issues, as well, because weeds, insects and diseases 
adapt and climate change could make them evolve in unexpected directions and become resistant.
Another challenge is the slowing rate of growth of agricultural yields shown in empirical studies (Adlas and 
Achoth, 2006; Estudillo and Otsuka, 2004), to a degree that varies by geographical area and level of climate stress. 
Pingali (2007) pointed out three factors to explain this downtrend in the major grains for human consumption: (i) land 
degradation due to more intensive farming; (ii) the rising opportunity cost of agricultural labour; and (iii) declining 
agricultural infrastructure and research investment. 









Selected emerging countries: real per capita income, 1980-2011
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators [database], 2012.
a  Purchasing power parity.
Figure III.2 
Selected countries: food consumption patterns, 2005
(Income elasticity for food subcategories)
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Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), International Food Consumption Patterns, 2012. 
Figure III.3 illustrates this last point. Between 1975 and 2000, public expenditure and investment in agricultural 
research dropped throughout the world; the percentage decrease is particularly significant in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. With public spending on agriculture trending down, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the sector can play 
a very important role (particularly in low-income countries), not only by disseminating new technologies to achieve 
high yields while sustainably managing natural resources, but also by contributing to economic growth in rural areas 
(where much of global poverty is still concentrated). 
Another factor that is putting pressure on agricultural supply is food waste. According to estimates, approximately 
one third of the food produced is not consumed (Saravia-Matus and others, 2012). In low-income countries, food 
loss tends to occur before or after harvesting; in high-income countries wastage is concentrated almost equally in 
supply chains (from farm to supermarket) and at the consumer level (Hodges and others, 2011; Gómez and Paloma 
and others, 2012).
Institutional factors can be a drag on the growth of agricultural supply, especially in the short and medium term. 
This is what happens, for example, when exchange rate appreciation or agricultural price volatility (which reached 
record highs between 2007 and 2008) make agriculture less competitive, or when the export tax structure is a key 
factor. In the longer run, increasing the area under cultivation is also constrained by infrastructure bottlenecks (such 
as difficulty of access and lack of irrigation systems or storage) and governance issues (like ownership rights). 









Annual growth rates of agricultural research expenditures by geographical area, 1976-2000
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Source: N. Beintema and H. Elliot, “Current trends in food retailing and consumption and key choices facing society”, European Food System in a Changing World, 
R. Rabbinge and A. Linnermann (eds.), Brussels, 2009.
Owing to factors such as these, the World Food Programme (WFP) has noted that the world has gone from a structural 
food surplus to a structural food deficit (WFP, 2007). This, together with the demand for biofuels, explains the renewed 
interest in controlling and securing access to natural and agricultural resources (land, water and nutrients). At the agro-
industry level, transnational food mega-companies are consolidating and a new generation of transnationals is emerging.
In short, technological and institutional innovations are needed to address the challenges involved in reversing 
the downtrend in agricultural yields, promoting land fertility conservation and the sustainable use of water, and 
developing agricultural production and trade infrastructure. Despite technological and infrastructure constraints in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, land and water are available for increasing the area under production.4 However, 
this will require new and strategic investments that are environmentally and socioeconomically responsible and 
involve realigning institutions and supporting innovation.
Because the sector has been low on government investment and international cooperation agendas in recent decades, 
FDI flows to agriculture and agro-industry are playing a strategic role in meeting current demographic and climate challenges.
This chapter focuses on three major areas of interest. Section B puts the strategic value of FDI into context, 
discussing major trends and developments in agriculture and agro-industry in the region. Recent investments in 
agricultural land worldwide are examined in order to understand the situation in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Section B goes on to describe the changing role of agro-industry in the global and regional food market, and it ends 
with a look at the macroeconomics of FDI flows to agriculture and agro-industry. 
The second focus is on foreign investment in two major production subsectors: the agro-commodities cluster 
and the agricultural inputs sector (see section C).5 The goal is to identify linkages in the production of flex-crops to 
produce food, energy and fodder and track the flow of investments in seeds and fertilizers as key inputs for increasing 
agricultural yields. This section seeks an understanding of the strategies followed by major transnational corporations 
in the region (including the trans-Latins) and the dynamics of the supply chains of which they are a part. It therefore 
provides an overview of the production dynamics of each agro-chain and the business strategies involved, based on 
available statistics (often weak or incomplete), a review of the literature and field work done specifically for this report. 
Lastly, Section D sets out the conclusions of the study, reviewing the dynamics of FDI in the region’s agricultural and 
agro-industry sector, the strategies behind FDI flows and the public policy instruments available to attract and regulate 
these flows. The emphasis is on innovation, environmental responsibility and social inclusion of small and medium-sized 
producers, as well as on potential synergies for accelerating the growth of rural economies in Latin America and the Caribbean.
4 Latin America and the Caribbean has enormous potential for producing food. It has the largest reservoir of arable land in the world 
(576 million hectares, equivalent to 30% of the worldwide total ), 30% of the planet’s renewable water reserves, 25% of the world’s 
forest area (including 46% of its tropical forests) and 30% of the world’s biodiversity (Sotomayor and others, 2011). 
5 The focus is on these issues because they are more directly linked to the challenges of food security, energy supply and environmental 
preservation. Because of space limitations, other important sectors such as dairy products, coffee, cocoa, fruits, vegetables, non-alcoholic 
beverages, wine, beer, mineral water, baked goods and sweets are not discussed.








B. Global and regional patterns and trends  
 in foreign direct investment in  
 agriculture and agro-industry
1. The emerging issue of investment in land
The recent wave of information from academia and the media on agricultural land “mega-deals” throughout the 
world has helped propel agriculture onto the political and socioeconomic agenda, mainly in countries with inflows 
of this type of FDI (see box III.1). 
Box III.1 
What is land grabbing?
The term “land grabbing” has drawn media attention and been 
a focus of academic and policy discussions over the past few 
years. But sources and authors disagree on how to define and 
measure it and gauge its impact because there is no standard 
approach that is widely accepted in the literature. 
In English, the term “land grabbing” has a negative 
connotation and refers to the purchase or leasing of large tracts 
of agricultural land. In Spanish, the term has sometimes been 
translated as land ownership concentration and foreignization, 
but this does not provide an accurate picture of contested 
definitions. 
According to the Land Matrix database, land grabbing is a 
matter of scale because of the size of the deals involved: as much 
as half a million hectares (which is unprecedented). This database 
records and classifies transfers of more than 1,000 hectares of 
agricultural land anywhere in the world. 
A recent FAO study (2011) defines land grabbing as purchases of 
agricultural land driven by foreign investors with the support of their 
governments. It assesses the impact in terms of changes in food 
security levels in the countries where these investments are made.
According to Borras and others (2012), land grabbing is the 
purchase of land, regardless of the type of investor (including 
nationality) or whether it is for agricultural or non-agricultural use. 
This definition explicitly includes the role of national and regional 
actors in land grabbing in Latin America. 
None of these definitions include cross-border movement 
or migration because it involves the purchase or leasing of 
agricultural land on a smaller scale.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Fernando Soto Barquero and Sergio Gómez (eds.), Dinámicas del 
mercado de la tierra en América Latina y el Caribe: concentración y extranjerización, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 
2011; and S. Borras and others, “Land grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 39, No. 3-4, 2012.
According to a World Bank study (2010), in 2009 foreign investors expressed interest in acquiring about 
56 million hectares around the world. The same study notes that owing to institutional constraints and lack of 
transparency in some deals, confirming that the investments actually took place and that the land was indeed 
put to agricultural use was possible for only 20% of the land in question. Despite the difficulty in obtaining 
reliable data, according to the same source it is clear that interest in purchasing or leasing agricultural land 
has grown exponentially over the past decade. Early this century, agricultural land was expanding by about 
4 million hectares per year, but between 2006 and 2009 the average rose to 11.3 million hectares per year. The 
World Bank (2010) has estimated that by 2030 an average of 6 million hectares of new land will be put into 
agricultural production each year. Experts regard this figure as a conservative estimate.
According to the Land Matrix database (2012), between 2000 and 2010 about 50 million hectares were or had 
been announced as part of investment projects. Although most such transactions take place in Africa, it is estimated 
that nearly 6.5 million hectares (13% of the worldwide total) correspond to land acquisitions in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Excluding forestry and conservation projects brings the overall number of hectares down to about 
30 million, of which 4.3 million hectares (14% of the total) are in Latin America and the Caribbean. Figure III.4 breaks 
down those 4.3 million hectares by investor country of origin (according to the data available in the Land Matrix 
database), showing that 30% are investors from the region and 33% are from elsewhere; for the remaining 37%, the 
country of origin could not be confirmed and is therefore classed as “unknown”. 
A recent FAO study (2011) on agricultural land concentration and foreign land acquisition in Latin America and the 
Caribbean suggests that this phenomenon is in its infancy and is mainly concentrated in Argentina and Brazil. In the study, 
which covers 17 countries of the region, the discussion of land grabbing is focused on States as investors in land. The study 
looks at land deals that meet two conditions: they involve large areas targeted for the production of food, and at least one 
foreign government is among the actors or stakeholders. Depending on the context in each country, the review extends to 
deals involving other crops and other investors. It highlights codes of conduct or good practices aimed at mitigating negative 
externalities for the countries where the land deals take place and for the local population. On the basis of the study it 
can be concluded that the region’s land market is growing briskly, especially since the 2007-2008 agricultural price crisis.









Latin America and the Caribbean: origin of investors in agricultural land purchase  


















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Land Matrix DataBase 2012.
a Does not include investments in forests or conservation. The total number of hectares (4.3 million) refers to 2000-2011, although the exact year of the deal could 
be determined for just 7% of this total. 
b Investors whose nationality is not specified in the Land Matrix database.
Box III.2 
A different kind of foreign investment: cross-border migration in Latin America
Offshoring agricultural activities is nothing new, but it is on the 
rise (Dirven, 2012). The main migration flow is associated with 
the massive displacement of Brazilian farmers towards Argentina, 
Paraguay, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. Brazil 
was settled in waves once the population was established in the 
coastal areas, and the process continued towards central and 
north-eastern Brazil and then intensified in the south. Because 
the country is much narrower there, settlers quickly reached the 
border areas with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. In the 1970s 
these areas were sparsely populated, so it is not surprising that 
large-scale Brazilian farmers set up operations there and were 
followed by a large contingent of rural workers. The process 
gathered momentum in the 1980s, leading to the current levels. 
The largest contingent of small and medium-scale farmers 
went to Paraguay, drawn by the wide availability of land. Smaller 
numbers moved into Argentina and Uruguay because less land 
was available and the cost was not as low. The triple interaction 
between agroindustrial modernization, the gradual closing of the 
agricultural frontier and relatively flexible controls over the movement 
of persons allowed large contingents of itinerant workers to drift 
from one country to another across extensive stretches of the border 
(Galeano, 1997). As new land was deforested, territory settled and 
an array of services set into motion, the Brazilians have consolidated 
a large-scale production model that is heavily industrialized but not 
very diversified; this has changed the production landscape and 
Brazil’s economy. Although Argentina has laws that bar foreigners 
from settling in border areas, many small-scale Brazilian growers 
have done so. But they have not radically changed the nature of the 
rural economy. This is not the case in Uruguay, which is exposed 
to pressure on two fronts: from Argentina and Brazil. 
In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, one of the most recent 
cross-border movements has been in the department of Santa 
Cruz, which saw a surge towards the end of the twentieth 
century. This department is one of the country’s richest, and in 
the past two decades its growth has outpaced the national rate. 
Much of this growth has been fuelled by a boom in agricultural 
activity, which accounts for 56% of the department’s foreign 
trade. Its main products are oilseeds, sugar, hides, timber, cotton, 
and vegetable oil and alcohol products (Urioste, 2011). Modern 
agroindustrial farming in low-lying areas of the department has 
been displacing traditional rural farming (concentrated in the 
valleys and Andean highlands) and expanded the agricultural 
frontier from 413,320 hectares in 1990 to 1,821,631 hectares 
in 2007. Of this total, an estimated 1 million hectares is devoted 
to the soybean complex and the rest to other crops. Santa Cruz 
thus accounts for 66% the 2.7 million hectares of land under 
cultivation in the Plurinational State of Bolivia (Urioste, 2011). 
As noted above, much of the agricultural boom is directly 
related to the expansion of soybean farming, driven to a large part 
by land owners from Brazil who arrived in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia in three waves. The first and smallest was in the late 1980s. 
The second, and largest, was between 1993 and 1999, when the 
government was promoting its Eastern Lowlands programme to 
encourage the use of very productive land and the development 
of infrastructure, thus expanding the supply of cheap fertile land 
(Urioste, 2011). Lastly, since 2005 there has been a new wave of 
immigration from Brazil. This time, however, it is not restricted so 
much to the soybean business but rather to the search for land 
for livestock (Urioste, 2011). In addition to the Brazilians, recent 
years have brought reports of an equally large wave of immigrants 
from Argentina, although it is not known whether this relates to 
businesses with operations in Argentina or Brazil, private interests, 
or a combination of both (Urioste, 2011).
In addition to the high mobility of Brazilian farmers in the 
Southern Cone, there is an emerging trend: Brazilian growers 
are beginning to settle in Africa, drawn by similar agroecological 
conditions. Since 2009, a number of major producers have been 
growing cotton, soybeans, rice and maize, among other crops, 
on land under concession from the Governments of Angola, 
Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, the Sudan and other countries (PIB, 
2009; VOA, 2011). This is taking place in the private sector, but it 
is associated with Brazil’s growing presence in Africa boosted by 
several government initiatives. One of these is the Mais Alimentos 
programme coordinated by the Ministry of Agrarian Development 
(MDA), which is aimed at improving food and nutrition security 
in Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal and Zimbabwe through 
lines of credit for the purchase of Brazilian agricultural machinery, 
which is particularly suited to family agriculture in Africa. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of M. Urioste, Extranjerización de la tierra boliviana, La Paz, Fundación Tierra.








Based on a review of the data used in the FAO study (2011), Borras and others (2012) conclude that at least 
10 countries of the region —in addition to Argentina and Brazil— are seeing a surge in agricultural land deals. 
According to these authors, the differences in how the data are interpreted lie in how agricultural land deals are 
defined and in the scope of the term “land grabbing”. FAO (2011) analyses land grabbing on the basis of its potential 
negative impact on food security in the host country and the profile of the foreign investors involved. Borras and 
others (2012) emphasize that a large part of land deals in the region are being handled by trans-Latin companies with 
contacts and representatives in the country in question. Table III.1 summarizes the type of land use involved in most 
of these deals in selected countries of the region, according to the definition used by these authors.
Table III.1 
Latin America (selected countries): intended uses in land investments
Country Branches of production Others
Argentina Soybeans, wheat, sugar cane, livestock Tobacco, conservation
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Soybeans, livestock Logging 
Brazil Soybeans, sugar cane, livestock, poultry, fruit Logging
Chile Fruit, dairy products, wineries, seeds, poultry Conservation and logging
Colombia Palm oil, sugar cane, soybeans, rice and maize Logging
Ecuador Bananas, sugar cane, palm oil Logging, minerals
Paraguay Soybeans, maize, wheat, livestock 
Peru Fruit, vegetables, sugar cane, palm oil Minerals
Uruguay Soybeans, dairy products, wheat, rice, livestock Logging
Mexico Maize (supply chain), sugar cane, fruit, coffee Flowers, tequila, conservation
Costa Rica Bananas, pineapples, palm oil 
Guatemala Sugar cane, palm oil Logging
Nicaragua Livestock, rice, palm oil, sugar cane, citrus Tourism, logging
Dominican Republic Sugar cane, bananas, fruit, vegetables
Guyana Sugar cane, livestock, rice, pineapples Logging
Trinidad and Tobago Sugar cane, cocoa, fruit
Source: S. Borras and others, “Land grabbing in Latin America and the Caribbean”, Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 39, No. 3-4, 2012.
The figures from Paraguay provide an idea of the scale and pattern of agricultural land purchases. Borras and 
others (2012) note that between 2006 and 2010, 1.8 million hectares of land were acquired by foreign companies, 
bringing the area under foreign ownership in Paraguay up to almost 6 million hectares. Urioste (2011) stresses that 
of the 5.5 million hectares used to produce some kind of food, about 1 million hectares are in the hands of foreign 
nationals. Brazilian nationals have acquired ownership of nearly 700,000 hectares, Argentines 100,000 hectares, 
and Mennonites and Japanese nationals another 200,000 hectares. The existence of a similar dynamic in other 
countries (with deals that are not in the Land Matrix database) would mean that the data in figure III.4 might be 
understating the scale of land acquisition in Latin America and the Caribbean. Moreover, the fact that the purchase 
of land by foreign nationals is defined and measured in different ways shows that it is more important to focus 
on trends rather than on exact numbers. In any case, these differences cast light on the ongoing discussion of 
investment in and acquisition of agricultural land, which must be put into context in order to avoid comparing 
sources that use different methodologies. 
The nature and interests of investors involved in the acquisition of land have changed, too. On the one hand, the 
ranks of traditional investors (agricultural and agro-industry companies) whose primary goal is to ensure inputs for the 
production of food or fodder are being joined by a growing group of companies venturing into biofuel production. 
On the other hand, public enterprises and mixed consortia financed by sovereign wealth funds (especially in Asian 
and Middle Eastern countries) are playing an ever larger role as they seek, among other things, to secure access to 
natural resources so as to offset their own limitations, avoid the impact of international agricultural price volatility 
or enhance their countries’ food self-sufficiency. In addition, the financial crisis and the commodity price boom 
made investing in land and agro-commodities more attractive for investment banks and pension fund managers. As 
a result, the actors interested in investing in agricultural land have grown more diverse; the long-term consequences 
remain to be seen. 








Evidence submitted by Borras and others (2012) and Land Matrix data indicate that in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
trans-Latin companies operating in a variety of sectors account for most of the agricultural land deals where the origin of the 
investors is known. However, the presence of these new actors and their interests should not be overlooked; even though 
their operations in the region are still incipient, their growing presence in the future could change how land and natural 
resources are used and have significant medium- and long-term impacts. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that 
37% per cent of the investments in purchasing or leasing land are from investors whose origin is unknown.
2. Restructuring agro-industry in the food markets
The past few decades have seen the consolidation of a small set of large, global food companies like Nestlé (dairy; 
Switzerland), Kraft Foods, Inc. (food; United States) and Unilever (food; the Netherlands).6 This phenomenon is part 
of a broader shift from the agro-industry stage to a new one that some authors have labelled “agro-tertiary” (Ayadi and 
others, 2006). In this new phase, the influence of the major agro-industrial processing and distribution transnationals is 
growing as they draw ever closer to the end consumer by managing globally recognized brands that go beyond food.
In addition to the consolidation of food industry mega-transnationals,7 a new generation of transnationals is 
emerging. It includes new Asian commodities giants, Latin American transnationals (the agro-food trans-Latins) with 
an increasingly high global market profile, and much smaller, flexible and decentralized companies with high-quality 
(specialty) products.
The list of the 500 largest companies in Latin America and the Caribbean (América Economía, 2011) includes 
51 agro-food companies (or agro-industry firms whose products target the food market). Some of them are, on 
the basis of volume of sales, in a class with the major global transnationals in the sector. Of these 51 companies, 
23 are from Brazil, 15 from Mexico, 4 from Argentina, 4 from Peru, 3 from Chile and 2 from Colombia. Brazil’s 
JBS-Friboi ranks first in the agro-food sector and is the ninth largest company in the region (see table III.2). 
Of the 51 Latin American and Caribbean agro-food companies on the América Economía list, at least 21 are 
trans-Latins8 whose growth is based on successful mergers and acquisitions strategies not only in countries of the 
region but also in Canada, Europe and the United States (see point 1 in section D).
The strategy for growing through agro-industry mergers and acquisitions is favoured by the tighter regulation 
—national and global— of food production and distribution (and, more recently, by policy incentives for 
producing biofuels) because setting up subsidiaries and joint ventures or acquiring local enterprises creates 
economies of scale that make it easier to comply with these regulations.
Mergers and acquisitions also boost value creation. From the point of view of economic content, food tends 
to be transformed into services: agricultural raw materials account for less than 20% of the value of the final 
product. The rest comes from activities associated with industrial processing, packaging, shipping, marketing, 
financial services, insurance and taxes. The reason for this trend is that in the new knowledge economy, food 
manufacturers not only sell food, but intangible goods and images as well in order to meet growing consumer 
demand for health, beauty, longevity, vitality, well-being and identity (Barrera, 2010). 
At the international level, mergers and acquisitions in the agricultural and agro-industry (food processing) sector 
rose sharply worldwide during 2007-2008 (UNCTAD, 2009). The net value of these transactions in the agricultural 
sector amounted to US $1.8 billion in 2007 and US $ 2.1 billion in 2008. The figure for the agro-industry sector was 
much higher: US $ 33 billion in 2007 and US $86 billion in 2008.
6 It is estimated that, in 2002, 27% of global food production was concentrated in the 100 largest transnational food corporations, mainly 
from the United States and Europe. The top 15 of these corporations had a total combined sales value of US$ 336.392 billion in 2002 
(Ayadi, Rastoin and Tozanli, 2006).
7 The same is true of the large transnational mega-companies that supply agricultural inputs (see point 2 in section C). By contrast, it is 
still too early to tell whether biofuel mega-production will follow a similar trend. In any case, the entry of companies such as BP and 
Shell could help reshape this sector in the same way if they decide to invest more in this area.
8 Companies were classed as trans-Latins if their web pages gave information on investments in the region (as of 15 January 2013).









Latin America and the Caribbean: agro-food companies ranked among the 500 largest firms,  
according to 2011 sales
(Millions of dollars)
Agro-food company Country Sector Sales Ranking
1 JBS-Friboi a Brazil Agro-industry 32 944.2 9
2 Femsa b Mexico Beverages 14 557.7 25
3 AmBev a Brazil Beverages 14 461.4 27
4 Brasil Foods (BRF) a Brazil Food 13 704.1 28
5 Bunge Alimentos b Brazil Agro-industry 12 340.0 34
6 Cosan b Brazil Agro-industry 12 214.7 35
7 Marfrig a Brazil Agro-industry 11 667.0 37
8 Coca-Cola b Brazil Beverages 11 000.0 42
9 Cargill b Brazil Agro-industry 10 065.0 46
10 Grupo Bimbo a Mexico Food 9 586.7 50
11 Coca-Cola Femsa b Mexico Beverages 8 941.7 59
12 Grupo Modelo a Mexico Beverages 6 539.0 77
13 Copersucar a Brazil Agro-industry 5 987.0 84
14 Nestlé b Brazil Food 5 082.0 99
15 Grupo Industrial Lala a Mexico Food 4 802.7 104
16 Cargill b Argentina Agro-industry 4 743.0 106
17 Louis Dreyfus Commodities b Brazil Agro-industry 4 187.0 125
18 Gruma a Mexico Food 4 133.0 129
19 Cervecería Cuauhtémoc – Heineken b Mexico Beverages 3 986.4 135
20 Pepsico de México b Mexico Beverages 3 835.2 138
21 Nestlé de México b Mexico Food 3 226.4 171
22 Embotelladoras Arca a Mexico Beverages 3 211.8 173
23 Molinos Río de la Plata a Argentina Agro-industry 3 106.7 182
24 Arcor a Argentina Food 3 100.0 183
25 Coamo c Brazil Food 2 960.0 189
26 Souza Cruz c Brazil Agro-industry 2 958 8 190
27 Sigma Alimentos a Mexico Food 2 945 1 191
28 Aceitera General Deheza a Argentina Agro-industry 2 900.0 196
29 Bavaria c Colombia Beverages 2 565 6 220
30 Grupo Nutresa a Colombia Food 2 553 2 224
31 Spal c Brazil Beverages 2 222.0 259
32 Syngenta Brasil b Brazil Agro-industry 2 152.0 267
33 Agrosuper c Chile Agro-industry 2 149.5 268
34 Minerva a Brazil Agro-industry 2 120.1 274
35 Industrias Bachoco a Mexico Agro-industry 1 988.5 286
36 Embotelladora Andina a Chile Beverages 1 884.8 303
37 Aurora Alimentos c Brazil Food 1 875.0 306
38 CCU a Chile Beverages 1 859.3 310
39 Holding Alimentario del Perú a Peru Food 1 790.8 320
40 Ajegroup b Peru Beverages 1 719.3 338
41 Grupo Schincariol b Brazil Beverages 1 684.0 344
42 Cooxupé c Brazil Food 1 622.0 358
43 Alicorp a Peru Food 1 578.5 368
44 M. Dias Branco c Brazil Food 1 551.9 382
45 Sukarne c Mexico Food 1 511.3 393
46 Syngenta Agro b Mexico Agro-industry 1 496.2 400
47 C. Vale c Brazil Agro-industry 1 429.0 413
48 Primo Schincariol b Brazil Beverages 1 248.0 461
49 Danone b Mexico Food 1 198.1 476
50 LBR Lácteos Brasil c Brazil Food 1 180.0 481
51 Backus y Johnston b Peru Beverages 1 114.8 498
Source: América Economía, Ranking de las 500 mayores empresas de América Latina, December 2011. 
a  Trans-Latin.
b  Foreign-owned (countries outside the region).
c  Operating in the domestic market, according to information provided on web pages as of 15 January 2013.








In short, the rearrangement of agro-industry chains is the result of mergers and acquisitions strategies employed by 
transnational corporations in order to compete in the global market. These operations are influenced by competition 
among companies in each production sector and by multilateral agreements and policy instruments implemented 
by national governments. These political and institutional frameworks are in turn very much determined by the 
dynamics of world agriculture. For example, it is likely that rising agricultural prices in 2007-2008 curbed a general 
trend towards deregulation, as evidenced by the stalled Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) talks. 
Highly volatile agricultural prices, together with poverty and food problems for a significant portion of the world’s 
population, along with the environmental impact of the current agricultural development model, are also likely to 
operate in favour of a change at the institutional level that could change the behaviour of transnational companies 
and further spur interest in controlling and securing access to natural resources, especially in the form of agricultural 
land and water. 
3. Evolution of foreign direct investment flows in  
 the agricultural and agro-industry sector
In the agricultural and agro-industry sector, FDI is driven primarily by an interest in securing the control and use of 
assets that make it possible to tap natural resources (land, water, forests) and use animals for human consumption, as 
well as assets that make it possible to obtain infrastructure for agricultural processing, acquire and develop technology, 
build production partnerships or carry out new mergers and acquisitions. 
Between 1989-1991 and 2005-2007, global FDI flows towards primary activities (agriculture, hunting, fishing 
and logging) and agro-industry operations (food, beverages and tobacco) quadrupled, driven by a number of factors 
including the liberalization of trade and capital flows, the consolidation of free trade agreements and the growth 
of emerging economies (UNCTAD, 2009). The share of FDI going to the agro-food industry (food, beverages and 
tobacco), primarily from developed countries, did not change significantly during this period and went from 98% to 
95%. Meanwhile, the percentage of FDI towards the primary sector in developed countries plummeted from 91% to 
52% because some developing countries began to generate important flows in this area (Rama and Martínez, 2012). 
The UNCTAD report (2009) on FDI in agriculture stresses that, in relative terms, these flows are not significant 
in Latin America and the Caribbean and accounted for just 0.47% of the total between 2005 and 2007. However, 
during this period these flows were important for some countries, ranging, for example, between 6% and 10% of the 
total in Ecuador, Peru, and Honduras and between 1% and 3% in Chile, Costa Rica and Brazil. Moreover, all of these 
countries were listed in the top 20 recipients of FDI in agriculture among the countries considered in the study, and 
the region ranked second after Asia and Oceania as an FDI destination (UNCTAD, 2009). The study shows that in 
South America, investment was concentrated in grains and oilseeds, fruit and meat, while in Central America and the 
Caribbean it was concentrated in fruit and sugar cane. According to the study, the main draws for such investments 
include the structure of the economy, the diversity of agricultural land and national public policies. 
This suggests that not all countries in the region have the same potential for boosting their agricultural sector or 
attracting FDI flows. Noteworthy among the countries with the most potential are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay, which have water in abundance and vast areas of available land. These 
countries are seeking to leverage these resources so as to become major exporters of agricultural and agro-industry 
products, as indeed they already are in sugar, coffee, soybeans, wheat, orange juice, poultry meat, beef, tobacco, 
ethanol and biodiesel, among other products. At the other extreme are the countries of the Caribbean, where the 
shortage of available land and slow growth in the sector have turned them into food importing countries. Between 
these two extremes are the countries of Central America, Mexico and the Andean countries, many of which are 
constrained by, for example, more limited integration into the global market or a more fragmented agrarian structure 
with a high proportion of smallholders. 
National statistics from the countries of the region on FDI flowing into the agricultural and agro-industry sector 
vary widely in availability. In some countries, the data are not recorded separately; in countries where flows are 
recorded, they are grouped according to different criteria. For example, some countries report agricultural FDI 
together with other primary activities (such as fishing). Others include mining sector flows in the same account 
(Guatemala is one example). In addition, FDI in agro-industry operations is often grouped with other industrial 








processes. For this reason, analysing data on FDI in this sector poses a challenge that can be addressed only 
partially. The analysis set out in this section is restricted to the countries that have statistics for agricultural activities 
or agro-industry operations. 
Figure III.5 shows cumulative FDI between 2005 and 2010 in the agricultural sectors of 10 countries of the 
region for which such data were available: US$ 9.255 billion, which is 1.8% of the combined total inward FDI for 
this group of countries (US$ 517.217 billion).
The importance of agricultural FDI varies greatly from one economy to another (see figure III.6). In Uruguay it 
accounts for nearly 22% of total inward FDI between 2005 and 2011. It also makes up a substantial proportion in 
Guatemala (12.5%), Costa Rica (7.3%) and Ecuador (7.2%). As agricultural prices spiralled up in 2007-2008, the 
countries for which data are available saw rising FDI flows to the agricultural sector, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Peru and Uruguay (see figure III.7). 
Figure III.5 
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): cumulative foreign direct  
investment in agriculture, 2005-2011 a

































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the national accounts of the central banks of the respective countries.
a FDI records include the forestry sector. Data on FDI by economic sector in Colombia and Ecuador include the fisheries subsector. In Guatemala, this information 
includes mining. Data on FDI by economic sector in Central Bank of Chile national accounts only began to be issued in 2009. Data prior to 2009 are estimates 
provided by the International Trade Center.
Figure III.6  
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): cumulative foreign  
direct investment in agriculture, 2005-2011 a
























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the national accounts of the central banks of the respective countries.
a Data on FDI by economic sector in Colombia and Ecuador include the fisheries subsector. In Guatemala, this information includes mining. Data on FDI by economic 
sector in Central Bank of Chile national accounts only began to be issued in 2009. Data prior to 2009 are estimates provided by the International Trade Center.









Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): foreign direct  
investment in agriculture, 2005-2010 a
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the national accounts of the central banks of the respective countries.
a FDI records include the forestry sector. Only countries with complete historical series are included. 
FDI in agro-industry in the same 10 countries totalled US$ 42.933 billion between 2005 and 2010 (see figure III.8). 
Most of these flows went to Brazil (37.9%), Mexico (35.9%) and Argentina (15.5%). FDI targeting the agro-industry 
sector in these 10 countries averaged 8.3% of total inward FDI between 2005 and 2010 (US$ 517.217 billion), with 
the lowest percentages in Chile (0.3%) and Colombia (0.4%) and the highest in Uruguay (27.0%) and Argentina 
(17.5%) (see figure III.9).
FDI flows to the agro-industry sector (see figure III.10) are growing at the fastest pace in Mexico and Brazil.
While the amounts of FDI flowing into the agricultural and agro-industry sector in Latin America and the Caribbean 
are not large compared with inward flows in other sectors, they do (especially those targeting agriculture) have a direct 
impact on rural economies and region-wide. That impact can spread out to a large part of the population —especially 
in rural areas, where the population depends on this activity and where, in Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
poorest households tend to be (Rodríguez and Meneses, 2011). 
Figure III.8  
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries): cumulative foreign direct  
investment in agro-industry, 2005-2010 a


































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the national accounts of the central banks of the respective countries.
a  Data include mainly food, beverages and tobacco. Excludes the agricultural machinery industry and biofuel processing.









Latin America and the Caribbean (10 countries): distribution of cumulative foreign direct investment in the primary 
agricultural sector, agro-industry and non-agricultural sectors, 2005-2010
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the national accounts of the central banks of the respective countries.
Figure III.10 
Latin America and the Caribbean (5 countries): foreign direct investment  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the national accounts of the central banks of the respective countries. 
C.  Foreign direct investment trends  
 by subsector
1.  Food-biofuel-fodder agro-commodities clusters
Agro-commodities are agricultural products that are traded in large volumes on a global scale; their properties are 
standardized in the market because they are usually used as raw material for other production processes (Gibbons, 
2009). This section looks at a subgroup of agro-commodities which are termed “flex-crops” because they can be 
used for a variety of purposes (to make food, fodder or biofuels). For this reason they are at the heart of the ongoing 
discussion about food security, energy supply and maintaining the environmental balance of the planet. The crops 
examined here are grains, oilseeds and sugar cane.








Diagram III.1 shows the interrelated uses of flex-crops in different sectors and their linkages in various markets. 
Flex-crops, regardless of whether they are intended for producing food, fodder or biofuel, compete for the same 
basic agricultural inputs (land, water, seeds, fertilizers and fuel). There is also a linkage between the biofuel market 
and the energy market, because the agro-energy business (like other alternative energies) will be profitable if fossil 
energy sources become less competitive or government policy promotes the use of cleaner energies, creating a 
synergy between agricultural markets and energy markets. Another connection that has always existed but has grown 
stronger in recent years is between the financial markets and agricultural activity, especially in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis when rising agricultural prices drove international portfolio investment to diversify into this sector. As 
will be seen, FDI in land, along with mergers and acquisitions in the flex-crop sector, are largely shaped by strategies 
in which the linkages described in diagram III.1 play a fundamental role.
Diagram III.1 
Agricultural product uses and linkages to the inputs, food and energy markets
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petroleum, biodiesel, and ethanol
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
This section is divided into three large blocs: production of grains, oilseeds and sugar cane (agro-commodities 
in the food-biofuel-fodder cluster); production of biofuel (ethanol and biodiesel); and meat agro-chains that rely 
heavily on fodder as input.
(a)  Grains, oilseeds and sugar cane: the flex-crops
The set of agricultural commodities discussed in this subsection includes wheat, maize, sorghum, soybeans, 
palm oil and sugar cane. These crops are often called flex-crops because they can be used for making biofuels in 
addition to their traditional uses as food for human consumption and as fodder. They account for a large part of total 
production in the region and, in the case of sugar cane and soybeans, worldwide.
(i)  Overview of agricultural production and the role of Latin America and the Caribbean
Surging demand for grains, oilseeds and sugar cane in recent years is perhaps one of the major developments in 
global agriculture. Latin America and the Caribbean is playing a leading role in both production and consumption. In 
2010, the countries of the region accounted for a large part of the global output of the agro-commodities examined 
in this section (see figure III.11), producing more than 50% of the world total for soybeans and sugar cane (as biofuel 
feedstocks) and fodder sorghum (important for the production of animal protein). 
As can be seen in table III.3, a large portion of the world planted area is in Latin America and the Caribbean. Between 
2006 and 2010, there were increases in almost all of the aforementioned crops: oil palm (14%), soybeans (13%), sugar 
cane (12%) and sorghum (11%). The region’s average maize and wheat area remained virtually unchanged. Growth of 
the area under cultivation between 2006 and 2010 took place largely in the Southern Cone; soybeans and sugar cane 
were the two crops that saw the most expansion (adding 5.3 million hectares and 2.8 million hectares, respectively). 
The biggest increases were in Brazil: almost 100% in the case of sugar cane and 25% in the case of soybeans. Argentina 
accounted for 53% of the region’s increase in the number of hectares planted in soybeans.









Latin America and the Caribbean: main agro-commodities in the flex-crop cluster as a portion  
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Palm oil Wheat 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT database.
Table III.3 
Regional and global cultivated area, by flex-crop cluster agro-commodity, 2010
Crop Hectares cultivated worldwide Hectares cultivated in Latin Americaand the Caribbean Percentage
Wheat 217 219 395 8 811 744 4
Fodder maize 12 105 840 1 684 784 14
Sorghum 40 935 896 5 762 459 14
Maize 161 765 388 35 786 869 22
Soybeans 102 556 310 46 334 967 45
Sugar cane 23 877 378 12 944 472 54
Fodder sorghum 1 135 006 1 046 272 92
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT database.
(ii) Foreign direct investment in selected agro-commodities
Wheat
Wheat is one of the most widely consumed grains, both for human food and for fodder. Latin America and the 
Caribbean produced 33.1 million tons of it in 2010. Wheat production is concentrated in Argentina (44%), followed 
by Brazil (18%) and Mexico (11%). Region-wide, the area planted changed very little between 2006 and 2010. 
In both Argentina and Brazil, the marketing chain is dominated by transnational companies specialized in the 
export of agricultural commodities. Four transnationals (ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus) control as much as 
90% of the world grain market. The international press has dubbed these four multinationals or the “ABCD of food” 
(The Guardian, 2011). It is not surprising, therefore, that the same companies operating in the wheat market in these 
countries also trade in the other agro-commodities discussed in this section.
In Argentina (the largest producer in the region and one of the top 10 worldwide), 8 companies alone accounted 
for almost 90% of wheat exports. These are the transnationals Cargill, ADM, Bunge, Dreyfus and Toepfer International, 
along with Argentina’s Nidera, Oleaginosa Moreno and the Association of Argentine Cooperatives (ACA).
Much transnationalization is through acquisitions. For example, in Argentina in 2001 Bunge acquired La Plata Cereal, 
one of the country’s largest food companies, with operations in wheat and soybean processing, the industrial production 
of fertilizers, and port facilities. With this acquisition Bunge improved its position in the wheat chain and became the 
largest soybean processor in Argentina. Also noteworthy are the Brazilian operations of the Argentine trans-Latins Molino 
Cañuelas, Grupo Navilli (which purchased a maize milling plant in Rio Grande do Sul), and Grupo Macri (Socma), 
which purchased six milling companies (Canale do Brasil, Isabela, Pastifício Basilar, Zabet, Adria and Todeschini).








Brazil saw a wave of acquisitions between 1991 and 2004 (Benetti, 2004). Bunge acquired Pullman/Campo 
Grande and Van Mill Produtos Alimentícios; Cargill purchased Moinho São Valentim; Global Grain (Canada/United 
States) acquired Moinho Santo André and Moinho MG e Rei das Massas; Danone (France) purchased Campineira and 
Biscoitos Aymoré; Nestlé (Switzerland) purchased Tostines; Parmalat (Italy) purchased Petybon and General Biscuits; 
and Pillsbury (United States) acquired Terra Branca and Frescarini.
Maize
Maize output in the region reached 140.6 million tons in 2010. The largest producers were Brazil (39%), the 
Central American countries (19%), Mexico (17%) and Argentina (16%). The top exporters were Argentina and Brazil, 
with 17.5 million tons and 10.8 million tons, respectively.
The main foreign investors in maize production are agrochemical companies seeking to plant genetically modified 
maize and companies interested in using maize to make ethanol. 
In Mexico, Monsanto, DuPont and Dow requested government authorization to plant 2.5 million hectares of 
genetically modified maize in different parts of the country. Investment plans are being reviewed because the area 
involved is so large and because a number of scientists have put forth arguments stressing the risks entailed, given that 
Mexico is a global repository of maize genetic diversity (for more information on this deal, see point 2 of section D). 
In Argentina in 2012, Monsanto announced a US$ 329 million investment to set up two experimental genetically 
modified maize facilities in Córdoba and Tucumán. It is expected that operations will start in 2013 and produce 
enough seeds to plant 3.5 million hectares. After this investment come five other facilities to grow maize and make 
biofuel (ethanol), and the German agricultural equipment company CLAAS is planning to set up a factory in the area. 
The nature of the investments reflects both the versatility of this crop and the growing demand for biofuel production. 
In Argentina there were nearly 11 projects (currently being processed) that could sharply increase the production of 
maize for ethanol in order to raise the ethanol content of gasoline from 4% to 10%. This increase would consume 7% of 
Argentina’s maize output. One of the key players in this field is Bio4 (in Córdoba), a company that produces 80,000 tons 
of maize ethanol. Maize and sorghum ethanol output is expected to rise to 1.3 million tons by 2015.
Sorghum
In 2010, Latin America and the Caribbean produced 20.6 million tons of sorghum. The largest producers were the 
Central American countries (35%), Mexico (33%) and Argentina (20%). The largest exporter was Argentina. Between 
2006 and 2010 the sorghum area expanded by 10% (167,000 hectares) in Mexico, 9% (163,000 hectares) in Central 
America and 3% (252,000 hectares, mainly between 2009 and 2010) in the Southern Cone.
Investments in sorghum are increasingly combined with investments in other crops, especially other grains. An 
example is the Argentine company El Tejar S.A., which manages 140,000 hectares in Uruguay planted in crops such as 
wheat, barley, soybeans, maize and sorghum and harvests approximately 650,000 tons of grain each year (see [online] 
www.eltejar.com). Investment in sorghum is combined with the construction of silos and fodder processing plants. 
Over the past three years as much as US$ 30 million in FDI flowed into Nicaragua from Cargill for poultry projects (see 
[online] www.cargill.com). Another case, which was reported in the press and recorded by Land Matrix, is the Saudi 
conglomerate Al-Khorayef, which in 2011 signed an agreement with the government of Chaco province in Argentina for 
a US$ 400 million investment in growing sorghum and other crops on 200,000 hectares. Also in 2011, the Indian- and 
Malaysian-owned Walbrook Group investment firm invested in close to 600,000 hectares in Argentina to be operated 
under a sublease arrangement (Iberoamerican Observatory of Asia-Pacific, 2011). The purpose of the investment is to 
meet the demand for grain in countries such as India with scarce water resources and a large population.
Soybeans
Soybeans are one of the most dynamic and flexible crops. They are the underpinning of emerging integrated agro-
industries that can produce soybeans, raw oil, refined oil, flour, pellet feed and biodiesel. For this reason, soybeans have 
drawn the interest of foreign and domestic investors in the region. They are part of a highly complementary crop rotation 
production system alongside wheat and maize, forming a production complex with a specific technical rationale. It is 
for this reason that the production modernization trends for soybeans are seen in the other crops in the rotation.








In 2010, Argentina had 18 million hectares planted under soybeans and produced 52.6 million tons, of which 
13.6 million tons (US$ 4.99 billion) were exported as beans. In the late 2000s there were 73,000 soybean growers 
(6% cent of them accounted for 54% of output); in 2008 there were 36 crushing companies with a total installed 
capacity of 146,527 tons per day (Adreani, 2008). Thanks to advanced crushing equipment (solvent extraction), 
Argentina’s soybean crushing plants are large and highly automated, which makes them very competitive compared 
with their peers in Brazil and the United States. With the exception of Argentina, most soybeans produced in the 
region are exported unprocessed.9 
Argentina’s soybean market has been changing quickly since the 1990s, with transnational corporations gaining 
more of a foothold. After Brazil’s Ceval bought the local company Guipeba in 1995, the family enterprise Oleaginosa 
Moreno was bought by the Swiss multinational Glencore in 1997. During the 2000s, the largest crushing companies 
continued to invest and reached approximately US$ 450 million in 2005-2006, plus more than US$ 900 million 
in complementary investments in logistics and port infrastructure. Leading this expansion was the transnational 
Bunge (currently the largest processor in the country, whose new facility was to have a daily processing capacity of 
30,000 metric tons), followed by Cargill, local groups AGD and Molinos Río de la Plata and the European transnational 
Louis Dreyfus Commodities LDC). By the late 2000s, 81% of crushing capacity was concentrated in five companies 
(Bunge, Cargill, Molinos Río de la Plata, Vicentin and LDC), four of which are foreign-owned (see table III.4).
Table III.4 
Argentina and Brazil: soybean crushing capacity indicators, by company, 2008
Argentina Brazil













Bunge 1884 United States 27 500 3 Bunge Alimentos 1905 United States 23 000 10
Cargill 1947 United States 27 350 5 Cargill Agrícola 1965 United States 15 700 7
Molinos Río de la Plata 1925 United States 22 200 2 ADM 1997 United States 12 650 6
Vicentin 1925 Argentina 21 850 3 Coinbra (Louis Dreyfus) 1942 France 8 600 4
Louis Dreyfus 1851 France 20 000 2 André Maggi 1970 Brazil 6 800 3
Deheza (AGD) 1948 Argentina 13 700 3 Imcopa 1967 Brazil 6 400 4
Moreno s.i. Argentina 4 400 3 Granol 1965 Brazil 6 300 3
Nidera 1920 Argentina-Netherlands 4 200 2 Coamo 1970 Brazil 6 080 4
Other, smaller companies 5 327 13
Rodosafra /
Insol do Brasil s.i. Brazil 5 600 4
Granóleo 1976 Brazil 4 300 3
Bianchini 1975 Brazil 4 000 2
Caramuru Alimentos 1969 Brazil 3 900 3
Comigo (South-
western Goiás Rural 
Producers Co-op)
1975 Brazil 3 500 1
ABC Inco s.i. Brazil 3 500 2
Sperafico 1957 Brazil 3 300 3
Cocamar 1963 Brazil 2 500 1
Brejeiro s.i. Brazil 1 900 2
Pardigão s.i. Brazil 1 650 2
Ovetril s.i. Brazil 1 600 2
Other, smaller companies 22 235 35
Total 146 527 36 Total 143 515 101
Source: AgriPAC Consultores on the basis of John Baize Associates, J.J. Hinrischen and ABIOVE. Cited by Adreani, 2008.
Note: n/a: No information available.
This trend could steepen over the next few years, given the growing interest of Chinese enterprises in venturing 
into the sector. For example, in 2011 the State-owned giant Heilongjiang Beidahuang Nongken Group Company tried 
to break into the direct production of grain and other food by leasing 300,000 hectares of land. To this end it entered 
negotiations with the province of Río Negro for a planned investment of US$ 1.5 billion. This operation has been on 
hold for the past few months because of political fallout from the deal. The strategy for attracting investments seems 
to have been changed recently in order to focus on investing in industrial facilities and infrastructure (Nelson, 2012). 
9 During the 2007 season, Brazil processed just 52% of its soybean output while Argentina processed 71% as soybean flour and oil. By 
contrast, Uruguay processed only 5% and exported 95% as beans.








Planting pools are a unique feature of Argentina’s soybean production model. Investors from other economic sectors 
recruit know-how, rent equipment and machinery, lease land and make intensive use of new technologies such as 
direct seeding and soybean double-cropping, as well as new inputs packages based on genetically engineered seeds 
(Roundup Ready, or RR, soybeans), partner herbicides (glyphosate) and fertilizer. Although there are no systematic 
data, it is estimated that significant FDI flows are being channelled through the system to Argentina’s soybean sector. 
This model has allowed the emergence of large producers that have expanded their operations in Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. Among the examples are Grupo Los Grobo and El Tejar S.A, 
a closely-held firm backed by the London-based hedge fund Altima Partners LLP and The Capital Group Companies 
venture capital group. 
In 2010 Brazil produced 78.7 million tons of soybeans (equivalent to US$ 11.042 billion) on 23 million hectares. 
Soybeans and soybean products are one of Brazil’s main agricultural exports, totalling 25.8 million tons in 2010. 
Brazil has great potential for expanding the area planted with soybeans, which depends in part on the possibility of 
improving livestock grassland management because much rangeland is severely degraded. Increasing the animal 
load from 1 head per hectare to 1.4 head per hectare could free up 30 million hectares for soybeans. Expansion is, 
however, constrained by a number of logistics challenges. Producing areas are quite some distance from the ports, 
and inadequate roads, railways and waterways have driven the cost of freight up sharply (US$ 150 per ton from 
Matto Grosso). That is why the federal government is promoting a major public works plan to improve infrastructure. 
Another highly sensitive matter (involving soybeans and other crops) has to do with deforestation in the Amazon 
region. To address this problem, environmental regulations are being tightened and government initiatives (such 
as the Land Registry and Agrarian Regularization Programme and the Satellite Monitoring Programme) are being 
launched to bolster enforcement. Other initiatives are in place, like Round Table on Responsible Soy Association 
(RTRS) certification, backed by the World Wide Fund for Nature; the Soy Moratorium in the Amazon Biome, supported 
by export companies belonging to the Brazilian Vegetable Oil Industries Association (ABIOVE) and other public and 
private actors; and the Soja Plus programme supported by private actors (such as ABIOVE and the Brazilian Association 
of Soybean Producers (APROSOJA)) and the government (the National Service for Rural Apprenticeship (SENAR)). 
In Brazil there are 101 soybean processing plants with a crushing capacity of 143,515 tons per day. Five companies 
(Bunge, Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), Coinbra (Louis Dreyfus) and the domestic group Maggi) own 47% 
of the crushing capacity. A number of foreign firms are long established in Brazil’s soybean market. For example, 
the United States multinational Bunge, which entered business in 1905, bought Cavalcanti & Cia in 1923 and then 
acquired other firms to expand throughout Brazil. The French multinational Louis Dreyfus has had interests in Brazil 
since the early twentieth century, and in 1942 bought Comércio e Industrias Brasileiras (Coinbra). More recently, 
between 1995 and 2002, ADM (United States) acquired the soybean operations of the local companies Sadia, Granja 
Rezende and J.B. Duarte; Bunge bought Covebras, Olvebasa, Incobrasa and Ceval Alimentos; and Louis Dreyfus 
(Coinbra) acquired Fábrica da Comove (Benetti, 2004).
A substantial portion of Brazil’s soybeans is exported in bean form, owing to two factors. First, there is a tax 
(ICMS) on transporting production between states for processing. Second, the importing countries, particularly China, 
have soybean meal and oil plants. Many of these plants are owned by the same transnationals that operate in Brazil, 
meaning that there is a good deal of intra-company trade. This arrangement also works against the consolidation of 
major Brazilian companies in the global market. Even so, Amaggi Exportação e Importação Ltda (part of the Maggi 
group) has been operating in Argentina since 2010, has representation offices in the Netherlands and controls the 
Norwegian company Denofa (which distributes non-GMO soybeans in the Scandinavian countries). 
In 2010 the area planted with soybeans in the Plurinational State of Bolivia stood at 922,115 hectares; soybean 
output was 1.9 million tons. According to data from the National Association of Oilseed and Wheat Producers (ANAPO), 
there are 14,000 soybean producers in the country; 2% (300 farms) are large, 20% (2,800 farms) are medium-sized and 
78% (11,000 farms) are small. Of the major producers, approximately 90% are foreign-owned, mainly by Brazilians and 
Argentines and, to a lesser extent, by Peruvians and by Mennonite and Japanese settlers who arrived in the 1950s.10 In 
2005, Shanghai Pengxin Group acquired 12,500 hectares to grow soybeans, maize and sorghum. According to data 
from Land Matrix, companies like El Tejar-Campos Verdes Limited and Cresud SACIFYA (Argentina) have acquired just 
over 20,000 hectares in recent years. It is estimated that 700,000 hectares are owned by Brazilian, Argentine, Peruvian 
and Colombian agro-industry firms, most of which is being used to grow genetically modified soybeans (Urioste, 2011).
10 These own an estimated 40% of the land under cultivation (Pérez, 2008).








The Bolivian vegetable oil industry has an installed storage capacity of nearly 800,000 metric tons per year, plus 
another 200,000 metric tons per year of capacity owned by service companies and individual soybean growers. The 
industrial sector is export-oriented and operates through seven processing plants with a combined installed processing 
capacity of 1,916,000 metric tons per year. Four of them are foreign-owned: ADM-SAO S.A. (United States), Gravetal 
Bolivia (Colombia and United States), Industrias de Aceites S.A. (Peru and Plurinational State of Bolivia) and Cargill 
(United States). 
During the 2010-2011 season, Paraguay’s planted area stood at 2.9 million hectares, production volume was 
8.6 million tons and exports totalled US $ 2.29 billion. Of the total soybean area, 87% is concentrated in farms with more 
than 100 hectares. Ninety percent of Paraguay’s soybeans and grain is stored and shipped by the major multinationals 
operating in Brazil and Argentina. In response to restrictions on exporting Paraguayan soybeans through the Rosario 
soybean oil complex imposed by the Government of Argentina in 2011, the international companies ADM, Bunge and 
Louis Dreyfus are investing US$ 280 million in setting up large export-oriented soybean oil plants in Paraguay. These 
plants will push soybean processing capacity above the 4-million-ton mark and triple current export capacity to 760,000 
tons of oil. Paraguay is thus seeking to produce more than the European Union and take the place of the United States 
as the third largest producer of soybean oil, behind Argentina and Brazil (América Economía, 2012).
Uruguay produced 1.8 million tons of soybeans on 863,200 hectares in 2010. Soybean growing expanded 
considerably over the 2000s: in the 2001/2002 season the soybean area totalled no more than 28,900 hectares. 
This growth has been fuelled by Argentine soybean producers, drawn by the low cost of land (between US$ 2,000 
per hectare and US$ 5,000 per hectare of good quality land versus US$ 10,000 per hectare in Argentina) and the 
lack of export taxes. Argentines make up 54% of all soybean growers in Uruguay; six companies, most of which 
are partially or wholly foreign-owned, work approximately 25% of the agricultural area. Uruguay does not process 
soybeans; exports are highly concentrated in foreign companies. In the mid-2000s, the five largest accounted for 77% 
of exports: the United States firms ADM (21.5%) and Cargill (18.6%); Argentina’s Agronegocios del Plata (15%) and 
Pérez Companc (11%); and Uruagri (10.6%), which is owned by the France-based Dreyfus Group (Zibechi, 2008). 
Palm oil
The region’s top producers of oil palm fruit are the Central American countries (36%), Colombia (26%), Ecuador 
(15%) and Brazil (11%). In Central America, the largest producers are Honduras (13%) and Guatemala (10%). In 
2010 the leading exporters were Honduras (183,000 tons), Ecuador (146,000 tons), Guatemala (153,000 tons), Costa 
Rica (132,000 tons) and Colombia (90,000 tons). Between 2006 and 2010 the palm oil area expanded significantly 
in Mexico (44%; 9,700 hectares) and in Central America (34%; 64,715 hectares).
In Colombia and Guatemala, investment in palm oil has been led by local enterprises and, to a lesser extent, 
by foreign companies (see table III.5). Company profiles in Colombia show that most of the palm oil output is used 
for making biofuels. According to the same source, in Peru the company Pure Biofuels (based in the United States) 
acquired 74,000 hectares to produce biofuel palm oil. 
Sugar cane
In 2010 the region produced 990 million tons of sugar cane. The region’s largest producer is Brazil (75% of 
the regional total); half of this output is for domestic production of ethanol (see figure III.12). The remaining 25% is 
produced in Central America (10%), Mexico (5%), Colombia (4%), Argentina (2.5%), the Caribbean (2%) and other 
countries such as Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. In most cases output is for domestic 
consumption; only the surplus is exported because the sector is still protected (MECON, 2011).
In Brazil, the main draw for FDI in sugar cane is the policy for promoting the use of ethanol that has been in 
place since the 1970s, although investments did not skyrocket until the mid-2000s. Since then, Brazilian companies 
have consolidated their position and restructured operations with the aim of capturing investment flows towards the 
sector. Their strategy included the sale of shares on the Brazilian stock exchange, which provided an opportunity 
for foreign investors to acquire majority and minority stakes. As a result, the foreign-owned sugar mills that were 
processing less than 1% of the sugar cane produced in Brazil were handling 12% by 2008. Including the sugar mills 
in which foreign shareholders have a minority holding brings the proportion up to 23%.









Colombia and Guatemala: acquisition of agricultural land for growing oil palm trees
Company Based in Hectares
Colombia
Oleoflores Colombia 15 555
Biocombustibles Sostenibles del Caribe S.A. Colombia 22 222
Bio D.S.A. Colombia 22 222
Ecodiesel Colombia S.A. Colombia 22 222
Aceites Manuelita S.A. Colombia 22 222
Consorcio El Labrador (formed by Aportes San Isidro SA and C.I. Tequendama) Colombia 1 235
Ecopetrol Colombia 17 000
Urapalma Colombia 21 142
Odin Energy Santa Marta Corporation S.A. Japan 8 000
Guatemala
Agro Industrias Hame (Corporación Olmeca) Guatemala 40 000
Inversiones de Desarrollo S.A. INDESA (Grupo Maegli) Guatemala 5 688
Nacional AgroIndustrial S.A. (NAISA) Guatemala 5 000
Palmas de Desarrollo S.A. (PADESA) (Grupo Maegli) Guatemala 2 518
Tikindustrias (Grupo del Ingenio Azucarero El Pilar) Guatemala 4 600
Agrocaribe S.A. Guatemala 5 000
Palmas del Ixcán (subsidiary of Green Earth Fuels LLC, owned by Carlyle Group, Riverstone Holdings and Goldman Sachs) United States 2 500
Source: Land Matrix Portal, 2012 [online] http://landportal.info/landmatrix.
Figure III.12 













































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures provided by the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association 
(UNICA), 2012.
a  At a conversion factor of 1.67 kilos of sugar to make 1 litre of ethanol.
At the national level, one third of the industry is controlled by the groups Cosan, Crystalsev and Copersucar 
(GRAIN, 2009). Private investment funds have also come in, such as Radar Propiedades Agrícolas (managed by Cosa), 
Calyx (managed by Louis Dreyfus) and BrasilAgro (managed by Cresud) (GRAIN, 2009). Another sector heavyweight is 
Monsanto, which in 2007 partnered with CanaVialis and Allelyx to develop varieties of sugar cane that are genetically 
engineered to be glyphosate-tolerant. In late 2008 Monsanto purchased the two companies for US$ 280 million and 
began to grow sugar cane directly. Another company that gained media attention was India’s largest sugar refiner and 
alcohol distiller, Shree Renuka Sugars, which acquired 130,000 hectares in Brazil in 2010 (GRAIN, 2009).
Like soybeans, growing sugar cane poses major environmental challenges. To address them, a number of programmes 
and regulations have been implemented in Brazil. Among the most ambitious ones is the Agro-environmental Protocol 
of the State of São Paulo, signed in 2007 by the private sector and the government. The protocol seeks to end the 
practice of burning cane fields by mechanizing the harvest, as well as to protect waterside forests, control erosion 
and promote best practices in land use. Other goals include ensuring proper handling of agrochemical containers 
and reducing water consumption during processing.11
11  See [online] http://www.ambiente.sp.gov.br/etanolverde/protocolo-agroambiental/o-protocolo/.








Argentina’s sugar output has surged over the past 20 years, from an average 1.5 million tons per year in the 
1990s to 2.3 million tons in 2006-2010. The leading sugar cane producing provinces are Tucumán, Salta and Jujuy. 
The sugar-cane growing structure varies widely from province to province. In Tucumán, most growers work less than 
50 hectares (91% of the growers cover 28% of the area). In Jujuy, farms with more than 500 hectares make up 89% 
of the sugar cane area and are owned by 15% of the growers).
In recent years, the trend has been towards greater integration and concentration of sugar cane operations, 
entailing increased crop mechanization (MECON, 2011). There are 23 mills, 16 alcohol distilleries and 9 dehydration 
plants; 273.9 million litres of alcohol were distilled in 2010. The leading alcohol producers are Argentina’s Ledesma, 
Tabacal Agroindustria, Atanor and Los Balcanes; together, they account for nearly 70% of total output. The five main 
economic groups involved in growing sugar cane produce more than 65% of the total (see table III.6). Among them, 
Tabacal Agroindustria has foreign investors (Seaboard Corporation, based in the United States). 
Table III.6 





Azucarera Juan M. Terán 10.4
Cía. Azucarera Los Balcanes 10.0
Tabacal Agroindustria 10.0





Source: Ministry of Economic Affairs and Public Finances of Argentina, “Complejo azucarero”, 
Producción Regional por Complejos Productivos series, Buenos Aires, October 2011.
Other countries with substantial FDI transactions related to sugar cane growing are Cuba and Guatemala. In Cuba, 
the Brazilian company Odebrecht Agroindustrial will be the first foreign company to own one of the Cuban sugar mills 
that were nationalized in 1959 (La Nación, Argentina, 10 November 2012). Odebrecht is part of Grupo Odebrecht, 
which specializes in large infrastructure projects and is also in charge of the US$ 800 million Mariel port construction 
project. A stake in Odebrecht Agroindustrial (14.97%) is owned by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and the 
firm has conducted operations in Angola in addition to Cuba. Since 2011, it has been engaged in discussions with 
the Sudanese sugar company Kenana for building an ethanol plant as work proceeds on a port facility (ANBA, 2011). 
The sugar agro-industry is one of the most dynamic in Guatemala, growing at an average annual rate of 11% over 
the past few years. A recent acquisition in the sector took place in June 2011, when Nicaragua’s Grupo Pellas acquired 
an 88% shareholding in Chabil Utzaj S.A. (sugar mill and land) in Polochic Valley, Alta Verapaz. Grupo Pellas also reports 
having made smaller investments in Honduran sugar mills over the past two years (see [online] www.grupopellas.com).
The Grupo Pellas acquisition in Guatemala was controversial because of social tension and conflict as to the 
use of land. According to the Guatemala Human Rights Commission in Washington, D.C., the investment displaced 
Kekchi Maya peasants (El Quetzal, 2011). Grupo Pellas has been highlighting the school projects near its sugar mills 
throughout Central America.
(b)  Biofuels
(i)  Biofuel production and the role of Latin America and the Caribbean 
Ongoing research, development and innovation efforts and policies encouraging biofuel consumption and 
production have turned the biofuel sector into one of global agriculture’s main production chains, with output totalling 
90.2 billion litres in 2009 (Brown, 2009). Ethanol from sugar-rich crops like sugar cane and maize makes up 82% of 
the total; 18% is biodiesel from oilseed crops like soybeans, canola (rapeseed) and palm oil. According to OECD-








FAO data (2012), global production of bioethanol and biodiesel is expected to almost double by 2021 and will be 
largely concentrated in Brazil, the United States and the European Union. By 2021, biofuel production is forecast to 
be consuming a growing proportion of global sugar cane (34%), vegetable oil (16%) and coarse grain (14%) output. 
As for Latin America and the Caribbean, ethanol production in Brazil dates back to the 1930s and received a 
boost in 1975 with the launch of Brazil’s Alcohol Fuel Programme (PROALCOOL) (BNDES-CGEE-ECLAC-FAO, 2009). 
In 2010, Brazil produced 27.5 billion litres of ethanol; 15% was exported and the rest went to the domestic market 
to cover more than 50% of the country’s gasoline consumption (REN21, 2009). The second largest producer of sugar 
cane ethanol is Colombia. Other countries, such as Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador and Trinidad and Tobago have 
been producing ethanol for a number of years, spurred by preferential access for their exports of hydrous ethanol to 
the United States (often after first importing it from Brazil in dehydrated form). Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay are 
starting to produce ethanol; Mexico does not have enough production capacity to meet domestic demand despite 
having the technological know-how for producing sugar-cane ethanol.
Global biodiesel production surged by 33% per year between 2005 and 2010, reaching 18.6 million tons in 2010. 
Production is expected to continue to climb in the coming years in view of the European Union’s target of replacing 10% 
of fuel consumption with biodiesel by 2020. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Argentina has a consolidated industry 
that, at 13.1% of global output in 2010, ranked second after the United States (14.3%). Brazil is in fifth place, with 9.7%. 
Argentina produces biodiesel primarily for the external market, although since 2010 the petroleum companies are subject 
to a 5% biofuel blending mandate under Law 26.093. This has boosted domestic consumption considerably.
Other than Brazil and Argentina, the other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean still play a very limited 
role in biofuel production (Dufey and Stange, 2011). Therefore, the paragraphs below focus on FDI flows towards 
ethanol and biodiesel production in Brazil and Argentina.
(ii)  Foreign direct investment in biofuel production in Latin America and the Caribbean
Brazil has a long history of innovation-driven technological development combined with regulatory policies to 
encourage the use of ethanol in the automotive sector (BNDES-CGEE-ECLAC-FAO, 2009). A key part of this policy 
makes a certain level (20%, rising to 25% as of May 2013) of anhydrous ethanol obligatory in gasoline and requires 
the design of vehicles able to use hydrous ethanol, which is used in the pure state (flex-fuel vehicles). Other part 
of these policies sought to deregulate the sector in the 1990s, when policies setting prices and production volume, 
subsidies and financial support were removed so that the sector would operate under market conditions. This objective 
has been fully attained, but the transition to the new situation entailed a profound restructuring of the chain. Many 
foreign companies took advantage of this to establish operations in Brazil by acquiring existing production plants. 
Among many such transactions between 1995 and 2002 were the purchase of Guarani by Béghin-Say (France and 
Italy); the purchase of Usina Portobello by Glencore (Switzerland); the purchase of Usina Cresciumal and Luciânia 
by Luis Dreyfus (Coinbra) (France); and the purchase of Univalem and seven other plants by Tate & Lyle (United 
States) (Benetti, 2004). This process continued in the following years, as the purchase of new enterprises and the 
creation of new units gathered momentum. But the global economic crisis that began in 2008 brought a slowdown 
and times of greater caution that persist to date (Pinto, 2011). Between 2003 and 2008, Cargill ventured into the 
sugar business by purchasing a 64% equity stake in the local company Cevasa, followed by the purchase of 43.7% 
of Usina Itapagipe Açúcar e Álcool, which was sold to Bunge in 2010. Bunge also entered the sugar sector during 
this period, purchasing Usina Santa Juliana together with the Triunfo group in 2007. In 2008, Bunge acquired sugar 
marketer Tate & Lyle and thereby became one of the country’s major exporters. That same year it acquired a 60% 
equity interest in the Monte Verde plant and built the Pedro Afonso plant; in 2009 it purchased Moemapar, a holding 
company that is part of Grupo Moema, which owns a number of plants. Bunge now has eight plants in operation and 
one under construction. With a processing capacity of 20 million tons of sugar cane per season, it ranks fifth in the 
sector. In 2008, another major global operator entered the picture. The United States company ADM bought part of 
the assets of Grupo Cabrera, which at the time owned a plant under construction (CCEA) as well as a greenfield plant 
project (Jataí) that ultimately was not built. During this period there was much other movement in the sector, where 
other transnational corporations as well as investment funds are active (Pinto, 2011). In 2008, 23.27% of Brazil’s 
production capacity was wholly- or partially-owned by foreign companies. The proportion increased in the following 
years, gauging by the large number of projects in the construction phase at that time (see table III.7).









Brazil: foreign ownership of sugar and ethanol plants, 2007-2008
Investor Plant Shareholding(percentage) Status in 2007-2008
Output
(tons)























































































































































































Kuok (China) Cosan 5.90 39 973 062
British Petroleum (Great Britain) Tropical Bioenergia 50.00 Greenfield -
UMOE (Norway) Dest. Paranapanema 95.00 Operating 88 000
Brazil Ethanol (United States) Usina Leão 100.00 Operating 1 377 267
Mitsubish Corporation (Japan) Boa Vista (São Martinho) 10.00 2008-2009 -
Global Foods/Carlyle/Riverstone/Goldman  
Sachs/Discovery Capital (United States)
CNAA – Ituiutaba
CNAA – Itumbiara





















Goldman Sachs (United States) SantelisaVale 15.00 Operating 16 715 872














Total output, foreign-owned companies 114 352 645
Total output, Brazilian-owned crushing plants 491 370 000
Percentage of output, foreign-owned companies 23.27
Source: Association of Agroenergy Industries of Minas Gerais (SIAMIG), “Capital Estrangeiro No Setor Sucroalcooleiro Brasileiro”, Relatório Econômico, No. 007, 2009.
a  Estimate.








According to industry analysts, this process is likely to speed up considerably. Projections provided by representatives 
of the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA) indicate that within the next five years, 40% of Brazilian 
production will be in foreign hands, with the major global petroleum companies accounting for more mergers and 
acquisitions than agricultural groups. Indeed, at the World Ethanol Conference held in Geneva in 2010, companies 
such as Shell, BP and Petrobras announced millions of dollars in investment in the sector, as they believe that biofuels 
are the “most realistic” option for complementing petroleum over the next 30 years. 
According to the same sources, these investments could reach US$ 20 billion over the next few years. Petrobras 
announced that it would partner with foreign groups to invest US$ 3.5 billion in the ethanol sector in order to 
expand production by 193% and exports by 135% in the coming years. Petrobras has already signed an agreement 
with the French multinational Tereos to turn Guaraní, controlled by the latter, into a sector leader by investing 
US$ 2.4 billion before year-end 2013. Shell has plans to invest US$ 12 billion in a joint venture with Cosan to create 
the first multinational in the sector (Chade, 2010). This operation was authorized by Brazil’s antitrust regulators in 
December 2012 and led to the creation of Raizen, which will produce and sell more than 2 billion litres per year 
of ethanol made from Brazilian sugar cane. In addition, Raizen will distribute more than 20 billion litres per year of 
other industrial and transport fuels through a network of some 4,500 Shell service stations and thus become the third 
largest fuel company in Brazil. The goal is to turn Raizen into a major ethanol exporter. Along the same lines, the 
British oil company BP acquired 100% of Brazil’s Tropical Bioenergia in 2011 and announced, in December 2012, 
its intention to invest US$ 350 million in expanding production capacity. 
 Other investments have already been made. In December 2010 Noble Group Limited, an energy and mining 
commodities company based in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, announced the US$ 950 million 
purchase of two plants in São Paulo from Brazil’s Cerradinho Açúcar, Etanol e Energia S.A. The plants are Catanduva 
and Potirendaba, with a capacity of 4.6 million tons and 3.4 million tons per year, respectively. (Catanduva also has 
a refinery for producing coarse sanding sugar and refined white sugar.) The purpose of the operation is to increase 
sugar cane processing volume (both ethanol and sugar) from 740,000 tons to 1.34 million tons. In another recent 
high-profile operation, Brazil’s Copersucar and Eco-Energy of the United States were to merge their international 
ethanol trading operations to achieve a 12% share of the global market (Fedebiocombustibles, 2012).
Biodiesel production in Argentina leverages the country’s competitive advantages for growing soybeans, and, to 
a lesser extent, other oilseed crops like sunflowers, maize, sorghum, canola (rapeseed), safflowers and castor beans. 
This set of crops produced 49 million tons in 2011. According to official data, biodiesel exports reached a record 
1.7 million tons in 2011, with an approximate value of US$ 1.5 billion (Hilbert, Sbarra and López Amorós, 2012). 
Most industrial facilities were built after 2007, making this an industry in the development phase. Like the vegetable 
oil industry, the biodiesel industry is based on a very small number of companies, many of them with modern 
technologies, a high degree of innovation and a large processing capacity (Adreani, 2008). 
Unlike Brazil, Argentina has just recently rolled out a strategy for promoting biofuels by means of a law encouraging 
production and use (Law 26.093, enacted in 2006) and a sliding-scale withholding tariff on proceeds from soybean 
complex exports. The current rate is 35% on soybeans, 32% for raw oil, 32% for flour and pellets and 19.11% for 
biodiesel (from September 2012). 
The sliding-scale withholding system encouraged exports, as did a US$ 300 per ton export rebate in the United 
States.12 In 2009, when the subsidy for products aimed at the external market was eliminated, the United States 
stopped purchasing Argentine biodiesel. Production was therefore redirected towards European Union countries 
(MECON, 2011).
Agricultural production research programmes (direct seeding, genetics, agrochemical management, mechanization) 
developed by the National Institute for Agricultural Technology (INTA) and international seed companies have also 
contributed to the emergence of this industry. Other factors have been an established vegetable oil industry and a 
developed infrastructure (ports and roads) network. All of this paved the way for multinational biofuel companies to 
make a rapid entry, putting the sector in an ideal position for further development. 
12 United States companies imported biodiesel from Argentina, modified it minimally, re-exported it to the European Union and collected 
the rebate.








Table III.8 shows that, as in Brazil, transnational corporations like Louis Dreyfus, Bunge and Cargill coexist with 
national enterprises such as AGD, Vicentin and Molinos Río de la Plata. In addition to these large companies there 
are small and medium-sized enterprises initially started up by the Government of Argentina. The sector can therefore 
be split into three levels according to production capacity (MECON, 2011): (a) high (more than 200,000 tons/year), 
comprising 22% of the companies (vegetable oil companies and large independents) and accounting for more than 
60% of total biodiesel output; (b) intermediate (between 50,000 tons/year and 200,000 tons/year), comprising 26% 
of the enterprises (large independents) and accounting for 26% of output; and (c) low (less than 50,000 tons/year), 
made up of the remaining firms (small independents) and accounting for 13% of total output.
Table III.8 
Argentina: biofuel producers, 2012
Company Production capacity(thousands of tons) Foreign-owned
Small
Biocombustibles Tres Arroyos S.A. 6 600 No
BH Biocombustibles S.R.L. 10 800 No
Héctor Bolzán y Cía. S.R.L. 10 800 No
SoyEnergy S.A. 18 100 No
Pitey S.A. 18 000 No
Pilar BsAs 18 100 No
Colalao del Valle S.A. 18 000 No
Prochem Bio S.A. 20 000 No
ERA S.R.L. 22 000 No
Subtotal 142 400 No
Medium-sized
Rosario Bioenergy S.A. 49 900 No
Advanced Organic Materials S.A. 48 000 No
Biomadero S.A. 48 000 No
Aripar Cereales S.A. 50 000 No
ENRESA 50 000 No
Agrup. de Colaboración San Antonio 50 000 No
Cremer y Asociados S.A. 50 000 No
Subtotal 345 900 
Large
Maikop S.A. 72 000 No
Diaser S.A. 96 000 No
Molinos Río de la Plata S.A. 120 000 No
Explora S.A. 120 000 Grupo Meck (Chile)
Vicentin S.A. 158 400 No
Viluco S.A. 200 000 No
Unitec Bio S.A. 230 000 No
Cargill S.A.C.I. 240 000 United States
Bunge 240 000 United States
Patagonia Bionergía S.A. 250 000 No
L.D.C. Argentina S.A. 305 000 Dreyfus-Francia
Renova S.A. 481 000 Grupo Pérez Companc (Argentina); Glencore (Switzerland); Grupo Vicentin (Argentina)
T6 Industrial S.A. 480 000 Grupo AGD (Argentina); Bunge Limited (United States)
Subtotal  2 992 400 
Total  3 480 700
Source: Argentine Biofuels Chamber; Chamber of Energy and Biofuel SMEs.








There are some questions as to the future of FDI in Argentina’s biodiesel chain. Agro-environmental impacts on natural 
resources and human health (toxicity, carcinogenic and reproductive effects, mutagenic impact and food contamination 
are some of the issues discussed in the academic literature on the prolonged use of glyphosate), together with positive 
effects such as the widespread use of direct soybean seeding, which reduces erosion and improves soil management. 
Another concern is the socioeconomic impact of the soybean expansion model in Argentina, which is based entirely on 
genetically modified seeds (Roundup-Ready) that are tolerant to the glyphosate used for weed control. In addition, soybean 
expansion leads to mono-cropping, displacement of beef and dairy livestock farming to marginal, lower-yield land and 
the depopulation of rural areas. These trends have sparked initiatives to design mechanisms for ensuring the sustainability 
of biodiesel soybean production, such as Round Table on Responsible Soy (RTRS) certification in Argentina and Brazil.
Argentina has begun to develop an ethanol industry based on maize and sorghum, drafting legislation (Law 26.334) 
seeking to bring the ethanol content of petrol up from the current 4% to 10% by 2014 as new industrial plants are 
authorized over the next few years and the local automotive industry makes the requisite technical changes. 
Developing Colombia’s biofuel industry is part of a State policy geared towards producing bioethanol for domestic 
consumption while generating benefits for rural areas and providing alternatives to growing illegal crops.
Ethanol production in Colombia has been driven by the major sugar mills located in the south-west of the country 
(Proexport Colombia, 2012) with an installed capacity of more than 1 million litres per day from 40,742 hectares 
planted in sugar cane. Ethanol projects under development by foreign companies are expected to start operating in 
the next few years, increasing daily capacity by 1.5 million litres. Among these companies, Israel’s Merhav is to invest 
an estimated US$ 300 million and expects to produce 376,000 litres of ethanol per day. Bioenergy (United States) 
and Alcol Río Suárez (a Colombian company owned by Bio-Fuel Company and Alcol Tech) plan to invest a similar 
amount in the departments of Meta and Santander, respectively. 
Biodiesel production in Colombia is based entirely on palm oil. According to Fedepalma, there are 54 crude 
palm oil extraction plants in Colombia with an installed production capacity of 1.8 million litres per day. There are 
also seven biodiesel refineries in the country, of which two are owned by foreign companies: Odin Energy Santa 
Marta Corporation (Japan) and Clean Energy (Great Britain), which together make up 14% of daily installed capacity. 
Maple Energy plc is an energy project development company that is listed on the Lima and London stock 
exchanges and has assets and operations in Peru. In July 2012 it launched an automotive ethanol project (Maple 
Ethanol) developed with an investment of more than US$ 275 million. The project includes one of the most modern 
biofuel plants in the world, with the capacity to process up to 5,000 tons of sugar cane per day and produce 
35 million gallons of ethanol per year. To supply the plant, the company owns 13,500 hectares in Piura Region, 
which are gradually being changed over from uncultivated land to a highly productive sugar cane plantation with 
drip irrigation and mechanical harvesting. The company has pledged to provide technical and credit support for 
planting sugar cane on 1,250 hectares of land owned by neighbouring farmers who want to voluntarily switch over 
from growing rice, and to buy the sugar cane produced on 1,000 hectares owned by growers in the area surrounding 
the complex (Proinversión Perú, 2012). The Maple Ethanol project is an example of the trend that is leading energy 
sector companies to venture into ethanol production.
As for Guatemala, in 2007, Spain’s CIE Automotive, through its subsidiary Bionor Transformación, acquired a 
51% equity stake in Biocombustibles de Guatemala, which is engaged in jatropha research and development13 and 
in making biodiesel from jatropha seed oil and used vegetable oil. The firm also bought, for US$ 3 million, the San 
Francisco-La Canoa farm in Chiquimula Department, which has 473 hectares under cultivation.
In 2009 the United States company Sirona Fuels invested US$ 103.7 million in Haiti to launch a jatropha production 
programme that would mean 1,367 jobs for small growers who will retain ownership of their land while receiving 
technical assistance and support from the company for the purchase of inputs. The jatropha is for making biodiesel. 
The investment has a high social impact: the company partnered with the non-profit 3C Missions to coordinate a 
support centre for nearly 1,000 orphaned children.
The Sirona Fuels investment in Haiti is an example of the potential for agricultural investments to contribute to 
job creation in rural areas and support vulnerable groups. Besides helping improve the socioeconomic conditions of 
this group of growers in Haiti, the company has enhanced its socially responsible image in the market.
13 Jatropha (Jatropha sp.) is a seed oil plant that grows in most tropical countries. It is cultivated in Central America, South America, 
South-East Asia, India and Africa. 








(c)  Meat chains
(i)  Meat production and the role of Latin America and the Caribbean
Large-scale industrial production of meat has significantly increased supply, with large intensive livestock 
operations (feedlots) using concentrate feeds (with soybeans and maize as the main raw material) and technological 
innovations, such as genetic improvements and balanced feed regimes. These innovations increased beef production 
by some 15% over the past decade, to nearly 65 million tons in 2011 (ECLAC-FAO-IICA, 2012). Population growth 
and changing consumption patterns in emerging countries, especially those where income has been on the rise, have 
contributed substantially to this growth.
A few countries dominate the production of beef cattle, sheep and poultry: 75% of the global cattle herd is 
concentrated in India (324.4 million head), Brazil (197.5 million head), China (104 million head), United States 
(91.4 million head) and the European Union (85.7 million head) (USDA, 2012). Four Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico) have cattle herds equal to 28.8% of the world total (see figure III.13). 
Both production and consumption are concentrated in these countries, although they do maintain trade flows in 
international markets because of the variety of cuts required for different markets.
Figure III.13 
Selected countries: beef cattle herd, 2012






















Source: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), “International Food Consumption Patterns”, Economic Research Service, 2012 [online] http://www.ers.
usda.gov/data-products/international-food-consumption-patterns.aspx#26207.
Latin America and the Caribbean is among the largest producers of other species as well. Brazil is the fourth 
largest producer of pigs worldwide (behind China, the European Union and the United States), with 3.2% per cent 
of global output. The region’s pork exports surged 358% between 2000 and 2011, with the largest increases posted 
by Brazil (387%), and Argentina (180%) (ECLAC-FAO-IICA, 2012). 
Brazil is the world’s third largest producer of poultry meat (after the United States and China), with an output of 
12.8 million tons in 2011. Combined, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina account for 21.9% of the world total. Brazil is 
the leading exporter (34.4%), together with the United States (33.9%). The main importers of poultry meat are Japan 
and Saudi Arabia, with almost 20% of the worldwide total.
(ii)  Leading companies in the meat chain
The position of the United States as the leading producer of beef and pork rests on four major multinational corporations 
(Tyson Foods, Cargill Meat, JBS USA and National Beef). Together, these firms account for 67% of the beef cattle slaughter 
volume and more than 50% of the swine slaughter volume worldwide.14 JBS USA and Smithfield Foods are the United 
States affiliates of the Brazilian group JBS-Friboi, which is the largest transnational meatpacker in the world. JBS USA is 
the top meat exporter in the United States and a major player in the United States market as well, where has a 22% share. 
14 In 2008 the Brazilian transnational JBS acquired the subsidiary Smithfield Beef (now renamed JBS Packerland) for US$ 565 million. 
With this purchase, JBS sought to enhance its position in the United States market, build synergies and cut costs.








These large transnational groups produce and market almost all the traditional animal species (beef cattle, swine, 
sheep and poultry). Their production strategies are geared towards vertical integration of the meat chain, seeking 
not only greater production efficiency but also, above all, consistent quality standards in keeping with animal safety 
regulations and environmental requirements that are increasingly stringent and uniform across countries.
There is a direct link between the production of agro-commodities for fodder and the production of animal protein. 
For example, soybeans and maize, which are the basis for poultry feed, make up 50% of the cost of production (Fava 
and others, 2012).
(iii)  Foreign direct investment in Brazil’s meat chain
Because of its large scale, Brazil’s meat industry is a source of FDI that shapes the regional context, with investments 
concentrated in the Southern Cone in addition to much of the rest of the world. The major recipients of FDI in the 
region’s meat chains are Argentina and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent, Mexico, Paraguay, Colombia and Chile.
Meat chains (beef, pork and poultry) can generally be broken into four major phases: technical support and services 
for the primary producers; breeding, grow-out and finishing; processing; and trading (see box III.3). Identifying the 
main market actors in each phase shows the role that trans-Latin companies play in FDI in the meat chain in Brazil 
and other countries of the region. 
Brazil became a major exporter of beef after the mad cow disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)) 
crisis in Europe in the early 1990s. Since then has been pursuing an aggressive internationalization strategy (Capozoli, 
2012). Brazil’s meat market is now dominated by four agro-industry groups: JBS-Friboi, Marfrig, BRF and Minerva, 
whose origins, strategies and investment flows are discussed below.
JBS-Friboi is the world’s largest meat producer. With approximately 135,000 employees, it has production and 
distribution facilities in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, the United States and Uruguay,15 in addition 
to trade offices across all continents. In 2011 the firm’s 286 production units had a daily slaughter capacity of 
149,800 head (beef cattle, swine and sheep), plus 7.2 million birds in the United States alone. Twenty-four per cent 
of the slaughter volume is for export; 64% of the net profit is from the beef business. According to the group’s 2011 
annual report, 24% of net profits are generated in South America, 73% in Australia and the United States, and the 
remaining 3% in other regions of the world.
JBS-Friboi began operations in 1953, with a small facility with a slaughter capacity of five head daily. Between 
1981 and 2002 the company began to expand aggressively through acquisitions and greenfield investments that boosted 
its capacity to 5,000 head per day. Growth has soared since 2004, thanks to the purchase of a 50% stake in BF Brasil, 
the creation of JBS S.A. and the acquisition of Swift Armour S.A. (Argentina’s largest producer and exporter of beef). 
Years later it expanded operations in Argentina through the acquisition of two refrigeration companies (Venado Tuerto 
and Pontevedra) and two additional units (Berazategui and Caroya). It also purchased the United States giant Swift 
Food Company, Australia’s Tasman and a 64% stake in the chicken processor Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation. Together 
with Australia’s VION Food Group, JBS-Friboi purchased the lamb processor Tatiara Meat Company, and it entered a 
partnership agreement with Brazil’s leading dairy product company, the Bertin group.16 
With these acquisitions, JBS-Friboi consolidated its international platform across all segments of the meat chain. 
The company operates through its divisions JBS Mercosul, JBS S.A. Bovines (including its operations in Australia), 
JBS USA Pork and Pilgrim’s Pride.
Acquisitions since 2005 total US$ 3.7 billion. Along the way, US$ 80 million in financial support from Brazil’s 
National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES) was key to enabling JBS-Friboi to start globalizing 
its operations by buying Argentina’s Swift Armour for US$ 200 million. In 2007, in JBS-Friboi’s largest acquisition to 
date, US$1 billion of the US$ 1.4 billion purchase price of Swift Food Company of the United States were from a 
BNDES loan and contributions from State-owned Brazilian pension funds like Petros (of the State-owned Petrobras) 
and Fundação dos Economiários Federais (FUNCEF). This funding enabled BNDES to acquire a 31% stake in JBS-Friboi 
through the former’s investment management arm BNDESPAR.
15  In Argentina, JBS-Friboi has a slaughter capacity of 3,750 head per day (Bisang and others, 2008).
16  This merger was not completed until 2011 and involved the takeover of Italy’s Rigamonti and the acquisition of the refrigeration 
company Canelones.









Brazil: stages of the meat production chain 
System of technical support and services  
for livestock growers
At this stage, companies providing genetic, feed and 
veterinary services play the leading role. Companies in related 
fields (suppliers of fertilizers, seeds and mineral salts) are equally 
important. The volume of business in Brazil’s animal husbandry 
sector stood at some US $ 1.46 billion annually in 2008. Of 
this total, supplying foot-and-mouth disease vaccines alone 
accounted for nearly 16% per cent, with sales of US$ 234 million 
(324 million doses) in 2008. Another 30% of vaccine output is 
absorbed by the swine and poultry industry, with antiparasitics, 
antimicrobials, biological supplements and other products 
making up the rest. As is the case with other components of 
the meat industry chain, the sector is highly concentrated. The 
five largest companies account for nearly 66% of total sales 
(Consoli and others, 2009).
In terms of production volume and revenue, supplying 
grain for producing concentrate feed is without doubt the most 
important economic activity in this stage of the chain. In 2008, 
grain production for animal feed in Brazil reached 59 million tons, 
representing 8% of global output. About 80% goes to the poultry 
and swine industry (55.7% and 25.9%, respectively). Only 12.5% 
is for beef cattle, which are raised on Brazil’s vast pasturelands. 
Only a very small proportion is feedlot-raised, although this type 
of production has been growing strongly in recent years. 
Breeding, grow-out and finishing (formation  
of raw materials)
Breeding and finishing operations prior to slaughter involve 
small and medium-sized “independent” producers who primarily 
target the domestic market, as well as integrated or contract 
farmers who work under an agreement with the processor. It is 
estimated that 68% of the entire swine herd is integrated with the 
industry under some kind of contract, while the remaining 32% 
is essentially subsistence pig farming. As in the pig industry, the 
poultry and beef cattle industry is extensive, although productivity 
varies among the producing areas in the country. Beef production 
is spread over the southern states of Mato Grosso and Mato 
Grosso do Sul, the state of Goias in the central region and the 
state of Pará in the north. Brazil’s vast natural pasturelands make 
extensive livestock farming less costly and therefore more widely 
practiced in these areas. However, intensive livestock operations 
in feedlots have been growing despite the higher cost (soybean 
and maize prices have been rising in recent years) because little 
land is needed and the risk of changing seasons is minimized, 
especially when the pasturage is not good. In addition, operations 
of this kind are more production technology-intensive, which 
makes for higher per-area yields.
The Brazilian livestock sector is facing major environmental 
challenges because it has traditionally operated in agricultural 
frontier areas where there are many informal producers. A 
recent National Institute for Space Research (INPE) study noted 
that this activity takes up 62.2% of the deforested areas in the 
Legal Amazon (Dias de Aguiar, 2012). This is on top of pressure 
from crops like soybeans and sugar cane in regard to the use 
of grasslands for agriculture. This, plus consumer demand for 
sustainable meat and concern among NGOs and government 
agencies over deforestation and the invasion of indigenous lands, 
is behind a drive to rearrange this chain. The private sector has 
established a working group on sustainable livestock farming 
under The Global Roundtable for Sustainable Beef, in order to 
develop new protocols and environmental standards. This is 
a major undertaking, because in addition to commitment by 
companies, it requires addressing the lack of information on 
property lines and the problems arising from legal insecurity of 
land tenure. The State must be involved in dealing with these 
issues (Sampaio, s.f.). 
Processing
Beyond the differences between the poultry, swine and 
beef cattle production systems, the industrial processing of 
meat essentially comes down to two steps. The first involves the 
chilling plant where the animals are slaughtered; the second is the 
facility where fresh and frozen cuts are prepared for commercial 
distribution, both at the domestic level and for export. This stage 
of the industry is highly concentrated in no more than four 
companies that dominate the Brazilian market —particularly, the 
holding company JBS-Friboi, Marfrig and BRF. These oligopolies 
control the entire chain, with backwards linkages under a number 
of contract farming models (if they have no agricultural assets) 
and forward linkages through partnerships with wholesale chains 
or direct points of sale.
Marketing
At the end of the chain is a complex network of supermarkets, 
fast-food chains, food service companies, butcher’s shops 
and exporters seeking to deliver a quality product to the end 
consumer. This concern as to meeting consumer demand for 
high quality, healthier and environmentally friendly products has 
led large meat industry operators to venture into the marketing 
stage of the chain as well, particularly by establishing production 
partnerships with marketing chains. For example, as Grupo Marfrig 
entered the United States market it acquired Keystone Foods 
to ensure that its products were placed in the fast-food chains 
McDonald’s and Subway, among other companies belonging 
to Keystone Foods.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of M.A. Consoli and others, “Mapping and Quantification of the Meat Chain 
in Brazil”, paper presented at the VII International Conference of Programa de Estudios del Sistema Agroalimentario (PENSA), São Paulo, 26-28 November 2009.
The Brazil Foods group (BRF) dates back to 1934 and the Perdigão marketing firm, which was acquired by 
eight pension funds in 1990. The entry of these pension funds entailed a drastic change in company management 
and paved the way for its consolidation as a transnational. Just five of the eight original funds retain a stake in the 
company, holding 27.5%. In May 2009, a partnership agreement between Perdigão and the food producer Sadia led 
to the birth of Brazil Foods. The merger made the group the tenth largest company in the region, with annual revenue 
of nearly US$ 10 billion and some 130,000 employees. For the US$ 722 million operation to be cleared by Brazil’s 
anti-trust Administrative Council for Economic Defense (CADE), BRF had to sell off 10 plants, 4 slaughterhouses and 
8 distribution centres, among other facilities.









Brazil: main acquisitions by trans-Latins in the meat chain sector
(Millions of dollars)
Acquiree Home country Amount Year
JBS-Friboi, since 2005
Swift Armour Argentina 200.0 2005
Swift Food Company United States 1 458.0 2007
Smithfield United States 565.0 2008
Pilgrim’s Pride United States 800.0 2009
Tasman Australia 150.0 2011
Tatiara Meat Australia 27.0 2011
BRF Foods group, in 2011
Avex S.A (acquisition of 69%) Argentina 55.3 2011
Grupo Dánica (through Avex S.A.) Argentina 94.7 2011
Grupo Marfrig, since 2006
Argentine Breeders & Packers (AB&P) Argentina n.d. 2006
Quinto Cuarto S.A. y Frigorífico Patagonia S.A Chile 8.5 2006
Frigorífico Tacuarembó Uruguay 3.0 2006
Quickfood S.A., Establecimientos Colonia S.A. United States 267.0 2007
CDB Meats United Kingdom 12.0 2008
OSI United States 680.0 2008
Doux-Frangosul French affiliate in Peru 33.5 2009
Grupo Zenda Uruguay 49.5 2009
Moy Park – Seara United States 900.0 2010
Keystone Foods United States 1 260.0 2010
Keystone-Chinwhiz Poultry (joint venture) China 125.0 2010
Grupo Minerva
Frigorífico PULSA S.A. Uruguay 65.0 2011
Source: Thomson One, mergers and acquisitions deals, 2012. 
In 2011 BRF expanded its operations in Argentina by acquiring a 69% stake in the poultry company Avex S.A. 
through its subsidiary Sadia Alimentos S.A. for US$ 55.3 million. Through Avex it also bought the Grupo Dánica 
food company for US $94.7 million (Thomson One, 2012). BRF has plans to invest in building a processing plant in 
the United Arab Emirates and set up a joint venture with China’s Dah Chong Hong Holdings Limited to market its 
products in China (BRF, 2011).
Marfrig is Brazil’s third largest industrial food group, after BRF. It dates back to 1986, with the opening of a 
frozen meat, vegetables and fish distribution centre in the state of São Paulo. Between 2000 and 2006 the group used 
leases and then acquisitions to take control of beef processing plants, mainly in the states of Mato Grosso and São 
Paulo. In 2006 the group launched its globalization strategy by purchasing Argentine Breeders & Packers (AB&P),17 
a 50% stake in Quinto Cuarto S.A. (Chile’s largest meat importer), and the Tacuarembó processing plant in Uruguay. 
Expansion speeded up the following year with the purchase of three additional refrigeration companies in São Paulo 
(Promissão II, Kilo Certo and Pampeano) and the takeover of refrigeration companies La Caballada and Colonia S.A. 
in Uruguay. These latter two acquisitions turned Marfrig Group into the largest meat exporter in Uruguay. Between 
2006 and 2007 the group took full control of Quinto Cuarto and acquired Chile’s Frigorífico Patagonia S.A., which 
processes and markets lamb. In Argentina, the group acquired Mirab S.A., which, through its subsidiary Mirab USA, 
is the main processor and distributor of beef jerky in the United States, and it purchased Quickfood S.A., specializing 
in the production of meat for hamburgers. In Brazil, Marfrig began its pork production operations by acquiring the 
processor Mabella.
In 2008 Marfrig Group entered the poultry meat market by purchasing the Brazilian company Moinhos Cruzeiro 
do Sul and expanded its presence in the pork segment by acquiring Carroll’s Foods. That same year it bought the 
17 By 2008 Marfrig Group controlled five slaughter facilities in Argentina with a capacity of 2,760 head per day (Bisang and others, 2008).








United Kingdom-based meat importer and distributor CBD Meats. In a similar operation, Marfrig acquired the 
United States group OSI (for US $ 680 million), which includes Braslo (poultry and beef cattle), Pena Sul (poultry 
and swine), Agrofrango (poultry) and Moy Park. In 2009, it acquired the Peruvian affiliate of France’s Doux-Frangosul 
(turkey division) and SEARA Alimentos, a Brazilian subsidiary of the United States-based Cargill (12 industrial plants 
in the poultry and swine segment and a port terminal). That same year, Marfrig took a 51% stake in Grupo Zenda, 
headquartered in Uruguay, which produces leather for the automobile and aviation industries. In 2010, the Marfrig 
Group consolidated its position as a world-class food producer by acquiring the United States company Keystone 
Foods (a food service provider to major restaurant chains), with a presence in 13 countries and 54 production units. 
Through this subsidiary, in 2011 Marfrig set up a joint venture with State-owned COFCO in China, with the aim of 
meeting the growing demand for food in that country.
Thanks to these acquisitions, Marfrig has become the world’s fourth largest meatpacker (and third largest producer 
of beef) with 106 meatpacking units, 14 tanneries and 30 distribution centres and more than 90,000 employees 
across all continents. 
As with Grupo JBS, support from BNDES has been key for transforming Marfrig into a world-class Brazilian 
transnational. To this end, BNDESPAR pledged to acquire a US$ 1.4 billion share offering, the proceeds of which 
would be used to fund the purchase of Keystone Foods and Ireland’s O’Kane Poultry (BNDES, 2010). Currently, 
BNDESPAR has a 13.9% stake in Marfrig (Marfrig Group, 2010).
The Minerva Foods story began in 1957, but it was not until 1992 that the São Paulo-based company was 
incorporated under the name Indústria e Comércio de Carnes Minerva Ltda. The company grew rapidly in 2006-2007, 
extending its operations throughout Brazil by leasing or buying slaughter units. In 2008 it entered a joint venture with 
Ireland’s Dawn Farms Foods that enabled the company to build the Minerva Dawn Farms processing plant at a cost 
of US$ 44 million. The first cross-border operation took place in 2011, with the acquisition of Uruguay’s Frigorífico 
PUL and Carnes Ana Paula (production capacity: 1,400 head per day). 
(iv)  The meat chain in Argentina
Argentina’s meat industry has undergone extensive reorganization since 2005, when foreign competitors (mainly 
from Brazil) started to buy major Argentine beef slaughter facilities. JBS acquired Swift Armour in 2005, CEPA in 2006, 
Consignaciones Rurales in 2007 and Col-Car in 2008. Marfrig acquired Argentine Breeders & Packers S.A. in 2006 
and Estancias del Sur S.A., Quickfood S.A. and BestBeef in 2007. Tyson Foods acquired a 52% stake in Exportaciones 
Agroindustriales Argentinas S.A.; Cargill purchased FINEXCOR in 2004. These acquisitions gave the foreign companies 
more than industrial facilities: a country image, a gene pool, preferential access quotas for external markets (like 
the Hilton Quota in the European Union), distribution chains and established trademarks in the domestic market.
These acquisitions took place during a period when output and exports were expected to surge while domestic 
consumption held steady. The scenario changed when the government set domestic reference prices and started 
to require export permits. This period also saw a decline in exports, which was exacerbated by the drought and 
sustained expansion of the soybean area that moved many farms into marginal areas. Industry uncertainty led some 
actors to sell their assets. Cargill sold FINEXCOR to a local group in 2010; Tyson sold its shareholding to CRESUD 
that same year. Other relevant stakeholders have put their plans on hold, given the importance of the domestic 
market and the production potential of Argentina’s livestock sector. These are still FDI pull factors and point to a 
possible trend reversal in the coming years. In fact, improving domestic prices in 2010 led to the holdback of cows 
to rebuild the cattle herd.
For white meat (both poultry and pork), the situation is very different because in both cases there are emerging, 
high-potential industries that are still largely Argentine-owned. For the poultry industry, which is more concentrated, 
coordination and integration are easier, feed (concentrate) is cheap, and technology, genetics, health, internal and 
external markets and government support have enabled it to start growing exports: from 16,600 tons in 2000 to 
250,000 tons in 2011 (USDA, 2012). The pork industry is growing and has a high production potential based on 
good health standards and high technology. Argentina’s domestic supply of pork still falls short of demand, forcing it 
to import about 50,000 tons in 2010 (Ministry of Agriculture, 2010), which indicates that expansion in the coming 
years will be geared towards import substitution. 








2. The agricultural inputs sector 
According to Pavitt (1984), innovation in agriculture is essentially determined by suppliers of inputs, material and 
equipment. In other words, technological change is product-driven (embedded technology). For this reason, it is 
important to examine how FDI is impacting the supply of agricultural inputs.
By contrast, in recent decades public institutions have not been as active in promoting new agricultural technologies 
as this role is increasingly filled by a few (but very large) transnational seed and agrochemical companies. In 2007, 
just 10 companies accounted for almost 90% of agrochemical market sales of fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and 
other products (see table III.10). 
Table III.10 
World’s principal agrochemical companies, 2007
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
Company Country Sales (millions of dollars)
Market share
(percentage)
Bayer Germany 7 458 19
Syngenta Switzerland 7 285 19
BASF Germany 4 297 11
Dow AgroSciences United States 3 779 10
Monsanto United States 3 599 9
DuPont United States 2 369 6
Makhteshim Agan Israel 1 895 5
Nufarm Australia 1 470 4
Sumitomo Chemical Japan 1 209 3
Arysta LifeScience Japan 1 035 3
Source: Agrow World Crop Protection News, August 2008.
(a)  Seeds
(i) Production and consumption in Latin America and the Caribbean
The use of improved seeds is a long-standing practice followed by farmers in the region (mass selection). But 
a substantive change took place with the introduction of hybrid maize in Mexico, when the Mexican Government 
opened the Office of Experiment Stations in 1940 to replicate the progress that researchers in the United States had 
been making in this area since the late nineteenth century (Matchett, 2005). 
In the first few decades of the twentieth century, the world’s genetic improvement programmes were run by 
national and international public entities that, because of their nature, did not have intellectual property strategies to 
protect their investments. The scenario has changed considerably in recent years, with a shift to programmes developed 
by private companies that market their seeds under the protection of intellectual property and trademark use laws. 
Plant varieties are protected under the 1961 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, 
which established the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) to which most of the 
countries of the region belong. This institutional framework has been key for attracting domestic and foreign private 
investments to the sector because gene development has long lead times (10 years or more) and funding hinges on 
legal formulas for effective ownership of outcomes. 
This institutional and legal framework led to a significant rearrangement of the global seed industry. In the late 
1960s, the market was dominated by large companies such as Pioneer, DEKALB, Agrow, SESVanderHave, Vilmorin, 
Tezier, Royal Sluis, Funk, and Sluis & Groot, many of them still family-owned. Upjohn’s purchase of Agrow in 1968 
set off a wave of consolidations from which a handful of major international corporations emerged. Some of them 
are from the chemical industry (Monsanto, Dow, BASF and DuPont) and others from the pharmaceutical industry 
(Syngenta, Bayer), but all of them specialize in producing genetically modified seeds and supplying complementary 
inputs, particularly herbicides and pesticides. 








Worldwide, the seed market grew from US$ 13.23 billion in 1979 to US$ 36.53 billion in 2007 (Le Buanec, 2008). 
The region benefited from this growth thanks to areas specializing in the production of hybrids and to the development 
of counter-season production, which began to surge in the 1980s (Le Buanec, 2008). Argentina’s seed market went 
from US$ 210 million in 1979 to US$ 950 million in 2007; Brazil went from US$ 570 million to US$ 2 billion and 
Mexico from US$ 150 million to US$ 350 million. 
(ii)  Foreign direct investment in the seed sector
International seed companies have followed two strategies in the region. One has been to set up operations or 
partner with local actors to conduct crop improvement programmes. The other has been to operate as seed suppliers.
The highest-profile case is Monsanto, which shifted from producing agrochemicals to producing genetically 
modified seeds. Either directly or indirectly through licensing arrangements, it supplies genetically modified soybean 
seeds to growers in the region, especially in the Southern Cone countries. The starting point was the market release 
of genetically modified RR seed in Argentina in 1996, followed by Uruguay (1998), Brazil (2002-2004),18 the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia (2003-2005) and Paraguay (2004). The technology package associated with this seed 
is based on direct seeding and the use of the weedkiller glyphosate. Both the RR seed and glyphosate are Monsanto 
products, but in Argentina, for example, the seeds are distributed by its licensee Asgrow, which in turn was acquired 
by Argentina’s Nidera. 
Monsanto has thus managed to control an embedded technology that has stirred up more than a little controversy 
(Motta, 2013). Beyond the apprehension caused by genetically modified organisms per se vis-à-vis their impact on 
human health and the environment, the company has come in for criticism for making local growers newly dependent 
by exerting pressure to block them from using leftover seed, requiring them to pay royalties when they do and barring 
them from reproducing seed even for their own use. This strategy has also been criticized as over-specialized and leading 
to levels of mono-cropping that have displaced other crops and alternative activities (such as cattle-raising) and caused 
depopulation of rural areas, biodiversity loss and other environmental impacts and risks, including for human health.
Monsanto has interests in Mexico, too, where it invested some US$ 20 million to expand a seed plant in Sinaloa. 
The company reports that it plans outlays of up to US$ 10.5 million in the area. Most of the investment is for producing 
genetically modified maize seeds for planting 2 million hectares (the project is still pending as it is being reviewed 
by the Government of Mexico). Another country of interest to Monsanto is Guatemala, where it has invested heavily 
in the seed market (United Nations, 2011). In 2008 it purchased Marmot S.A. for a reported US$ 135 million. In 
addition to its core business of producing and supplying seeds, Monsanto is developing hybrid vegetables and fruit 
in Guatemala in the framework of the SHIELD programme designed by Seminis. 
Dow AgroSciences is developing its maize seed business in Brazil after acquiring Agromen Tecnologia Ltda. in 
2007. The transaction included the Brazilian company’s entire marketing, production and research platform, which 
had at the time been operating for 35 years and had a solid background in hybrid seed development.
(b)  Fertilizers
(i)  Production and consumption in Latin America and the Caribbean
The fertilizer market is based on three primary nutrients. Nitrogen is the most important one (60% of total consumption). 
It is obtained through chemical processes that make ammonia from natural gas. The most heavily traded nitrogen fertilizer 
worldwide is urea; the main exporters are the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Qatar. Brazil, India and the European 
Union are the largest importers. China is the world’s largest consumer and is self-sufficient. The other two main nutrients 
are potassium and phosphorus; they are obtained from phosphate or potash rock deposits found in just a handful of 
countries in the world, such as Canada, the Russian Federation and some European countries.
The use of chemical fertilizers in agriculture in the region spread slowly starting in 1950, when technicians 
involved in the Green Revolution and the agrarian reform began to promote it. Consumption went from 500,000 tons 
18 Millions of hectares of Roundup Ready soybean seeds were planted in Brazil in 2002-2004 despite a moratorium. 








in 1950 to 16.7 million tons in 2004. By 2008, total global consumption stood at 165 million tons, with China 
as the largest consumer (29.8% of the total), followed by India (14.5%), the United States (12.1%) and Brazil 
(5.7%). The use of fertilizers in the region is shaped by three major food-producing countries: Brazil, Argentina 
and Mexico.
Fertilizer consumption in Argentina has grown by 900% over the past 20 years and ranges between 2.5 million tons 
and 3.8 million tons. Most of the soil in Argentina still has a good supply of soil potassium, but this is not the case with 
nitrogen or phosphorous. Argentina does not have many natural gas fields at a price that would enable it to compete 
with other countries in producing nitrogen fertilizers, although its huge shale gas reserves could change the situation. 
Argentina does not have commercially exploitable phosphate rock deposits, although it has potassium in its soil as well 
as mineable potassium salt fields for producing a large volume of base raw material for export (CIAFA, 2010).
Consumption in 2008 reached 24.1 million tons. Of the 8.9 million tons produced domestically, 6.7 million 
tons were phosphate fertilizers because Brazil has phosphate rock deposits, especially in the state of Minas Gerais. 
Nitrogen fertilizer output has been declining along with the volume of urea produced by Petrobras (which owns 
two of the country’s three plants). Nor does Brazil produce a significant volume of potassium fertilizer. The single 
potassium chloride plant in Brazil accounts for 100% of production, although new fields are being explored that 
could change this situation.
Brazil has phosphate mines that would enable it to become self-sufficient in 5 to 10 years, but these operations 
need to be optimized. Potential potash mines have been discovered in the Amazon area, although their viability 
depends on environmental requirements that are difficult to meet. Petrobras controls natural gas operations; availability 
could climb with the new shale gas deposits in south-eastern Brazil and thus provide the State with a guaranteed 
supply of raw material for producing nitrogen fertilizers. The availability of raw materials, together with prospects for 
developing Brazilian agriculture, could attract investment to the sector. 
Mexico’s fertilizer market has not grown significantly over the past few years, although the mix of fertilizers has 
changed. Phosphorus and potassium consumption has increased; nitrogen consumption has declined. Sales in 2005 
totaled 4.3 million tons, of which 1.3 million tons were urea, which is not produced domestically. Mexico has always 
imported all of the potash fertilizers it uses, but importing nitrogen fertilizers is a relatively recent development. The 
high cost of natural gas resulted in the closure of urea and diammonium phosphate plants between 1999 and 2001. 
Since then, Mexico has imported 100% of its supply of both products (Martínez, 2006).
(ii)  Foreign direct investment in the fertilizer sector 
The market is dominated by five large transnational companies, which in 2007 accounted for 33% of global 
production. Table III.11 provides a snapshot of these companies. Other relevant companies are Eurochem and Acron 
(both based in the Russian Federation), Stirol (Ukraine), Sinochem (China), IFCCO (India), SABIC (Saudi Arabia), 
Fosfertil (Brazil) and EFIC (Egypt). In the United States, PotashCorp and The Mosaic Company are the only survivors 
of the Phosphate Chemicals Export Association export cartel. Under a law enacted in the early twentieth century to 
promote United States exports, the companies are authorized to sell their products abroad as a single entity and to 
define prices in consultation with the other party. Canada has its own cartel (Canpotex), as does the Russian Federation 
(Belarus Potash Company).
Privatization of Brazil’s State-owned fertilizer industry between 1992 and 1994 involved the transfer of ownership 
of five companies that had been managed by the State since the 1940s: Indag, Arafertil, Fosfertil, Goiasfertil and 
Ultrafertil. These sell-offs laid the groundwork of the market as it is today, where Brazilian companies and foreign 
ones coexist and the latter predominate. IAP acquired a 35% stake in Indag and was subsequently sold to Bunge, 
which also acquired Arafertil. This privatization involved creating the holding company Fertifós (formed by Brazilian 
fertilizer companies). Fertifós acquired Fosfertil (1992), Ultrafertil (1993) and Goaisfertil (1995). Since 2004 these 
companies have had a single corporate identity, Fosfertil, which in 2007 had a 13.6% share of sales in the domestic 
market. Between 1997 and 2000 Bunge acquired some of the firms that set up Fertifós; because Fosfertil shares have 
been traded on the stock exchange, Bunge currently holds a 12% equity stake in Fosfertil. Fertifós, after a series of 
mergers and acquisitions, has also become majority foreign-owned: Bunge has a 52% stake; Yara Mosaic holds 33% 
and Yara owns 13% (Fernandes and others, 2009). 









Leading fertilizer producers worldwide
Company Description Foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean
Yara
(Norway)
Yara is the largest fertilizer company in terms of revenue and the leader in the European market. 
It has a physical presence in 50 countries and sales in 120 countries. Yara is the global leader 
in nitrogen fertilizers, with a production capacity of 5.9 million tons of ammonia, 4.8 million 
tons of nitrates (ceric ammonium nitrate and ammonium nitrate) and 4.1 million tons of NPK. 
Yara has a one-third share of the global ammonia trade. 
Yara has facilities in Trinidad and Tobago and Qatar. 
Yara Trinidad manages and operates a three-
plant ammonia production facility in Savonetta. 
Most of the 1.3 million tons it produces annually 
is exported, making Trinidad and Tobago the 
world’s leading exporter of ammonia.
The Mosaic Company
(United States)
This company was formed in 2004 when IMC Global Inc. merged with the crop nutrition division 
of Cargill, Incorporated. It is the world’s largest producer of phosphates, with an annual 
capacity of nearly 9.4 million tons–more than the following three producers combined. At some 
10.4 million tons per year, Mosaic ranks second worldwide in potash production capacity. The 
company’s annual nitrogen fertilizer production capacity is 1.2 million tons.
Mosaic operates five phosphate mines in Florida and four potash mines in Saskatchewan, 
Canada (including the world’s largest potash mine) and a potash mine in New Mexico. 
Approximately one third of its output is shipped within North America, with the remainder 
exported around the world to some 45 countries. Mosaic’s offshore interests form a production 
and distribution network in key markets around the world. They include a 35% equity stake in 
a granular DAP facility in China. 
Mosaic has a 20% stake in Fosfertil S.A. en Brazil 
and a 35% ownership interest in a GSSP fertilizer 
plant in Argentina. Profertil plans to invest 
US$ 60 million in a fertilizer plant in Argentina.
Agrium Inc.
(Canada)
Agrium has an annual production capacity of 6.5 million tons of nitrogen fertilizer, 2.1 million 
tons of potash and 1.3 million tons of phosphate. It has two nitrogen fertilizer plants that target 
international markets, one in Argentina and the other in Alaska. Its primary markets are the 
Republic of Korea, Mexico and Taiwan Province of China. The key potash export markets are 
China, Brazil and India. 
As part of its efforts to diversify internationally, Agrium is investing in Egypt and expanding 
into China by purchasing a stake in the fertilizer company Hanfeng Evergreen. 
Agrium is a major retail supplier of agricultural 
products and services in North America and 
South America. In Argentina it operates 
through Agroservicios Pampeanos S.A. (ASP), 
a decentralized business made up of 15 units 
called agrocentres located throughout the country. 
PotashCorp
(Canada)
This firm accounts for 22% of the world’s potash production capacity. In response to global 
demand, PotashCorp has announced projects for boosting its annual production capacity from 
10.8 million tons in 2007 to 17.2 million tons in 2015. 
PotashCorp has strategic investments in four offshore potash businesses: a 28% stake in Arab 
Potash Company Ltd. (APC) in Jordan; a 10% holding in Israel Chemicals Ltd. (ICL) in Israel; 
32% of Química y Minera de Chile, S.A. (Soquimich) in Chile; and a 20% share of Sinofert 
Holdings Limited (Sinofert) in China. 
Soquimich produces natural nitrates from 
the lithium and boron fields it works. Among 
its main products are potassium nitrate and 
potassium chloride. In 2007, Soquimich produced 
1,212,774 tons of fertilizer (nitrates, potassium 
chloride, potassium sulphate, boric acid and 
boron), of which 227,973 tons (18.8%) were 
for the domestic market. 
Kali & Salz Group (K+S)
(Germany)
The group extracts potash and crude magnesium salts at six mines in Germany, with a total 
output of 8 million tons. At 12% of worldwide potash output, it is the fourth largest producer 
in the world and the leading supplier in Europe. K+S is also the global leader in potassium 
sulphate and magnesium. Its company Fertiva is a major European supplier, with a particularly 
strong position in nitrogen fertilizers containing sulphur. The firm’s focus is on the European 
market but it exports about 40 % of production overseas, mainly to Latin America. The K+S 
Group has become more international with the acquisition of Chilean salt producer Sociedad 
Punta de Lobos (SPL). 
In 2006 the K+S Group acquired Chile’s Sociedad 
Punta de Lobos (SPL), the country’s main producer 
of salt. SPL operates one of the largest open-pit 
sodium chloride mines, the Tarapacá salt flat 
(which measures 45 kilometres by 5 kilometres 
and ranges between 12 metres and 60 meters 
in depth. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of K. Arovuori K. y H. Karikallio, “Consumption patterns and competition 
in the world fertilizer markets”, paper presented at the 19th Symposium of the International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, June 2009.
Bunge Fertilizantes began to operate in Brazil in 1938, through the company Serrana. Bunge bought IAP in 1997; in 
1998 it added Elekeiroz’s fertilizer unit and took a partial equity stake in Takenaka, owner of the Ouro Verde trademark. 
Bunge Fertilizantes was born in August 2000 when Fertilizantes Serrana became part of Manah, which had itself been 
acquired by Bunge in April of that same year. By 2007, the company had a 31.1% share of the domestic market; it is 
now the largest fertilizer company in South America. Mosaic took over the structure of Cargill Fertilizantes when the 
latter merged with IMC Global worldwide in 2004. Cargill had been operating in Brazil since 1994 and had a liquid 
fertilizer plant in Monte Alto along with a blending facility in Candeias that it added in 1998. The company acquired 
a controlling shareholding in Solorrico in 2000 and in Fertiza in 2000, both of which were traditional companies in 
the sector. In 2007 Mosaic’s market share was 14.7% (Fernandes and others, 2009; Fernández, 2004).
Heringer Group, created in 1968, has eight manufacturing units. It is Brazilian in origin but sold a 20.6% stake 
to American International Group (AIG) in 2004. In 2007 it had a market share of 12.7%. Yara arrived in Brazil in 
1974, first acquiring just the domestic company Trevo and, subsequently, Fertibras in 2006. By 2007 Yara’s market 
share stood at 12%. There are other groups in addition to these companies. Among them are Copebrás (4.5% of the 
market), owned by AngloAmerican and Brazilian-owned Fertipar (4.5% market share). As this background information 
shows, the sector is going through a profound restructuring and transnational corporations are making inroads. Bunge, 
Mosaic and Yara dominate domestic production and are reproducing, on a local scale, their fierce competition in the 
global market (Fernandes and others, 2009). 








The pattern is the same in Mexico. Fertimex (a State monopoly established in 1977 that controlled all operations 
in the local market and sought to promote consumption through a subsidized pricing policy) was privatized in 
1992. The company’s industrial units were acquired by groups of domestic and foreign investors that are currently 
operating in a free market where each company makes its own decisions. In 2005 there were five ammonium 
sulphate plants (Univex, Agrogen, Fertirrey, Fegusa and Fesur), as well as two superphosphate plants (Rhodia 
and Agrogen).
The situation in Argentina is similar. The largest company in the market is Profertil, which is controlled by the 
transnational Agrium alongside YPF. It makes nitrogen fertilizers. Bunge is another important actor; in 2009 it acquired 
the Campana (formerly, Pasa) nitrogen fertilizer plant from Petrobras, which had purchased the plant from Pecom Energía 
(Pérez Companc) in 2003. Like the other actors in the market, Bunge imports other types of fertilizers, particularly 
phosphate fertilizers. Cargill has a nitrogen fertilizer plant in Ramallo and supplements this operation by importing 
phosphate fertilizers. This picture could be changed by the Río Colorado potash deposit that Brazil’s transnational 
mining company Vale do Rio Doce owns and plans to develop. This megaproject involves a US$ 4.5 billion investment. 
Although press sources report that it might be postponed because of the current global economic situation (La Mañana 
de Neuquén, 2012) it could, once built, turn Argentina in a major producer of this type of fertilizer. 
D. Conclusions, challenges and outlook
1. FDI strategies in the agricultural and agro-industry sector, 
 and kinds of companies
(a)  Investments in land
Studies and databases on agricultural land purchase and lease operations in the region disagree as to their scale 
and extent. A FAO study (2011) concludes that Brazil and Argentina are the only countries with widespread land 
grabbing. Other authors contend that it is taking place in other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean as 
well, if the investor profile is expanded to include other types of private and local actors (Borras and others, 2012). 
However, the sources examined do agree that the land market is growing quickly and that trans-Latin companies are 
playing a leading role (FAO, 2011; Borras and others, 2012; Land Matrix, 2012). 
Trans-Latin companies (which are the result of mergers between two or more regional firms, or of cross-border 
operations by firms headquartered in one Latin American country) conduct negotiations through their contacts in 
the host country. According to Borras and others (2012) this is what keeps many transactions from being detected, 
because they are conducted in the name of companies or corporations that are registered in the country in question. 
In the Land Matrix database, most of the investors identified in the region are from Latin America (48%), followed by 
investors from North America (21%). A smaller percentage of the transactions involve investors from East Asia (14%), 
Europe (10%) and the Middle East (7%). According to a FAO study (2011), trans-Latin firms (chiefly, ones based in 
Brazil or Argentina) have a substantial presence and operations in countries such as Chile, Paraguay, the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and Uruguay. In Central America, companies based in Mexico and other countries of the region have 
the larger footprint. Available sources also agree that most investment in land is for growing flex-crops, seeking to 
meet the rising regional and global demand for food, fodder and biofuels.
The governments of the countries of the region have responded to this interest in acquiring agricultural land. 
A clear example is Argentina, where Law 26.737 limits land ownership rights of foreigners (or companies that are 
majority-owned by foreigners) to 15% in rural areas. In Brazil, Law 5.709 regulates land purchases by foreign nationals 
and has been amended several times in the past few years. This issue is regulated, particularly, by ruling GQ-181 
AGU of 17 December 1998, which is currently under review in response to the recent land rush, much of it illegal 
and on which there is little information (Hackbart, 2008). Other countries, such as Colombia, the Plurinational State 








of Bolivia and Uruguay, are also discussing similar bills aimed at curbing foreign ownership of agricultural land. 
International agencies such as FAO have put forth a set of voluntary guidelines to encourage investments in land that are 
environmentally responsible and promote social inclusion and the socioeconomic development of rural populations. 
This issue should be made an explicit part of bilateral agendas between countries, as the governments of Australia 
and China (DFAT, 2012) have recently done by establishing consultation mechanisms and integrated information 
systems in order to make foreign investments in agriculture more transparent and legitimate. These mechanisms are 
very useful benchmarks for the region, in view of the agricultural cooperation proposal announced by the Chinese 
Premier during his visit to ECLAC in June 2012, which called for, among other things, creating a forum of ministers 
of agriculture of China and Latin America and the Caribbean.
One example of FDI in agriculture are planting pools (also discussed in the FAO study), which have expanded 
out from Argentina to the other Southern Cone countries except for Chile. The ephemeral nature of these operations 
(leasing land and machinery, recruiting technical personnel for short periods) makes it difficult to quantify the FDI 
mobilized, although the figures point to a sweeping trend that could change the face of agriculture in the region. 
This could bring benefits in terms of profitability, professionalism and high technology, but, on the downside, could 
favour an extractive, short-term approach that could have negative social and environmental impacts (for example, 
approaching agriculture as mining). 
(b)  Mergers and acquisitions 
This chapter shows that companies specializing in the production of agricultural commodities map their 
strategies in order to integrate all of their operations along the value chain and optimize global raw materials exports. 
This requires meshing agricultural production, logistics, the maritime freight business and industrial processing in 
order to reduce costs and produce competitively. This approach is being followed by the world’s four major grain 
processing corporations (ADM, Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus) together with a wide range of other key but smaller 
transnationals (Glencore, Tereos, Mitsui Mitsubishi and Goldman Sachs) and emerging transnational corporations 
like the China-based Noble Group Limited. 
These companies’ operations are also increasingly global in scale, in response to geographic, strategic, geopolitical, 
financial and regulatory factors. Burgeoning international trade in food products requires diversifying sources of 
supply and working in different geographical markets. On the other hand, competition between companies calls for 
strategies that involve breaking up supply chains into a network of firms and industrial plants. Among the noteworthy 
geopolitical and financial factors are political decisions by governments, which play a key role in guiding FDI. The 
most paradigmatic cases are Brazil’s fuel alcohol programme PROALCOOL created by the ethanol industry with the 
participation of major foreign companies, and funding from public banks (BNDES), which facilitated the expansion 
of Brazilian trans-Latins in meat chains. 
The pattern across countries and agro-industry chains is to acquire domestic enterprises (via mergers and 
acquisitions) and, to a lesser extent, enter into joint ventures with local companies and set up subsidiaries. This trend 
is a reflection of the longstanding presence of the major transnationals in the region, which has made them familiar 
with local markets. These mergers and acquisitions are driven by an interest in expanding operations or quickly gaining 
a foothold in the local market without having to go through all of the stages involved in creating a new company and 
starting from scratch. In addition to providing ownership of a business that already has a market share, this decreases 
the number of competitors. In these cases the foreign firm determines the most efficient mechanism for absorbing 
local knowledge so that the staff recruited can use that know-how in keeping with the company’s strategic objectives. 
When this knowledge cannot be hired directly because it is too costly, shared ownership can be a more efficient 
solution than setting up an affiliate. Such is the case with some transnational corporations with a longer track record 
in the region that have opted for partnering with local groups so as to expand their organizational boundaries, gain 
access to local knowledge and thus reduce their exposure.
In the area of agricultural inputs, corporate dissemination strategies are crucial in creating a market for the technology 
packages that growers use, although logistics infrastructure and industrial capacities also play a leading role. In the 
seed industry, major transnational corporations dominate the regional scene (including Bayer, Syngenta, BASF, Dow 
AgroSciences and Monsanto). All of them have robust research and development operations. The situation is different in 
the case of the fertilizer industry because it is essentially an extractive industry where the possession of mineral deposits 








plays a key role. That is why that the main actors are transnational corporations specializing in the production of fertilizers 
(plus Cargill and Bunge, which entered the sector to optimize their grain production operations).
Agricultural FDI from Asia, especially China, is of particular note. Although there are no exact figures, it has 
so far been limited to a handful of companies setting up operations in the region, such as Noble and Kuok in 
the ethanol sector. On the other hand, some Brazilian companies in the meat sector (Marfrig and BRF) seeking 
to venture into the Chinese market have partnered with Chinese enterprises (COFCO, Chinwiz and Dah Chong 
Hong Holdings Limited). That said, FDI flows from China could surge in the coming years, as seen in State-owned 
Heilongjiang Beidahuang Nongken Group Company’s plans to lease 300,000 hectares of land in Argentina’s Río 
Negro province. This limited but growing trend can also be inferred from official Chinese government figures, which 
show that Chinese agricultural FDI worldwide increased from US$ 834 million in 2008 to a cumulative US$ 2.61 
billion in 2010. This figure contrasts with the cumulative US$ 44.66 billion in FDI in the mining sector as of 2010 
(Ministry of Commerce of China, 2011). 
In short, FDI plays a major role not only for major international corporations that process grain and supply 
agricultural inputs, but also for trans-Latins that are relevant links in meat, wheat and ethanol production chains.
(c)  Trans-Latins and FDI in the agricultural and agro-industry sector in Latin America 
and the Caribbean
Trans-Latin companies have partnered with firms based in other countries for distributing their products and 
have even set up production facilities there. The expansion of these firms has been guided by offensive strategies 
(seeking economies of scale, regional market knowledge and access to new distribution channels) and defensive 
strategies (occupying key positions before competitors, avoiding being absorbed by transnational corporations). 
There is also some sectoral specialization based on existing comparative and competitive advantages. Examples 
are the Argentine grain millers expanding into Brazil, and Brazilian meatpackers investing in Argentina, Uruguay 
and elsewhere in the region.
Agro-food trans-Latins follow expansion strategies that range from specializing in regional and niche markets to 
buying and selling shares in order to become part of transnational corporate global networks. The greatest agro-food 
sector success story is the Brazilian trans-Latins in the meat industry chain. They have become global leaders, as can 
be seen in their acquisitions in Southern Cone countries and in the United States and Australia. In addition to the 
inherent advantages of these chains over their competitors, their push to globalize is supported by BNDES national 
development policy that, among other instruments, provides loans for stock purchases and funding that enables 
Brazilian companies to buy competing ones abroad, acquire local companies with subsidiaries abroad or establish 
joint ventures with competing firms. 
(d)  Companies and business models
The major agro-industry corporations (agro-food and agricultural input companies in particular) are opting for 
vertical integration and globalization strategies aimed at gaining control over the entire production process and 
ensuring consistent-quality supply for different markets. This makes it possible for them to meet the requirements of 
the new global food paradigm while expanding their markets. In this business model, integrating the entire process 
from farm to final delivery to the consumer, combined with insourcing, helps yield high profits (transforming food 
from a commodity into a service generates more value added), economies of scale (as markets expand and become 
integrated) and consistent output quality (as phytosanitary and environmental regulations are standardized).
The vertically integrated, internationalized business model is not within the reach of all companies because 
not all are at the same level or have the same implementation capacity. The specific characteristics of the different 
subsectors (such as those examined in this chapter) have an impact on the degree of vertical integration at each 
point. The major actors in the sectors examined in this chapter therefore fall into four general groups: (i) transnational 
corporations with market positioning advantages; (ii) foreign companies with limited market presence; (iii) trans-Latins; 
and (iv) domestic enterprises.








(i)  Transnational corporations with market positioning advantages
As described in this chapter, four major grain sector transnationals dominate much of the global market; these 
are ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus —the ABCD traders. The agricultural input market is oligopolistic in 
that a handful of companies account for more than 70% of worldwide sales. Because of their track record and early 
arrival in the industry (many of these companies are more than a hundred years old), these companies are at an 
advantage when it comes to creating value, owning the value created along the chain and influencing the operations 
of correlated businesses (Teece, 1986; Jacobides, 2006). 
With the passage of time, these companies have consolidated their position of power in the markets on the 
strength of their high degree of integration and globalization. This gives them considerable influence over all their 
transactions, such as contracts with direct and indirect suppliers (growers and shippers) and buyers (distributors 
and end consumers). Their position allows them to innovate and create more value as they build relationships of 
dependence with customers and suppliers. The grain ABCDs and major agrochemical companies are not only very 
vertically integrated (towards the consumer) but also have substantial horizontal influence in that they control a 
significant portion of the markets correlated with grains and agriculture. 
In the medium to long term, the major petroleum companies (such as Shell and BP) are expected to surge into the 
biofuels sector. While they have not followed the same path as the ABCD traders or major agrochemical corporations, 
their size and resources could put them in a strong position. Nevertheless, for the time being the smaller foreign 
companies are the ones that are gaining ground in the region’s ethanol and biodiesel markets.
(ii)  Foreign companies with limited market presence
Together with the major transnationals, other foreign companies with smaller market shares operate in the region’s 
agro-industry sector. These firms often stand out for their know-how or innovativeness. Examples in the biofuels 
sector include Sirona Fuels, Clean Energy, Abengoa, Sojitz Corporation, Tereos and Explora. Companies that have 
entered agreements with local governments to gain access to agro-commodities (such as the Saudi conglomerate 
Al-Khorayef with 200,000 hectares of sorghum and other crops in Argentina) or tap into new markets on the strength 
of their economies of scale (like Noble Group Limited’s investment in sugar and ethanol in Brazil). These are all major 
companies, but they do not have the advantages that enable the large transnationals to influence the organizational 
structure of their sector, influence competitors’ strategies or leverage their position in the chain.
(iii) Trans-Latins
Brazil’s trans-Latin companies in the meat chain exemplify successful strategies for vertical integration and 
insourcing. The four major Brazilian meat sector companies (JBS-Friboi, BRF, Marfrig and Minerva) have been able to 
position themselves as regional leaders with a large global footprint. Their growth is due in part to policies providing 
support from public entities, coupled with the country’s obvious competitive advantages. Other examples in the region, 
albeit on a smaller scale, are Argentina’s oilseed mills, which have been making inroads into regional markets, and 
Brazil’s grain company Amaggi Exportação e Importação Ltda., which operates in Argentina and Europe. While there 
are key players with market positioning advantages (like the ABCDs and other meat industry heavyweights such as 
Tyson Foods), there is an emerging trend in the region, driven by trans-Latins following the new global food paradigm 
and its vertically integrated and internationalized business model. The Brazilian trans-Latins in the meat industry are 
the clearest expression of this trend.
While different in nature, planting pools are another part of this trend, which is spreading throughout the 
Southern Cone. Grupo Los Grobo is a prime example. Beyond the ephemeral nature of these endeavours, planting 
pools are transnational in scope and are having a significant impact on agriculture in some countries because their 
business model adjusts in keeping with locally available resources. The same is true of spontaneous cross-border 
movements by growers setting up operations in neighbouring countries in search of access to new land. Although 
both trends involve little or no vertical integration, they are wide-reaching in geopolitical, economic, social and 
environmental terms. 









Because of the cultural nature of food products, small and medium-sized domestic enterprises subsist alongside 
major international and trans-Latin corporations as well as other foreign companies operating in the domestic 
market. They exist because their broad knowledge of the domestic market enables them to meet that market’s specific 
needs. Agricultural producers (except for planting pools) tend to operate in the local market, as do slaughterhouses 
and meatpackers, wheat flour mills and biodiesel plants. These companies, which are always smaller and not 
internationalized, are being forced to innovate and comply with new quality standards to be able to compete with 
foreign companies and thus maintain their market position. 
Table III.12 summarizes the different types of companies discussed in this chapter.
Table III.12 
Types of agro-commodity and agricultural input companies
Type of company Definition Main products Vertical integration Internationalization
Transnationals with market 
positioning advantages
Large multinational 
companies with a long 
history in the industry. This 
enables them to influence 
the organizational structure 
of the sector and have an 
impact on the strategies of 
competing companies. They 
benefit from a dominant 
position in the chain. 
Agro-commodities, especially 
grains (wheat, soybeans 
and others) and ethanol.
Agrochemicals, including 
seeds and fertilizers. For the 
former, their advantage lies 
in research and development 
capabilities. For the latter, 
their advantage comes from 
possessing gas, phosphate 
and potash deposits.
Agricultural commodities: 
High (forward). In addition to 
large industrial facilities for 
processing raw materials, 
such operations have 
ports, infrastructure and 
distribution channels.
Agrochemicals: High 
(backward and forward). 
Integrated all the way from 
research and development 
to sale of embedded 
technology to the farmer. 
High. Present in multiple 
markets, with operations 
on a global scale. 
Foreign companies with 
limited market presence
Businesses with technology 
and innovation capacity, 
but with limited influence 
in their chain. 
Biofuels Mixed (vertical integration 
can be stepped up as 
larger, international 
companies come in). 
Medium. Present in 
just a few markets.
Trans-Latins Latin American enterprises 
investing in countries 
in the region.
Meat chains High, especially forward, 
because they possess 
distribution channels 
and trademarks.
Only the pork and poultry 
chains are integrated 
backwards, because many 
firms operate on the basis 
of contract farming.
High. Operations on 
a global scale.
Domestic enterprises Growers of all sizes, and 
agribusinesses that operate 
only in the domestic market. 
Production of agricultural 
commodities. Local 
slaughterhouses, small biofuel 
enterprises, sugar mills, 
distributors of national inputs. 
Low Low
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
2. Public policies for attracting, regulating and enhancing  
 the positive externalities of FDI in the agricultural and  
 agro-industry sector 
FDI has the potential to impact economic growth endogenously if it generates production returns through externalities 
and technological and organizational spillovers. The public policy regime and the institutional framework in general 
play a decisive role in promoting FDI, absorbing its positive domestic economic impact and building the knowledge 
base that economies need in order to achieve this end (Cimoli and others, 2009; Mello Jr., 2007; ECLAC, 1998; 
ECLAC, 2002). The information set out herein indicates that biofuel and meat industry FDI is driven not only by new 
market trends but also by the government incentives and regulations that have shaped foreign investor and trans-Latin 
company decision-making. 








The factors that draw transnational firms are generally well-known: advantageous location, defence of a strategic 
position, access to strategic local resources, and a dynamic market that makes it possible to produce at the lowest 
cost and sell on a large scale. This means that foreign investors weigh the income level of the target country’s 
population, the degree of urbanization, trade agreements, comparative advantages, economic incentives and the 
quality of institutions. The factors that discourage investment include fragile public institutions, an uncertain legal 
framework and the concomitant political risks, as well as small market size and export constraints. For those tasked 
with designing policies to attract and regulate FDI, the question is how to encourage investments that are not only 
profitable but also have an endogenous impact on socioeconomic growth in their countries. 
(a)  Institutional instruments for attracting and regulating FDI in the agricultural and 
agro-industry sector
As in other economic sectors, appropriate macroeconomic policies (inflation, exchange rate, interest rate and labour 
legislation, among others) and trade agreements (such as economic complementarity and free trade agreements) are 
factors that play a critical role in the dynamics of FDI in the agricultural and agro-industry sector in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. This is in addition to the legal instruments and technical standards that allow FDI to flow in consistently 
and transparently. Some countries have foreign investment regimes in place to ensure legal stability and generate tax 
incentives for foreign investors; legislative decree 600 in Chile and legislative decree 662 and Law 27.360 in Peru 
are examples of this. For other countries, schemes that are domestic- and foreign-investor neutral, like Uruguay’s 
investment promotion and protection law (Law 16.906), are essential for creating a favourable climate and drawing 
investment into the country. Another institutional aspect that stimulates FDI is the guarantee of free convertibility of 
profits into foreign currency and the absence of barriers to the movement of capital. 
These general factors run along with others that are directly associated with the energy and food sector. Biofuel 
legislation has greatly influenced the development of this industry in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia. The meat 
industry depends directly on health regulations and the existence of health and trade agreements with other countries 
and blocs, which are essential for exporting. Domestic price policies can encourage or discourage FDI. Grower 
development and technological support programmes are essential for making improvements in the early stages 
of production. Investment project banks that help identify new FDI opportunities are also useful in a sector that is 
complex, heterogeneous and geographically dispersed.
To ensure that FDI will generate benefits for the receiving countries, government action (particularly in low-income 
economies) is crucial for attracting and regulating FDI that will bring socioeconomically inclusive and environmentally 
sustainable technological innovation and spillovers. This is relevant above all for the new types of investors who have 
different levels of bargaining power and are venturing into the sector to ensure access to scarce natural resources such 
as water and land. The pitfall is that the lower-income countries are precisely the ones that most lack the technical 
and managerial capacities needed for crafting policies and regulations that would attract quality FDI. 
(b) Innovation and FDI in the agricultural and agro-industry sector
The impact of FDI in the agricultural and agro-industry sector in terms of innovation is another area for consideration. 
Transnational corporations have tended to keep their research and development operations in their home countries (or 
in other developed countries where there are centres of excellence and research), with their foreign affiliates limited 
to planning for innovation adoption (Rama and Martínez, 2012). The case of ethanol in Brazil is an exception: the 
entire technological development effort is entrusted to teams of Brazilian scientists. The recent arrival of transnationals 
in this sector could have a positive impact on the development of second-generation (biomass) ethanol because the 
technology is not available and research is being conducted through partnerships between domestic and foreign firms. 
Often, merely setting up new industrial plants in a given country can have a potential spillover effect. FDI has 
three types of spillovers for domestic enterprise productivity and innovativeness: horizontal, backward and forward 
(the latter two are usually referred to as vertical spillover). 
Horizontal spillover shows up in three ways (Havranek and Irsova, 2012).
i) There is a competition effect when domestic firms respond to FDI flows by improving their procedures and 
end products for the consumer. This entails boosting production. The competition effect can also have negative 








consequences if the entry of foreign investors makes it harder to take advantage of economies of scale or if 
severe restrictions are imposed on the mobility of know-how and skilled labour (see demonstration effect and 
labour market effect). 
ii) There is a demonstration effect when new foreign actors introduce new technology or new applications that 
drive the domestic actors to imitate them and improve their own production processes.
iii) There is a labour market effect when foreign firms need to train workers in the receiving economy and this 
starts a learning process that can, over time, radiate out to the rest of the domestic economy. 
Backward spillover (one of the best documented in the academic literature) depends on the relationship between 
the foreign investor and its local suppliers, which must meet new standards in order to adapt to investor requirements. 
The idea is that domestic suppliers can thereby improve their quality standards, and this spreads out to the benefit of 
other clients and associated activities. There are fewer empirical studies on forward spillover, but the idea is the same as 
for backward spillover: the components of the foreign investor’s supply chain gain in productivity and innovativeness.
Such is the case with the vegetable oil and biodiesel industry, which operates on the basis of benchmarks and 
whose technological innovation leaped forward (horizontal spillover effect) when Glencore set up a 250,000-ton 
capacity plant in Argentina, using European technology and opening a new phase that changed the scale of production. 
The spillover effect became evident when this process was subsequently replicated by the Terminal 6 group and 
others in the sector. The same thing happened with the meat industry in all of the Southern Cone countries, whose 
export-oriented facilities are technologically far superior to slaughter facilities oriented towards the domestic market. 
In addition to technology dissemination at the industry level, export-oriented facilities have a systemic effect because 
they operate under stringent health and safety regulations that impact the production process along the entire chain, 
including the primary link (vertical spillover). The development of meat industry trans-Latins had a demonstration 
effect, because operating in more developed markets (such as the United States and others) has provided these 
companies with new technologies (like spray chilling, also known as Clor-Chil, in the North American market) that 
have subsequently been taken back to Brazil and have even resulted in changes to local standards and regulations. But 
innovation in production does not just come from stiffer market competition and the need to meet higher standards. 
Innovation is also driven by public policies, as is the case of ethanol in Brazil: both research and the implementation 
of new technologies for making biofuels have been fuelled by public resources.
Another form of innovation has to do with biotechnology research, both for producing genetically modified 
organisms and for developing agrochemicals. The impact of these activities all along the supply chain is more 
controversial, particularly because most of the research, development and innovation is being funded by major 
transnationals. According to Pingali (2007), this new structure for agricultural research will increase transaction 
costs for growers in developing countries that wish to use improved seeds or embedded agro-technologies. This is 
primarily due to the widespread use of royalties and the need to apply these products on an ongoing basis because 
weeds and pests become resistant to these agrochemicals. Another related cost concerns preserving the environment 
and human health; this calls for a preventive health and environmental system to assess the risk of prolonged use of 
these products and set limits for chemical residues in the environment (especially in bodies of water) and in food. 
The level of innovation depends on the nature of each factor because production needs vary between, for 
example, processing biodiesel and exporting raw materials (soybean meal). Even so, and despite the constraints, 
research and development and organizational innovation that encompass national producers can be spurred by 
public policies aimed at reducing transaction costs for small and medium-sized enterprises. This can be achieved 
by supporting growers and manufacturers associations, investing in capacity building and in research and extension 
services, improving rural infrastructure and expanding access to information and communication technologies in 
remote or isolated areas, among other measures. 
(c)  Information systems for FDI in agriculture and agro-industry in Latin America and 
the Caribbean
To conclude, information (qualitative and quantitative) is crucial. Reliable data are a must for designing these 
policies and for businesses to make appropriate decisions. This study showed that there is little research on FDI in 
the agricultural and agro-industry sector in Latin America and the Caribbean and that there is a shortage of statistics 
and case studies from which lessons can be drawn. For example, micro-investing in farms is supposed to be growing, 








but there is virtually no information because the official figures do not include such deals. This is due in part to the 
fact that the amounts involved are smaller than in other economic sectors (such as mining, energy and transport). 
Nevertheless, these flows do have a greater direct impact on rural economies in the countries and figure heavily in 
poverty reduction strategies.
Beyond basic official figures on investment flows, there is a need for useful information on investment opportunities, 
how to take advantage of them and the regulatory frameworks (environment, soil and water management, health and 
biosafety, food safety, taxes, labour legislation, among others) to be complied with if FDI is to be an effective force 
for job creation, social inclusion, sustainability, innovation and economic growth. Ongoing e-government initiatives 
in the region provide an appropriate forum for addressing this demand for information.
3. The new role of transnational and national corporations  
 in agriculture and agro-industry 
This study clearly shows how extensively involved transnational corporations are in agriculture in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. FDI accounts for 23% of ethanol output in Brazil; the figures are similar for soybeans in Argentina 
and the seed and fertilizer industry. 
This level of penetration calls for a look at how accountable these companies are to their host countries. Agriculture 
depends on fragile environmental balances, and many supply chains generate negative externalities that must be 
controlled. The most obvious case is soybean mono-cropping in Argentina, but the sugar sector in Brazil and meat 
production throughout the Southern Cone also face formidable environmental challenges that require new responses 
by transnational corporations (and national ones as well). 
The same can be said of the social challenges. It is estimated that there are about 15 million family farms in the 
region. They control approximately 400 million hectares, of which 10 million hectares are defined as subsistence 
farms (IFAD, 2011a, 2011b). This means that FDI in the agro-food and agro-energy sector necessarily has a direct 
connection with rural areas with a high concentration of lower-income households, greater vulnerability in terms of 
food insecurity and less access to education and to information and communication technologies (Rodríguez and 
Meneses, 2011; Rodrigues and Rodríguez, 2013). A clear example is soybeans in Argentina. Now that easy expansion 
in the humid pampas is over, expansion is turning to regional economies where smallholdings predominate. This 
machinery- and herbicide-intensive crop does not create jobs. The dairy industry employs approximately 22 workers 
per 1,000 hectares; grain agriculture employs 10. Soybean agriculture employs two to five workers per 1,000 hectares; 
only forestry creates fewer jobs than soybeans (Zibechi, 2008). 
This leads to rethinking production and calls for companies to work with new environmental sustainability 
standards while building successful relationships all around (a win-win situation) (FAO, 2011) and build new production 
chain linkages with small growers and surrounding communities. Two clear examples of the social impact of FDI 
flows in agriculture were Sirona Fuels in Haiti and Grupo Pellas in Guatemala. These two examples show that social 
inclusion in agricultural investment depends not only on the framework defined by governments, but also on how 
important social responsibility is for the company in question and how committed it is to the rural population. This 
commitment can be encouraged by government policies aimed at rewarding investment strategies that are inclusive 
vis-à-vis rural communities and vulnerable segments of the population.
Agricultural and agro-industry FDI can open substantial development opportunities, not only for the main 
traditional players (transnational corporations) but also for small and medium-sized producers if the investments 
foster integration in production systems, environmental stewardship, government regulation and compliance with 
international standards such as the Santiago Principles: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign 
Wealth Funds19 (advocated by the IMF), FAO guidelines for land governance20 and the investment policies recently 
published in the UNCTAD World Investment Report (2012). These principles promote mergers and acquisitions that 
improve production efficiency and/or bring small and medium-sized producers into the supply chain. They also seek 
19 See [online] http://blog-pfm.imf.org/pfmblog/2008/11/the-santiago-pr.html.
20 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
(see [online] http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs/Docs1112/VG/VG_Final_EN_May_2012.pdf).








spillovers from investments in research, development and innovation in the face of a growing research investment 
gap on the part of public agencies and domestic private producers. With regard to investment in land, voluntary 
guidelines put forth by FAO and signed by 126 countries call for such projects to generate positive impacts for 
local communities by developing infrastructure (irrigation, roads, processing plants), promoting rural employment 
and working with local producers. In this regard, corporate social responsibility initiatives promoted by the Global 
Compact 21 are also relevant. 
In the region’s rural economies there are still very few domestic producers who have contact with foreign 
companies; this is because the vast majority are small growers and many are subsistence operations. It is therefore 
a challenge for governments to attract FDI that will also go to these areas, where there are many producers on 
the sidelines of the sector’s rapid growth. Greater social inclusion in agriculture would also create new economic 
activities in rural economies. By creating vertical and horizontal production linkages, it could help to build virtuous 
circles of economic growth that would contribute to the stability of the region’s agricultural sector and further the 
well-being of the rural population. To this end, companies (transnational and national alike) must realize that they 
are working with the common property of humankind (air, water, land, climate, the genome, local knowledge and 
cultures) that in essence belongs to everyone and must be preserved for future generations. As a number of case 
studies show —for example, the RTRS standard, followed for growing soybeans in Argentina and Brazil, and the 
Agro-environmental Protocol of the State of São Paulo for the sugar cane sector— this process is already under way. 
But it must take root and grow. This means shouldering new commitments in the face of major global challenges and 
joining networks and coalitions of multiple actors (public and private) that can generate new synergies in order to 
successfully address these challenges and help build a new global governance grounded in solidarity, responsibility 
and democracy. 
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